A group of Russian navy ships has arrived at Thilawa port, Yangon, to join Myanmar's military junta for joint maritime exercises. State media announced the arrival of the vessels, comprising four corvettes and a logistics ship, from Russia's Pacific Fleet on October 20, 2024. They are scheduled to engage in the second Myanmar-Russia joint maritime security exercise, reported by the Global New Light of Myanmar.
During these exercises, the Russian ships are expected to take part primarily in what officials call the "harbour phase." This phase typically involves preparations and preliminary drills conducted away from the main exercises. The details of these harbour drills remain somewhat vague, as official statements have not clarified the specific activities planned.
Parallel to the arrival of Russian ships, the junta also declared live-fire maritime exercises to take place from October 20 to 24 over the Andaman Sea. The military has explicitly warned fishing vessels and aircraft to steer clear of the designated area. Still, there's no confirmation from authorities whether these exercises involve the Russian navy directly.
This coming joint drill marks another significant moment for the Myanmar military, which is increasingly reliant on external military support as it faces severe internal strife. The military junta has been involved in continuous conflict since the coup d'état in February 2021, and analysts suggest their armed forces remain under intense pressure from various opposition groups.
Previously, the Myanmar and Russian navies had successfully conducted joint exercises as recently as November last year, also in the Andaman Sea. This collaboration is seen by many as part of a broader alliance—Moscow continues to support Myanmar's military leadership, providing arms, training, and military hardware. Alongside China, Russia's support has been pivotal for the Myanmar military as it seeks to stabilize its grip on power.
Indeed, as ground troops grapple with resistance movements—the country is now facing considerable unrest from various factions—the junta has augmented its air force capabilities. This includes assets like Russian Sukhoi Su-30s, MiG-29s, and Yak fighter jets. These aerial forces are becoming increasingly central to the Myanmar military's operations.
Min Aung Hlaing, the Junta chief, has visited Russia multiple times since taking control, meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss military cooperation and strategy, including plans for future elections proposed by the junta.
Shortly after the 2021 takeover, Min Aung Hlaing promised to hold elections, which Russia has publicly supported. Yet, critics, including the United States, remain adamant these elections are merely performative as they label any electoral process orchestrated under the junta as illegitimate. Opposition movements are expected to disrupt such elections, raising fears of escalated violence.
China, too, has shown notable involvement, insisting it backs the military's electoral plans. Remarkably, Min Aung Hlaing is slated to visit China next month, signifying the importance of both regional powers' support for the junta.
This collaboration between military forces is more than just about exercises; it forms part of the geopolitical dynamics within the region. Myanmar's military is increasingly caught between the interests of neighboring powers and its internal conflicts. The arrangements and alliances forged during these exercises may very well influence the stability and security across Southeast Asia, especially as military partnerships evolve amid growing tensions globally.
The arrival of these Russian forces at this time underlines the complex relationships between Myanmar's governing military and its allies, with significant impacts on how these exercises could shift the balance—not just locally, but also regionally. It’s a tough balancing act for the junta as they navigate these waters with multiple agendas at stake.
