Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s appearance at the 80th United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 23, 2025, was anything but routine. His 41-minute speech, delivered with characteristic candor and urgency, sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles and ignited a fresh round of tensions between Colombia and the United States, according to multiple sources including the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Within just five minutes of Petro’s address, cameras caught the U.S. delegation rising from their seats and leaving the chamber in protest—a dramatic gesture that set the tone for what would follow.
Petro’s remarks were a forceful rebuke of U.S. policy, particularly the recent decision by President Donald Trump to decertify Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. As reported by CRS, this marked the first time in nearly three decades that Colombia was found to have “failed demonstrably” in meeting international drug control obligations. Despite this, Trump issued a waiver allowing U.S. assistance to continue for fiscal year 2026, calling it “vital to U.S. national interests.” Yet the diplomatic fallout was immediate and intense.
In his speech, Petro did not hold back. He denounced what he called the “excessive drug consumption” in the United States and lambasted Washington’s decision to decertify his government’s fight against drug trafficking. “This government seized more cocaine than any other in history, and even so, they decertify me,” Petro declared, highlighting what he viewed as a double standard. He went further, accusing the U.S. of hypocrisy, pointing out that former Colombian president Iván Duque “had a drug trafficker as a campaign financier and was not decertified.”
The Colombian leader’s criticism extended beyond drug policy. He accused the U.S. of using migration as “an excuse for a rich, white, and racist society to feel racially superior,” and claimed that such attitudes were pushing humanity “to the brink of extinction.” Petro also alleged that Trump’s foreign policy toward Colombia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean was “advised by Colombians allied with the cocaine mafia.” He recalled his own history as a senator exposing politicians linked to paramilitaries and drug trafficking, stating, “They tried to kill me many times for that, and now they want me to stay silent as president.”
Petro’s allegations didn’t stop there. He accused the U.S. military of operations in international waters that resulted in the deaths of Caribbean youth, possibly Colombian, whose boats were sunk by American missiles. “They were not from Tren de Aragua, nor from Hamas, they were Caribbean,” he said, insisting that those responsible—including Trump—should face criminal prosecution. The speech culminated with a condemnation of Israel’s actions in Gaza, which Petro described as genocide, and he accused Trump of complicity. “This chamber is a silent and complicit witness to genocide,” Petro declared, drawing applause from some quarters at the end of his remarks.
According to CRS, the U.S. decertification of Colombia was a significant escalation in a relationship already strained by policy differences. Since Petro took office, the U.S. Congress has reduced assistance to Colombia and imposed additional conditions, largely because of Petro’s opposition to forced coca eradication and his government’s peace negotiations with armed groups. The U.S. Presidential Determination, while praising “Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities,” pointedly criticized Petro’s “failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups.”
Despite the decertification, the United States has continued to provide assistance, citing national interest. Most forms of bilateral aid can be withheld from countries found to have failed in their counternarcotics efforts, but exceptions are made for counternarcotics, humanitarian, and emergency assistance. The waiver allows Colombia to continue receiving this crucial support, especially through programs like International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and narcotics-related Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance. However, as CRS notes, the decertification could still have “political and diplomatic ramifications.”
Petro’s response has been defiant. He reportedly halted U.S. weapons purchases and questioned what the U.S. has done to address its own domestic fentanyl and cocaine consumption. He has publicly vowed to ignore U.S. pressure to resume forced eradication of coca crops—a policy that has long been a sticking point in bilateral relations. Notably, coca crop eradication levels in Colombia declined by 83% from 2022 through 2024, and violence related to eradication efforts has escalated. In August 2025, for example, armed groups used a drone to shoot down an antinarcotics helicopter, killing 12 Colombian police eradicators, as documented by CRS.
The broader context is that Colombia has been a key U.S. security partner in South America for decades. Initiatives like Plan Colombia, heavily funded by the U.S., helped modernize Colombia’s security forces, reclaim territory from illegal armed groups, and end a decades-long civil conflict. U.S. assistance has also enabled Colombia to become a leader in multinational maritime interdiction operations and a primary source of drug-related intelligence for the region. Yet, as the CRS report observes, the relationship has become increasingly complicated under Petro’s presidency, with some analysts predicting that decertification could worsen political polarization in Colombia ahead of the presidential elections scheduled for May 2026.
While some in Washington expect continued partnership on antidrug efforts—especially given the waiver and Trump’s statements that he would reconsider Colombia’s designation if improvements are made—others are less optimistic. Petro’s vocal opposition to U.S.-backed drug policies, his criticism of U.S. military operations in Venezuela, and his denunciations at the UN suggest a widening rift. There is also speculation, according to CRS, that worsening security conditions in Colombia could push Petro to pursue closer ties with China, which has offered security cooperation to countries in the region.
At the heart of this diplomatic drama are competing visions for how to address the intertwined challenges of drug trafficking, security, and social justice. Petro’s speech at the UN was not just a critique of U.S. policy; it was a call for a new approach—one that, in his view, addresses the root causes of violence and inequality rather than perpetuating cycles of blame and intervention. Whether this message will resonate beyond the applause in the General Assembly hall remains to be seen.
As Petro’s term draws to a close in August 2026, his final address to the UN may well be remembered as a defining moment in Colombia’s evolving relationship with the United States. The coming months will reveal whether this high-stakes diplomatic standoff leads to meaningful change or deeper division.
