Today : Feb 22, 2025
Politics
22 February 2025

US Sanctions Risk Undermining India’s Strategic Position

Modi's government faces challenges as Chabahar's importance grows amid shifting US foreign policy.

The recent diplomatic talks between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump have sparked fresh concerns over the geostrategic balance of power in Asia. Although their meeting at the White House on February 13, 2025, highlighted rebounding ties with commitments to bolster bilateral trade, the situation surrounding Iran’s Chabahar Port looms large over these discussions. The port, which plays a pivotal role not only for India’s trade ambitions but also for regional stability, is caught up amid shifting US sanctions policies—and this could reshape diplomatic relations across Asia.

Chabahar, situated on Iran's southeastern coast, serves as the centerpiece of India’s outreach to Central Asia, providing much-needed access to markets and routes traditionally dominated by Pakistan. This strategic asset allows India to expand its influence and aims to establish connectivity to Afghanistan and beyond. According to analysts, India’s significant investment—projected at around $370 million—demonstrates its commitment to counterbalance rival China and uphold regional economic interests.

On February 6, 2025, just days before the Modi-Trump meeting, Trump signed an executive order directing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to alter or rescind sanctions waivers related to Chabahar. This action continues the previous administration’s strategy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, targeting its regional activities. Experts fear, though, the consequences may extend beyond Iran, negatively impacting India’s investments and positioning. Haris Gul, pursuing international relations at the University of AJK, asserts, "The immediate consequence of undermining India’s strategic interests will be a weaker Quad and strained US-India relations." It’s becoming apparent these sanctions could backfire, against the very US interests they are intended to protect.

Historically, India has been cautious about its foreign policy, embracing non-alignment over direct dependencies. Modi's government views Chabahar as central not only for economic engagement but also for fostering relationships with countries like Afghanistan and the broader Central Asian states. Despite India’s vast investments and operational successes—having handled around 90,000 TEUs of container traffic and over 8.4 million tonnes of bulk cargo since 2018—this newfound uncertainty is remarkably disconcerting. The port enhances New Delhi's capacity to counterbalance China’s domination, especially relevant with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) providing Islamabad with vast infrastructural support at Gwadar.

Gwadar, which has seen significant Chinese funding, offers Pakistan the ability to leverage its geopolitical position, posing direct challenges to India’s strategic objectives. With extensive Chinese economic presence and military ambitions, Beijing’s presence at Gwadar could intensify as Indian investments falter. While the Quad—a strategic partnership involving Australia, Japan, India, and the US—was initially intended to build consensus against Chinese assertiveness, any discord arising from US policies, particularly sanction adjustments, could jeopardize its effectiveness. The concept of the Quad was to collectively counterbalance China’s influence; removing India’s support and viability with Chabahar could unravel the very foundation of this partnership.

There’s more at stake than mere relations between New Delhi and Washington; the overarching influence of China is real and growing. With Trump's recent sanctions initiatives, India's response remains somewhat muted. Analysts suggest it could be attributed to attempts at behind-the-scenes negotiations concerning the waivers. Should these diplomacy efforts fail, India might push back against what it perceives as unwarranted US interference. The need for distinctiveness—a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy—will become increasingly relevant, as Modi's administration weighs continuing investments against possible sanctions. The prospect of re-evaluated strategy is looming.

While the U.S. administration argues for sanctions as necessary to check Iranian assertions and regional influences, it risks destroying the very partnerships it seeks to solidify against China. Gul highlights this vulnerable predicament, stating, "Trump's move to punish Iran has also hurt a key partner in India, risking the future cohesion among allies his administration will need to effectively check and balance China across the wider Indo-Pacific and beyond." This pivot away from supporting India’s stature may grant leverage to Chinese interests operating through Pakistan, potentially reshaping all geo-strategic relationships.

The ramifications of these foreign policy decisions won’t just impact India’s status at Chabahar; it may well shift the balance of power throughout Central and South Asia. If India reduces its commitments or reassesses involvement at Chabahar, this could also catalyze expansion by China and Pakistan, undercutting India’s historical influence.

With such high stakes, the reshuffling of geopolitical dynamics is inevitable. Should the US continue its current path, India’s long-standing role as the counterweight to Chinese interests may diminish, scattering the commitment toward Indo-Pacific cooperation. The ultimate outcome of Trump's sanctions ambitions is one of every conceivable danger to regional stability and balance, challenging India’s investments and influence just as China looks to strengthen its own foothold.