TOKYO: Japan's Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, has officially approved the Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, mandaring nuclear energy to account for 20 percent of the nation’s energy needs. This controversial decision has sparked strong protests from the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), which argues this move disregards the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station disaster.
According to CNIC, the government’s revised energy framework aims to cut greenhouse gases by 73 percent by 2040, compared to 2013 levels. The ambitious plan envisions renewables making up 40-50 percent of Japan's energy mix, with 20 percent sourced from nuclear power and 30-40 percent from thermal generation. Despite the lofty goals, CNIC raises serious concerns about the feasibility of these targets, emphasizing the impracticality of achieving 20 percent nuclear energy, especially if all nuclear reactors currently under construction are factored in.
“The Seventh Strategic Energy Plan holds many more problems,” stated CNIC. “Those problems arise because the energy policy is determined intuitively by de facto collusion among stakeholders.” The organization criticized the government’s approach for lacking substantial dialogue on the future of Japan's energy mix, reflecting broader worries about the nation's nuclear reliance.
Adding to the debate on energy sourcing, Japan's strategy to increase imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become particularly contentious. Following the February 2025 summit between Ishiba and U.S. President Donald Trump, officials proclaimed intentions to increase U.S. LNG exports to Japan, claiming imports would begin “immediately” and “in record numbers.” Yet, industry experts approach these announcements with skepticism.
Historically, the trade relations concerning LNG have been challenging. Reports indicate Japan has failed to secure substantial commercial agreements following political announcements, with major U.S. projects like the Alaska LNG and the CP2 project hindered by economic realities and high costs. President Trump's ambition for Japan to displace its reliance on Russian gas with U.S. LNG faces multiple hurdles, including existing contracts and market competition.
Current market trends reveal Japan's LNG demand has decreased significantly over the past decade, leading to increased resales of imported LNG. This decline reflects shifting priorities toward sustainability and renewable energy, placing pressure on the transitional role of LNG.
Japan's energy strategy is also reflective of its broader climate commitments, indicated by CNIC’s growing alarm about the country’s energy framework. The group has pointed out the potential risks associated with ramping up nuclear energy use when it is framed as part of the nation's decarbonization efforts.
“The cost of providing nuclear power has been underestimated,” they emphasized, pointing out relevant factors affecting Japan's energy calculations. These evaluations become increasingly important as Japan seeks to update its energy capabilities, which will undoubtedly shape both domestic and international perspectives on its energy future.
This complex dynamic surrounding U.S. LNG imports highlights Japan’s greater energy challenges, as it navigates geopolitical issues and the intricacies of energy reliance. For example, recent negotiations involving other suppliers, such as Qatar and Russia, could reshape the market. The uncertain nature of future supply agreements adds layers of complexity to Japan's energy future as it attempts to balance domestic needs with international commitments.
Looking forward, the flexible nature of U.S. LNG contracts—allowing for cargo resales—seems to align with Japan's adaption requirements to the fluctuated energy demands. Combined with efforts to achieve high renewable penetration, Japan’s energy plan necessitates comprehensive adaptations across the sector to meet both domestic and global objectives.
While the government is moving forward with its strategies, including nuclear energy re-engagement, growing opposition from civil society groups like CNIC indicates significant public discontent. This opposition reflects the larger societal apprehensions surrounding nuclear safety and the broader imperative for energy reform based on sustainable practices.
Japan stands at a pivotal juncture, trying to determine its energy path within the sensitive framework of historical disasters. Navigational shifts toward nuclear and LNG as part of the energy policy agenda raise questions about societal acceptance and long-term viability. The resolution of these dilemmas will undoubtedly influence Japan’s posture on energy sustainability and resilience.
Both the fate of the Seventh Strategic Energy Plan and its reception by the public and industry players will shape how Japan engages internationally amid pressing climate change challenges and energy security concerns. The coming years will be telling as stakeholders work to translate strategic ambitions effectively and responsibly.