More than a decade into its development, the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail project in the UK remains mired in controversy, cost overruns, and delays, prompting renewed calls from manufacturing firms to revive the scrapped northern leg of the network. Originally envisioned as a transformative infrastructure undertaking to boost capacity and connectivity across the country, HS2 has become emblematic of the challenges inherent in delivering large-scale projects within the UK's unique political and geographic landscape.
The northern section of HS2, which was intended to extend high-speed rail services to Leeds and Manchester, was officially cancelled by the Conservative government in October 2023. Then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak justified the decision by citing potential savings of £36 billion, which he proposed redirecting toward other transport initiatives. This move, however, has been met with strong opposition from industry leaders and regional politicians, particularly in Yorkshire.
A recent poll conducted among 200 manufacturing companies by Make UK and Barclays Corporate Banking revealed that nine out of ten firms still support the original plan for the northern leg. These companies argue that the high-speed line would not only increase passenger numbers but also free up existing rail lines for freight traffic, a crucial consideration given the government's own projections for future freight demand. Furthermore, a similar majority called for enhanced investment in faster rail links connecting Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Hull, and Newcastle, underscoring widespread frustration with current transport infrastructure.
Political figures in the north have voiced their dismay at the cancellations. Tracy Brabin, West Yorkshire's Mayor, described the decision to limit HS2 to a London-Birmingham route as "yet another blow to northern transport" that threatens to "derail our efforts to boost the economy and level up opportunities." Similarly, South Yorkshire Mayor Oliver Coppard condemned the move as "not just a broken promise to the North, it's a catastrophe for the whole of the UK." Their sentiments reflect broader concerns that scaling back HS2 undermines regional economic growth and national cohesion.
Behind the headlines, the HS2 project has been plagued by a series of fundamental issues. More than 15 years after its inception, the rail minister Lord Peter Hendy admitted that the final cost of HS2 remains unknown. The Public Accounts Committee has labeled the project a textbook example of mismanagement, with costs ballooning tens of billions of pounds over budget and schedules slipping by roughly a decade. Current estimates suggest that the shortened London to Birmingham segment could cost £81 billion, which, when adjusted for inflation, might exceed £100 billion — all for just 135 miles of track.
HS2's early ambitions were bold. The project aimed to create the fastest and most frequent train services in the world, with trains capable of speeds up to 250 miles per hour and running 18 trains per hour into London Euston station — a train every three minutes. This vision was partly inspired by warnings from French railway officials not to build "yesterday's railway," encouraging UK engineers to future-proof the line to accommodate faster trains. HS2's first technical director, Andrew McNaughton, accepted a roughly 10% increase in costs to achieve this goal, believing it would pay dividends in the long term.
However, this ambition also contributed to escalating costs and complexity. Government reviews have suggested that the project's scope expanded dramatically, shifting focus away from merely increasing network capacity to building a state-of-the-art railway. Andrew Meaney, head of transport at consultancy Oxera, criticized the lack of detailed analysis on trade-offs, such as whether slower train speeds like those on Eurostar might have reduced costs and increased feasibility.
Compounding these challenges was the UK's political and planning environment. Much of HS2's route traversed rural constituencies represented by Conservative MPs, necessitating intense negotiation and compromise. The government employed a rare hybrid bill process, allowing directly affected parties to petition for changes. This led to thousands of assurances being added, including costly measures such as £250,000 to insulate a church, £500,000 for a new park, and £10,000 to renovate a listed drinking fountain. Sir Geoffrey Clifton Brown, a Conservative MP involved in the process, recalled a Transport Secretary remarking, "You've just cost us another couple of hundred million this afternoon," highlighting how these concessions inflated the budget.
Tunnels and noise barriers became particularly expensive elements. On a 49-minute journey from London to Birmingham, passengers will see the countryside for only nine minutes due to extensive tunneling and cuttings. HS2 Ltd, the company overseeing the project, acknowledges that it failed to control costs and that early expectations were unrealistic.
Despite securing parliamentary approval by a significant majority in 2013, the hybrid bill only granted "deemed planning permission." Since then, HS2 has had to obtain over 8,000 additional permissions from local councils and agencies, some of which have been denied. For example, in Buckinghamshire, a request to upgrade a farm track necessary for tunnel monitoring was rejected after over 800 local residents petitioned against it, threatening costly delays.
Former Deputy Mayor of London Ed Lister attributes many of these hurdles to the UK's planning system and advocates for reforms to the judicial review process to prevent projects like HS2 from being stalled by legal challenges. The contrast with other countries is stark: France boasts over 1,000 miles of high-speed rail across a larger landmass with more open countryside, while China has nearly 30,000 miles of high-speed track enabled by a centralized government and fewer protest rights.
These realities underscore a fundamental tension. As one chartered surveyor put it, "We live on a small, highly populated, property-owning, democratic island," which inherently complicates large infrastructure projects. The question then becomes how much disruption society is willing to tolerate for long-term national benefits. Andrew Meaney emphasizes that political leaders often lack the confidence to commit firmly to such projects, instead bending to shifting public opinion.
Some critics argue that HS2 was never the right solution. Andrew Gilligan, a former advisor to Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak, contends, "You've got to choose the right projects," suggesting that the UK's transport crisis is better addressed through "lots of boring little things like bus lanes and tram systems and new stations" rather than a grand mega-project that benefits only a few.
Yet, without resolving the underlying issues of consent, planning, and political will, any future infrastructure effort in the UK risks similar pitfalls. The HS2 saga serves as a cautionary tale of ambition colliding with reality, raising profound questions about how the country builds its future.
