In the aftermath of the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament, the world teetered on the edge of a crisis that could have changed the face of South Asia forever. For former CIA officer John Kiriakou, the events that followed were not just a distant geopolitical concern—they were an urgent, lived reality. "Family members had been evacuated from Islamabad. We believed India and Pakistan would go to war," Kiriakou recalled in a recent interview with ANI, as reported by multiple sources including Mathrubhumi, The Economic Times, Business Today, and India Today.
The attack on Parliament set off Operation Parakram, a massive military mobilization by India along the border with Pakistan in early 2002. The United States, deeply engaged in its own war on terror after 9/11, suddenly found itself scrambling to prevent a catastrophic conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbors. "The deputy secretary of state came in and shuttled between Delhi and Islamabad and negotiated a settlement where both sides backed off. But we were so busy and focused on Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, we never gave two thoughts to India," Kiriakou admitted, highlighting the US’s preoccupation with its own security priorities at the time.
Kiriakou, who spent 15 years with the CIA—first as an analyst, then as chief of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan—remembers the tension vividly. The US took the threat seriously enough to evacuate American families from Islamabad, a move that underscored just how close the world came to witnessing a devastating war. In his words, "We believed India and Pakistan would go to war."
But war was averted, thanks in part to high-level diplomacy and, crucially, New Delhi’s restraint. The CIA came to describe India’s approach as "strategic patience." According to Kiriakou, "India showed restraint after the Parliament attacks and the Mumbai attacks. At the CIA, we called the Indian policy strategic patience. But India has gotten to the point where they can't risk strategic patience being misunderstood as weakness." This sentiment was echoed in American intelligence circles, where officials saw India’s restraint as a "very mature foreign policy decision" that likely prevented escalation into a nuclear confrontation. "That restraint probably kept the world from a nuclear exchange," Kiriakou reflected.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks, which left more than 170 people dead, presented another stern test. Kiriakou was unequivocal in his assessment of the perpetrators: "I don't think this is Al-Qaeda. I think this is the Pakistani-supported Kashmiri groups. That turned out to be exactly the case. The bigger story was that Pakistan was committing terrorism in India and nobody did anything about it." He described a pivotal 2002 raid in Lahore, where "we captured three Lashkar-e-Tayyiba fighters who had with them a copy of the Al Qaeda training manual. It was the very first time that we could attach the Pakistani government to Al-Qaeda." Yet, despite such evidence, the US refrained from taking direct action against Pakistan. "That was a decision made at the White House. The relationship was bigger than India and Pakistan. We needed the Pakistanis more than they needed us," Kiriakou explained, shedding light on the complex and sometimes contradictory calculus of American foreign policy.
Over the years, India’s patience has been tested repeatedly. But recent events suggest a shift. In May 2025, following a terror attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 people, India launched Operation Sindoor, a four-day high-intensity conflict in Pulgam. This, along with earlier decisive responses such as the 2016 surgical strikes across the Line of Control and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, signals a new chapter. "India has shown again and again it won’t tolerate nuclear blackmail or cross-border terror," Kiriakou said. "India’s gotten to the point where it can’t risk strategic patience being misunderstood as weakness—and so they had to respond."
Pakistan, for its part, faces a daunting imbalance. Kiriakou’s warning is blunt: "Nothing, literally nothing good will come of an actual war between India and Pakistan because the Pakistanis will lose. It's as simple as that. They'll lose. And I'm not talking about nuclear weapons—I'm talking just about a conventional war. And so there is no benefit to constantly provoking Indians." He urged Islamabad to abandon its confrontational mindset, arguing that "there’s no benefit in constantly provoking Indians. They’ll lose—it’s as simple as that."
Kiriakou’s insights also extend to the inner workings of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. He described the ISI as "two parallel ISIs—one trained by Sandhurst and the FBI, and another made up of people with long beards who created groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed." This duality, he suggested, has contributed to Pakistan’s ongoing instability and its complicated relationship with terrorism.
The story doesn’t end at South Asia’s borders. Kiriakou highlighted the shifting sands of global power, pointing to the intricate ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. "Almost the entire Saudi military is Pakistanis. It's the Pakistanis that protect Saudi Arabia on the ground," he said. He also recounted the US’s dealings with Pakistan’s nuclear program and the AQ Khan episode, noting, "If we had taken the Israeli approach, we would have just killed him. He was easy enough to find. But he had the support of the Saudi government. The Saudis came to us and said, please leave him alone." For Kiriakou, these episodes reveal the tangled web of alliances and interests shaping the region.
As for the broader geopolitical landscape, Kiriakou observed, "We're sitting on an ocean of oil. We don't need the Saudis anymore. They're hedging their bets, improving relations with China and India. We're witnessing a transformation in how the world operates." This transformation, he argued, is mirrored in South Asia, where India’s growing assertiveness and Pakistan’s internal divisions are reshaping old equations.
John Kiriakou’s career has been anything but ordinary. Beyond his years in the CIA, he became known as a whistleblower after exposing the agency’s use of torture in 2007—a revelation that landed him in prison for nearly two years. Yet, he remains steadfast in his convictions, offering a rare, unvarnished perspective on the shadowy world of espionage, counterterrorism, and international diplomacy.
Looking back, Kiriakou’s account is both a warning and a testament to the power of restraint. India’s "strategic patience" may have averted catastrophe in the past, but as the ground shifts, the world will be watching closely to see what comes next for South Asia—and whether the lessons of the past have truly been learned.
