In a striking display of evolving military strategy, the U.S. Air Force and Navy are recalibrating their focus in the face of mounting threats from near-peer adversaries, particularly China and Russia. Recent events in the Norwegian Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific have highlighted both technological innovation and a growing debate within the U.S. military about where its priorities should lie.
On September 3, 2025, the U.S. Air Force made headlines by successfully sinking a maritime target in the Norwegian Sea using the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, assigned to the 393rd Bomber Generation Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. This wasn’t just any bombing run. According to an Air Force news release cited by USNI News, the mission marked the latest demonstration of the QUICKSINK maritime weapon—a precision-guided bomb designed to neutralize naval threats quickly and efficiently across vast ocean expanses. Four Royal Norwegian Air Force F-35A Lightning II and P-8A Poseidon aircraft played a key supporting role, providing access to critical infrastructure and airspace to ensure the test was conducted in a strategically relevant and operationally challenging environment.
QUICKSINK itself represents a leap forward in anti-ship warfare. Derived from the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) series, it’s engineered to address a pressing concern: what happens if the U.S. faces a shortage of precision-guided munitions during a large-scale conflict against adversaries like China or Russia? The Air Force has tailored QUICKSINK’s specialized anti-ship seeker to adapt previously underutilized Mark 80 series bombs for maritime strike missions—an efficient answer to the ever-present question of munitions stockpile management.
This wasn’t QUICKSINK’s first time in action. The weapon was first publicly demonstrated in 2022 from an F-15E Strike Eagle. Since then, its capabilities have been showcased in sinking drills at the 2024 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, targeting decommissioned amphibious ships such as the former USS Dubuque and USS Tarawa. Notably, these demonstrations also involved the B-2 Spirit, underlining the bomber’s versatility and the Air Force’s intent to integrate anti-ship weaponry onto its aircraft, adapting to the shifting tides of global naval power.
Yet, the B-2’s role doesn’t end with conventional missions. In June 2025, Missouri-based B-2 Spirits dropped fourteen 30,000-pound GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators against Iranian nuclear sites during Operation Midnight Hammer—a mission that underscored the bomber’s ability to deliver heavy payloads over long distances, reinforcing its status as a key element of U.S. nuclear deterrence and conventional strike capability.
Photos from the September 3 test showed both 2,000-pound GBU-31 and 500-pound GBU-38 bombs being prepped for the demonstration, hinting at the flexibility and scalability of the QUICKSINK system. According to the Air Force, progress on both large and small variants of the weapon advanced as a result of these North Atlantic tests. All of this comes at a time when the U.S. military is grappling with the implications of Beijing’s naval buildup in the Indo-Pacific—a development that could stretch Washington’s missile and munitions reserves in the event of a prolonged conflict.
But while the Air Force and Navy are racing to innovate, a parallel debate is raging within the ranks about where America’s naval assets are most needed. This debate is far from academic—it’s playing out in the operational decisions that define the Navy’s global posture.
A firsthand account from a U.S. Naval Academy midshipman, published in Proceedings, brings this tension into sharp relief. During Plebe Summer 2022, the incoming class was subjected to a simulated crisis: a speech modeled after President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s address following Pearl Harbor, but with China as the aggressor. The exercise was designed to test how midshipmen would react to the sudden news of an attack by a near-peer rival. The experience, the midshipman recalls, was “incredibly real,” and it left an indelible mark as he prepared to join a fleet increasingly shadowed by the prospect of conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
China has made no secret of its ambition to be ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027—a timeline that coincides with the author’s own commissioning into the Navy. Yet, as the midshipman observed, the Navy’s operational deployments remain heavily weighted toward the Middle East and U.S. Central Command (CentCom), even as the strategic rhetoric emphasizes the growing Chinese threat.
Operations Prosperity Guardian and Rough Rider, for example, were launched to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and ensure freedom of navigation. These missions saw carrier strike groups (CSGs) extend their deployments, with the loss of two F/A-18s. However, the Houthis’ attempted closure of the Red Sea had limited impact on the global economy, as shipping companies rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk the Red Sea—an adjustment that proved less costly than paying higher insurance premiums.
Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 further illustrated the changing nature of U.S. military power projection. Air and missile strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities were carried out largely without the support of locally deployed U.S. forces; Navy ships stationed in Bahrain put to sea before the operation to avoid becoming targets of Iranian retaliation. The U.S. demonstrated its ability to strike in the region without relying on forward-deployed CSGs—assets that many argue are badly needed in the Indo-Pacific.
Since the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, CSGs have logged hundreds of days in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, with five different carriers cycling through the region. At one point in 2024, the Navy had no forward-deployed carrier in the Indo-Pacific for the first time in decades—a development that alarmed strategists focused on China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea and beyond.
The strain on the fleet is palpable. Delays in the delivery of the PCU John F. Kennedy and the pending retirement of the USS Nimitz mean the Navy will operate with just ten carriers for about a year. Prolonged CSG deployments to the Middle East have stretched shipyards and degraded combat readiness, running counter to the strategic imperative to deter China.
Lieutenant Commander Stephen Walsh, a vocal critic of the current deployment strategy, summed it up in 2022: “The Department of Defense has allocated aircraft carriers to U.S. Central Command for Iranian deterrence at the expense of strategic competition with China and Russia repeatedly over the past decade.” He warned that this cycle deprives Indo-Pacific Command and European Command of the carriers they need for strategic competition, and that incoherent messaging and misaligned priorities are undermining readiness.
For the next generation of Navy leaders, the challenge is clear: reality must begin to match the rhetoric. As the midshipman put it, “A modern war against China would be the Navy’s greatest test in 80 years.” The imperative is to prioritize preparedness for that scenario, deploying carriers to the Middle East only when absolutely necessary. Operation Midnight Hammer proved that many missions in the region can be accomplished without these critical assets.
The future of U.S. naval power will depend on striking the right balance—maintaining forward presence where needed, but always within a strategic framework that puts long-term readiness first. The stakes, as recent events have shown, could not be higher.
