The Baltic Sea has recently been at the center of alarm as several incidents involving the sabotage of underwater infrastructure have drawn international scrutiny. With global communications heavily reliant on these undersea cables and pipelines, the threat is not just local; it echoes through Europe and beyond, eliciting questions about the security of such networks amid increasing geopolitical tensions.
Starting with the latest incidents, on November 17 and 18, 2023, two undersea fiber-optic communications cables located approximately 100 nautical miles apart were severed. The disruption raised suspicions of deliberate sabotage, especially as one of the cables was part of the 218-km (135-mile) internet link between Lithuania and Sweden's Gotland Island. It went offline around 08:00 GMT on November 17. The second cable, extending 1,200 km (745 miles) and linking Helsinki to the German port of Rostock, ceased functioning early on November 18. Investigators have focused their attention on the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3, which had recently departed from the Russian port of Ust-Luga just days before the incidents.
Notably, this wasn’t the first incident of its kind. A year earlier, the Balticconnector, which connects Finland and Estonia, suffered similar treatment. Finnish authorities attributed this damage to the Chinese vessel NewNew Polar Bear, which reportedly dragged its anchor, leading to the cut. There are also accusations of this ship having caused damage to telecommunications cables around the same time. Although China has expressed willingness to assist with the investigations, the effectiveness of their cooperation remains questionable.
The history of the Baltic Sea’s infrastructural damage goes beyond these recent events. The Nord Stream pipelines, which are controlled by Russia's state-owned Gazprom, were deliberately attacked on September 26, 2022. Swedish authorities detected underwater explosions off the Danish island of Bornholm, which ruptured three out of four Nord Stream lines, leading to extensive natural gas leaks. Despite investigations confirming the presence of explosives, both Denmark and Sweden have closed their probes without identifying the perpetrators.
These patterns of sabotage have prompted European authorities to reconsider their security strategies. Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz called for more NATO involvement to improve surveillance over the Baltic Sea, emphasizing the urgent need for collective defense measures against potential aggressors like Russia. During recent conversations, the Minister expressed his hope for contributions from countries beyond the Baltic region, stating, "Those who are far from the conflict with Ukraine should contribute to security." This reflects the broader concern among European leaders about the possibility of Russia extending its activities to target other EU nations.
Further evidence of these fears includes warnings from NATO officials, highlighting Russia’s mapping of underwater cables. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, suggested the country could attack undersea communication lines if they perceived Western complicity in sabotage actions like those against Nord Stream.
Meanwhile, GPS systems are also under siege. Russia has been reported to interfere with these navigation systems, alarming security experts and posing significant risks to civil aviation. Examples of this disruption included halted flights from Helsinki to Tartu, Estonia, earlier this year. Melanie Garson, an international security expert from University College London, remarked this interference forms part of Russia's low-level conflict strategy, aimed at sowing confusion and uncertainty within Western nations.
Many specialists are now sounding the alarm on the fragility of the infrastructure, noting how dependent modern society has become on these undersea cables and GPS networks. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) warns these fiber-optic cables, responsible for transmitting vast amounts of international data, are potential military targets and are vulnerable to hostile actions.
Efforts to bolster security have been initiated, but experts agree these measures may not be sufficient. NATO has started working on protective systems to monitor and alert for potential sabotage attempts, yet experts like Garson stress the need for comprehensive contingency plans. She argues for improved resilience, advocating the adoption of alternatives to the current infrastructure, noting how the lack of safeguards around satellite communications makes them ripe for interference.
Strikingly, as reliance on undersea cables surges, the international response framework concerning sabotage incidents appears fragmented. Current legal liabilities are complex, especially when incidents occur beyond national jurisdictions. There lacks any unified system for holding perpetrators accountable when such cables are damaged, which means they can act with impunity.
Given the mounting risks, experts caution the need for nations reliant on these data arteries to rethink their strategies and potentially reduce their dependency on these vulnerable infrastructures. Richard Dover, from Hull University, articulated the concern, remarking, “The growth of electronic communication has made undersea cables indispensable yet also extraordinarily vulnerable.” Policymakers are increasingly compelled to factor in the potential political consequences of larger international transit links failing by ensuring their viability against hostile actions.
With growing tensions, the urgent question remains: How can countries contend with these threats and safeguard their communications networks? The global community is witnessing the creeping shadow of conflict over infrastructure, as nations are prompted to overhaul their defenses to adapt to the new realities of warfare—a war not just at the borders, but under the waves.
