The situation in Myanmar's western territories is experiencing monumental upheaval as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) gain considerable ground against the military junta, threatening the already precarious hold the ruling government has on power. Recent developments reveal the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) vocalizing strong opposition to the junta's impending elections, branding them as illegitimate and coercive measures aimed to reinforce military control.
On December 24, 2024, the NUG and NUCC issued a joint statement asserting their commitment to the Spring Revolution. The statement condemned the junta's planned 2025 elections as merely tokenistic - “the military participation in politics” renders the people’s aspiration for a federal democratic union unachievable. The NUG emphasized its resolve to defend the results of the 2020 elections, recognized by the populace, and dismissed any manipulation attempts from the junta. “The revolution will only intensify,” the statement declared, reflecting the unwavering spirit of resistance.
Concurrently, the military junta's grip is faltering, with reports indicating it has lost control over nearly 80 percent of Chin State and almost the entirety of Rakhine State. The Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA), which claims substantial victories against junta forces over the past weeks, has established control over significant regions, buoyed by alliances with other armed groups such as the Yaw Defence Force and the Monywa People’s Defence Force. Many soldiers of the Myanmarese armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, have reportedly defected, with fresh recruits joining the rebel groups instead of the junta.
The Arakan Army (AA) has also made impressive strides, gaining control over nearly the entirety of Rakhine State, following the fall of the junta’s Western Command. The AA’s successful capture of key towns has consolidated its power, substantially altering the military dynamics within the region. Security analysts predict the junta could be completely ejected from these areas as early as next year, raising pressing questions about the future governance of these contested territories.
This rapid deterioration of military authority presents new opportunities for India, which has vested interests aligning with stability and economic progression. First and foremost, the recent advancements by the CBA and AA have renewed hope for the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project, aimed at establishing more efficient trade routes by connecting goods from Kolkata to Mizoram through Myanmar’s ports. This project has faced delays but is now potentially on the brink of resurgence.
The Kaladan project is significant; it allows India to bypass uncertainty surrounding transportation via Bangladesh, prioritizing effective logistics. Security experts suggest leveraging relationships with the CBA and AA, particularly to aid administrative organization after the troops’ withdrawal, could play to India's advantage. Re-establishing infrastructure and capacity building aligns with India’s aims of enhancing regional trade and connectivity.
India also faces the complex reality of dealing with Kuki-Chin militant factions within this broader picture. The CBA faces internal conflict with rival Kuki-Chin groups, which complicates India's efforts to maintain harmony and coherence within these communities. By fostering strong ties with the CBA and mitigating Kuki-Chin fratricidal issues, India could pave the way for repatriation efforts concerning the Kuki-Chin refugees who currently find shelter across its borders.
Another significant aspect of the current conflict involves China's ambiguous position. Historically, China has alternated support between the junta and various EAOs, but recent developments have engendered suspicion among the groups it previously aided. The junta, feeling pressure from both the EAOs and dissenting voices within, has begun to distance itself from Chinese influence, providing India with a strategic opening to offer support to the NUG and build alliances within the EAOs effectively.
Following the army's waning power, the political future of Myanmar remains uncertain. EAOs like the AA seek to leverage their military successes to advocate for autonomy or independence, setting their political agendas distinct from whatever emerges from the junta-led elections. Questions concerning inclusivity, especially concerning the Rohingya Muslim community, persist as the AA grapples with accusations of past aggressions toward them.
With Myanmar’s citizens remaining resilient against the military regime, the struggle for autonomy continues. Cities across Chin and Rakhine States serve as battlefields for both control and the fight for human rights. The potential for the Arakan Army and CBA hinges on establishing administrative machinery to govern effectively and maintain their newfound sovereignty post-junta.
Efforts to negotiate peace need to focus on cooperation among the various ethnic entities and the NUG to facilitate stability within Myanmar, as both the humanitarian situation for the people and geopolitical dynamics evolve inexorably. Engaging with the NUG and EAOs could fortify India’s position as a key stakeholder. The future of Myanmar will be determined by the ability of the resistance to unify and articulate the aspirations of its peoples, undeterred by the contentious past and present state of conflict.
