On November 27, 2025, the United States took a decisive—if quiet—step toward transforming its national security frontier. The US Space Force, acting on President Donald Trump’s ambitious vision, awarded a series of under-the-radar contracts to begin developing early prototypes of the so-called “Golden Dome” missile defense system. The move, shrouded in secrecy with each contract valued at less than $9 million to avoid public disclosure, signals that the Golden Dome initiative is shifting from political promise to tangible, if tentative, reality.
The Golden Dome, first unveiled by Trump in May, is no ordinary missile shield. According to Bloomberg, the plan calls for a nationwide defense network, one that would rely on hundreds of satellites in low Earth orbit. These satellites would be tasked with identifying incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and dispatching rapid-response interceptors to destroy them before they could strike American soil. “We have certain areas of missiles and certain missile defense, but there’s no system,” Trump asserted at the time, touting the project as a “cutting-edge” leap in protective capability. He set a bold target: a fully operational Golden Dome by January 2029.
Yet, as the Pentagon’s newly issued contracts mirror both Israel’s Iron Dome and Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative, this iteration is unique in its heavy reliance on weapons stationed in orbit rather than on the ground. The US Space Force, in its statement to Bloomberg, emphasized that the selection process for contractors was “robust and thorough,” and that the companies involved are “protected by enhanced security measures.” The agency is determined to “lead a fast-paced effort… to develop, demonstrate and deliver prototype interceptors.”
But as history and experts remind us, big dreams in missile defense often face bigger hurdles. Defense analysts have been quick to caution that Trump’s timeline is, to put it mildly, ambitious. Thomas G. Roberts, an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has previously warned that “the resources required to deploy space-based interceptors would be better spent on other layers of US missile defense.” The technological and financial challenges of launching and maintaining a network of weaponized satellites are immense, and for decades, such concepts have been considered more theoretical than practical.
Still, the Pentagon is pressing forward. Alongside these initial contracts, Space Force is preparing to issue another request for industry proposals in early December. This next phase will focus on the feasibility of kinetic midcourse defense—a technique that intercepts missiles in the middle of their trajectory using sheer impact energy rather than explosives. While innovative, this approach has its own set of headaches. Chief among them: the difficulty in distinguishing a real missile from surrounding debris, a limitation that could complicate the system’s effectiveness.
As the US accelerates its missile defense ambitions, the international response has been swift and stern—especially from China. On the same day the Space Force contracts became public, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper that pulled no punches. “Certain countries continue to adjust their nuclear policies, stubbornly maintaining massive nuclear arsenals, enhancing nuclear deterrence and combat capabilities, thereby heightening the risk of global nuclear conflict,” the document declared, as reported by UNN and echoed in Bloomberg coverage.
China’s criticism did not end at nuclear policy. The white paper specifically called out the US for its pursuit of “absolute security” through the Golden Dome and accused Washington of undermining the “legitimate security interests” of other countries. “China will resolutely counter any acts that threaten or undermine its core interests,” the document warned, adding that the deployment of weapons in outer space would “severely threaten security in the domain.”
Beijing’s concerns are not new, but the tone has sharpened as the US pushes the envelope. China’s leadership pointed out that the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 “severely undermined strategic mutual trust, increased strategic risks, and damaged global and regional security and stability.” While the US justifies its own missile defense initiatives as necessary to counter evolving threats—including those from Russia and China—Beijing maintains that its own missile development is strictly for self-defense and not aimed at any particular country.
Adding fuel to the fire, President Trump recently pledged that the US would not concede to adversaries in nuclear weapons testing. This came in response to Russia’s announcement of tests of a nuclear-powered underwater drone and a cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Trump promised that the US would conduct such tests “quite soon,” though it remains unclear whether he was referring to detonating nuclear warheads—a move that would reverse decades of US policy and violate a de facto global ban—or simply expanding tests of delivery systems like ICBMs.
China, for its part, has not tested a nuclear bomb since 1996 but continues to develop and test missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, including an ICBM as recently as 2024 and hypersonic warheads designed to evade interception. Despite its rapid modernization, Beijing insists it will “never participate in a nuclear arms race” and maintains an “extremely restrained” approach to nuclear weapons development.
Yet, China’s white paper also justified its own missile defense capabilities, citing a “complex and volatile security environment” and the need for “modern military equipment and capabilities” to safeguard its sovereignty. The document protested the US deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region, likely referring to the Typhon system in the Philippines and Japan—both key allies in Washington’s strategy to deter Chinese aggression.
Meanwhile, behind closed doors, Washington and Seoul are reportedly discussing the joint construction of nuclear submarines, a move aimed at countering China’s rapidly expanding naval fleet. Admiral Daryl Caudle, commander of US naval operations, told Bloomberg that these submarines could play a critical role in maintaining the balance of power in the Pacific.
As the US presses on with the Golden Dome, the world is watching—some with hope, others with trepidation. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, speaking in May, summed up the stakes: “Within the last four decades, our adversaries have developed more advanced and lethal long-range weapons than ever before, including ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles capable of striking the homeland with either conventional or nuclear warheads.”
With the Golden Dome’s fate hanging in the balance, the coming months will test not just America’s technological prowess, but also the fragile web of international trust and deterrence that has defined the nuclear age. Whether the US can realize its “cutting-edge” vision—or whether the effort will spark an arms race and deepen global divisions—remains to be seen. One thing is clear: the race for missile defense supremacy is entering a new, unpredictable phase.
