Following the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Syria has unveiled its deep-rooted association with the illicit drug trade, particularly the highly addictive amphetamine, Captagon. This transformation marks Syria as the world's leading producer of Captagon, yielding annual revenues estimated at $10 billion. Reports indicate industrial-scale facilities linked to Captagon manufacturing have been discovered across the country, changing the drug’s production narrative significantly.
Among the prominent sites of production were the Mazzeh air base in Damascus, a car trading company located in Latakia, and even the remnants of what was once a potato chip factory on the outskirts of Damascus. When the factory—previously known as "Captain Korn"—was seized by government forces back in 2018, it revealed much about how the Assad regime capitalized on the drug trade during the country's economic crisis and civil turmoil. According to Firas al-Toot, the factory's original owner, upon his return he found the facility ablaze. "They came at night and lit the drugs on fire, but they couldn't burn everything," he remarked, illustrating the desperation of the regime’s efforts to cover up its illicit practices.
Assad’s government, alongside militias and warlords, transformed Captagon production from what was once considered mere petty crime to a flourishing billion-dollar industry. The chaos of nearly 14 years of civil war created fertile conditions for this development, allowing criminal organizations to thrive unperturbed. Activist Abu Zihab, affiliated with the ruling group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), emphasized the severe repercussions of this drug trade, stating, "From here, Captagon pills emerged to kill our people." Such sentiments speak to the war's destruction and the socio-economic repercussions felt across Syria.
Originated as a prescription medication in Germany during the 1960s for narcolepsy, Captagon was later banned due to its addictive nature and various health risks. Its rapid popularity escalated within the Middle East, especially among fighters and the elite, due to its stimulant effects, enhancing focus and endurance. Exploiting this demand, the Assad regime began mass-producing the drug during the prevailing economic hardship, setting the stage for the rise of industrialized production routes around 2018–2019.
Notably, connections between the Assad regime and the Captagon trade became more apparent following reports indicating oversight by the Syrian Arab Army's 4th Mechanized Division, controlled by Assad's brother, Maher. The establishment of smuggling routes through porous borders with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq has allowed for the extensive distribution of Captagon across the region and beyond. Rich Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have emerged as primary markets, with Lebanese authorities struggling against the influx of drugs arriving from Syria.
These conditions facilitated widespread initiatives by neighboring countries to curb Captagon trafficking. Saudi Arabia has enforced stringent penalties against smuggling activities, enhancing surveillance initiatives along the borders. This backdrop of rising tensions due to the drug trade correlates with the geopolitical dynamics of Syria, where Captagon has also served as leverage for Assad to negotiate his government’s reintegration with regional powers following his diplomatic isolation.
On May 2023, Syria was readmitted to the Arab League, marking significant political momentum for the region after previous sanctions following Assad's brutal responses to protests. The promise to tackle the Captagon issue has emerged as pivotal for rebuilding trust among neighboring countries. Nevertheless, criticism remains around the effectiveness of these efforts, with skepticism about the potency of promises made by the regime and its affiliates.
Despite significant gains against drug production and smuggling, analysts caution against underestimations of the Captagon trade’s resilience. Caroline Rose, director of the New Lines Institute Captagon Trade Project, notes, “While we are likely to see temporary supply reductions due to the arrest of high-profile traffickers, criminal networks are oftentimes adaptive, and may pivot to alternative forms of production.” Analysts fear this boom might witness the emergence of new actors within the drug trade, thereby continuing the cycles of addiction and exploitation among the Syrian populace.
While HTS seeks to distance itself from Captagon tied to the regime, evidence suggests opposition actors were also deeply embedded within the drug trade. Rebel groups alongside local militias have historically engaged in smuggling operations, employing drugs to fund their activities. HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa proclaimed, “Today, Syria is being cleansed,” marking their intention to pursue the remnants of the Captagon production network. Yet, how effectively the new authorities will combat this deeply entrenched illicit economy remains uncertain.
To make substantial progress, experts believe transitional authorities must implement economic development strategies to draw Syrians away from illicit trades. Failure to do so risks perpetuating cycles of poverty and criminal behavior, as many strive to meet basic needs amid the wreckage of war-torn Syria. The rising demand for alternatives, such as crystal meth, among prior Captagon users showcases the persistent dangers confronting their efforts.
Looking forward, the fate of Captagon’s future hangs precariously amid changing political tides. Can new leadership genuinely dismantle what has evolved as Syria's dominant economic engine? Can they veer the country toward legitimate avenues of progress, or will old habits hinder the evolution of governance where vice has long flourished?
