In a swirl of high-stakes negotiations, shifting alliances, and mounting economic pressure, the United States has dramatically expanded its influence over both domestic and international investment landscapes. The Trump administration’s recent moves—ranging from aggressive trade deals with Asian allies to the government’s unprecedented equity stake in major American companies—have sent ripples across global markets, leaving corporate leaders, foreign governments, and policy experts both wary and bewildered.
At the heart of these developments is Howard Lutnick, President Donald Trump’s commerce secretary and a former Wall Street bond broker. Lutnick, known for his sharp dealmaking instincts, has become a central architect in a strategy that stretches the traditional boundaries of U.S. economic policy. According to The New York Times, Lutnick’s approach has involved leveraging tariffs, halting government grants, and even threatening to withhold export licenses to secure greater investment and concessions from both U.S. corporations and foreign governments.
The most visible manifestation of this new strategy emerged in late August 2025, when Lutnick and Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan prepared to sign an agreement that would make the U.S. government the largest shareholder of the iconic tech giant. The deal was catalyzed by President Trump’s public demand for Tan’s resignation over his ties to Chinese companies—a comment that sent Intel’s leadership scrambling to appease the administration. “America should have shares,” Lutnick told Tan, as reported in a video posted on social media. “Because it’s just fair. And we agreed together, and then you went to your board of directors, and they agreed. This is exactly what Donald Trump is all about.”
This agreement is not an isolated case. In recent months, the administration has also moved to take stakes in U.S. Steel and rare earths producer MP Materials, with officials suggesting that other industries could soon follow. The government’s new relationship with Intel, in particular, has unsettled many in the business community. The Biden-era CHIPS Act, which initially set aside tens of billions of dollars in grants for semiconductor manufacturing, had envisioned a gradual release of funds as companies met specific milestones. Lutnick, however, has paused many of these payments, instead offering upfront grant money in exchange for equity—effectively making the government a major player in the boardrooms of America’s most critical industries.
The approach has sparked controversy across the political spectrum. Some progressives, including Senator Bernie Sanders, have praised the move as a bold step toward ensuring national economic security. Yet many Republicans and Democrats alike have decried it as a dangerous overreach. Senator Rand Paul, for instance, called the government’s stake in Intel “a step toward socialism.”
But the administration’s ambitions extend well beyond U.S. borders. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ongoing trade standoff with South Korea. As reported by Korea JoongAng Daily, talks over tariffs between Korea and the United States have stalled, with the dispute centering on Seoul’s $350 billion investment pledge. Korea has sought to count policy bank loans and guarantees toward this commitment, hoping to reduce the burden of direct investment. The U.S., however, is pressing for a larger share of cash contributions—mirroring the terms it extracted from Japan.
The U.S.–Japan deal, announced by President Trump as “the largest trade deal in history,” requires Japan to invest $550 billion during Trump’s term, with Washington determining where the funds are allocated. Once a project is approved, Tokyo has just 45 days to wire the money, and profits are shared evenly until the principal is recovered. After that, the United States claims a staggering 90 percent of profits. Should Japan refuse, tariffs rise yet again. Critics at home have likened the agreement to handing Washington a blank check, and many question whether such hefty sums will ultimately materialize.
For Korea, the stakes are even higher. Its $350 billion pledge amounts to 72 percent of its national budget for 2025, and 17.5 percent of its GDP—significantly higher than Japan’s 13.1 percent ratio. Unlike Japan, which enjoys more than triple Korea’s foreign reserves and the privileges of a reserve currency, Seoul faces serious liquidity concerns. If forced to adopt the Japanese model, Korea would be committing 84 percent of its foreign reserves—$416.3 billion—to U.S. projects, a move that could undermine its financial foundation.
The urgency is palpable. Starting September 16, 2025, U.S. tariffs on Japanese cars will fall to 15 percent, leaving Korean exporters at a disadvantage. Yet, as the Korea JoongAng Daily notes, signing a deal in haste could be reckless. President Lee Jae Myung, at his 100-day press conference on September 14, 2025, reaffirmed his commitment to reason and fairness, stating he would not accept terms that undermine Korea’s interests. Japan’s inclusion of a safeguard clause—ensuring that investments cannot contradict domestic laws—offers a potential model for Korea as it navigates these treacherous waters.
Behind the scenes, Lutnick’s Commerce Department has quietly launched the Investment Accelerator, an initiative created in March 2025 through executive order. Ostensibly a concierge service for companies making high-dollar investments in the United States, the Accelerator has quickly assumed control of vast sums from the CHIPS Act and is now positioned to collect foreign capital and negotiate equity stakes to fulfill the administration’s goals. Lutnick has described it as a “national and economic security fund,” financed by the hundreds of billions pledged by Japan and South Korea. The fund’s resources can be directed toward building America’s industrial capacity—or, as some speculate, even paying down the national debt.
Yet, this rapid expansion of government power has raised alarms among business leaders, government officials, and legal experts. Many question whether the Commerce Department even has the authority to invest directly in private-sector firms, and whether these interventions will distort the market by picking winners and losers. Some department employees, including Lutnick appointees, are reportedly afraid to push back, fearing dismissal. Corporate executives, too, are wary of lobbying the administration, worried they’ll be pressured for concessions in return. Privately, some have likened the tactics to those of the Mafia.
Perhaps the most contentious proposal under consideration is the idea of the government taking a cut of artificial-intelligence chip sales to China. This would put the Commerce Department in the uncomfortable position of both regulating and profiting from sensitive technology exports—a move many officials and outside lawyers argue is not legally permitted. Nevertheless, the administration insists that national security remains its top priority, and it will not compromise on those concerns.
As the dust settles on these seismic shifts in U.S. economic policy, one thing is clear: the rules of the game have changed. With the government now wielding unprecedented power over both domestic industry and international investment, the coming months will test the resilience of global markets—and the resolve of America’s allies and adversaries alike.
