Los Angeles County’s response to the catastrophic wildfires that swept through Pacific Palisades and Altadena in January 2025 has come under intense scrutiny following the release of an independent after-action report. The review, conducted by the McChrystal Group and commissioned by county supervisors, paints a sobering picture: outdated policies, inconsistent practices, and a patchwork of communication systems hampered efforts to alert and evacuate residents as flames tore through neighborhoods, ultimately killing 31 people and destroying more than 16,000 buildings over 37,000 acres.
The report, spanning 133 pages, left no stone unturned in its assessment of the county’s emergency response. According to NPR, the analysis found that “a series of weaknesses, including outdated policies, inconsistent practices, and communications vulnerabilities,” led to an ineffective response to the most destructive wildfires in Los Angeles County’s history. The report outlined five core areas needing urgent improvement: evacuation protocols, emergency response training, resource management, coordination across agencies, and community engagement.
One of the most glaring issues highlighted was the speed—or lack thereof—of evacuation alerts. As flames began consuming homes in Altadena, evacuation orders in some neighborhoods arrived only after houses had already burned down. The Associated Press reported similar delays in the Palisades Fire, where the Los Angeles Police Department initially managed evacuations. The process for communicating an evacuation decision to the public was described as “slow, convoluted, and involving multiple leadership roles across county-level departments.” In practice, this meant that it could take between 20 and 30 minutes for the public to receive an evacuation notice—a marked improvement from the old system’s 30 to 60 minutes, but still dangerously slow given the speed of the advancing fires.
Behind these delays were critical staffing shortages, particularly within the Sheriff’s Department and the Office of Emergency Management. The report noted a high number of deputy vacancies and an under-resourced emergency office. On top of that, an experienced staffer who would have been crucial to the response was away at a training event when the fires struck, leaving less knowledgeable personnel to fill key roles. To make matters worse, the county had only recently expanded its contract with the emergency alert company Genasys, and just four staff members had been trained on the new notification software when disaster hit.
Communication breakdowns extended beyond the county’s internal operations. First responders and incident commanders struggled to share information due to unreliable cellular connectivity, inconsistent field reporting methods, and the use of various unconnected platforms. During the January inferno, power outages and cell tower failures further hindered the transmission of evacuation notices. The report stated, “While frontline responders acted decisively and, in many cases, heroically, in the face of extraordinary conditions, the events underscored the need for clearer policies, stronger training, integrated tools, and improved public communication.”
Public outreach was another weak link. Before the fires, the county sent out a handful of warnings about the incoming Santa Ana winds and amplified National Weather Service messaging on social media and in news releases. However, there was no official, stand-alone preparedness messaging provided by the county. The review stressed the importance of prior communication with the public about where to find reliable information during a crisis and called for the establishment of a joint information center much sooner in future emergencies. Notably, the countywide joint information center was not created until January 9—two days after the fires began.
The report also shed light on the challenges faced by vulnerable populations during the evacuations. Older residents, especially those not monitoring digital alerts or with mobility challenges, were at increased risk of delayed evacuation. Vehicle shortages in the Sheriff’s Department further hindered efforts to reach those in need, as some units were already deployed in the Palisades when the Eaton Fire erupted in Altadena. Despite these obstacles, first responders were praised for their heroism, evacuating senior care facilities, leading public transit buses through burning neighborhoods, and rescuing people from their homes. As the report’s authors put it, “This heroic response was driven by urgency and their commitment to save lives, but it also added additional complexity to their responsibilities as they worked to maintain broader operational oversight in the field.”
In areas with a history of wildfire risk, such as Pacific Palisades, the report noted a higher level of preparedness and collaboration between the Fire and Sheriff’s Departments. In contrast, Altadena had not experienced a wildfire in over 30 years, and its residents were less prepared for such an event. The review recommended that emergency response training be expanded to focus on areas previously not considered vulnerable to wildfire, ensuring that all communities are better equipped to handle future disasters.
The report’s recommendations were clear and actionable: restructure the Office of Emergency Management, increase staffing, and establish a robust emergency response training program for law enforcement officials. This training should emphasize coordination among multiple cities and fire departments and address the unique challenges of vulnerable populations. Additionally, the county was urged to streamline its alert systems, ensure all staff are trained on new technologies, and develop a cohesive framework for public outreach and education in collaboration with local and state agencies.
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Chair Kathryn Barger emphasized that the report “isn’t about pointing fingers” but about “learning lessons, improving safety, and restoring public trust.” Supervisor Lindsey Horvath echoed this sentiment, calling the review “a critical step toward accountability,” and adding, “This report is only as strong as the action that follows. As climate-driven disasters accelerate, we must stay focused on education and prevention, training, and community partnerships that make us truly prepared.”
The city of Los Angeles plans to release its own after-action report on the wildfire response, as required by state regulations. Meanwhile, California Governor Gavin Newsom has commissioned the Fire Safety Research Institute to conduct a separate review, with the first phase of that report expected in the coming weeks. The causes of both the Palisades and Eaton fires remain under investigation.
Notably, the challenges faced by Los Angeles County are not unique. The report drew comparisons to alert system failures in other major wildfires, including the 2017 Tubbs Fire in Santa Rosa, the 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, the Woolsey Fire in Malibu, Colorado’s 2021 Marshall Fire, and Hawaii’s 2023 Lahaina Fire. Each tragedy has underscored the urgent need for better preparedness, faster communication, and robust community engagement in the face of increasingly severe and frequent climate-driven disasters.
As Los Angeles County officials prepare to review the McChrystal Group’s findings, the message is clear: transforming lessons learned into concrete action is the only way to ensure that communities are better protected when the next disaster strikes.