The political scene in Jordan has recently been charged with excitement after the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as the biggest winner during the parliamentary elections held on September 10, 2024. With 31 seats secured out of 138, this marks a significant increase from their previous tally of just seven. Incidentally, the elections saw the participation of nearly 1.5 million voters, which translates to approximately 31% turnout—indicating growing civic engagement among the Jordanian populace.
This election was notable not only for its participation but also as the first held under the new electoral laws, which were part of King Abdullah II's initiative to reshape Jordan's political dynamics. The new system allocated voters two votes: one for closed nationwide party lists, which accounted for 41 seats, and another for open local lists tied to their residence, covering the remaining seats. The shift aimed at broadening representation saw 25 out of 38 registered political parties participating, yet only 10 managed to secure parliamentary seats.
The IAF's victory has stirred interest and debate, leading to analytical narratives on the underlying causes. Various factors, most prominently local and regional developments, seem to have converged, enhancing the IAF's appeal among the voters. One key issue at hand is the continuing crisis and violence seen amid the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The party’s active involvement in the pro-Gaza movement and its symbolic campaign strategies played significant roles. For example, Yanal al-Fraihat, one of the prominent candidates, opted for campaign visuals inspired by the red triangle emblem associated with Hamas, thereby aligning with voter sentiments around the conflict.
What set this election apart from its predecessors was the apparent absence of security interventions aimed at diminishing the IAF's presence—an unusual approach considering the historical backdrop. Observers suggested this was possibly twofold: to send signals to international allies, particularly the US and the West, and to accommodate the new electoral law which restricts the power of preemptive security measures. It appears the government understood the risks of squashing voter participation amid widespread distrust stemming from long-standing economic grievances.
With poverty rates now touching 35% and unemployment rates sitting at 21.4%, many Jordanians feel increasingly alienated from their government and lean toward movements promising genuine change. The representation of candidates with local charisma—like former Teachers' Union leader Nasser al-Nawasrah—proved effective as well, drawing substantial support from disenfranchised teacher constituencies, hierarchy affording the IAF opportunities in unfamiliar districts such as al-Wasat.
Yet, alongside the Islamists' success, traditional political parties have seen significant declines. The lack of traction among traditional leftist and nationalist parties suggests they didn’t resonate with the voters' needs. Despite entering the elections under new banners, the integration of former regime officials and their perceived affiliation with the state has diminished their credibility. Allegations of corrupt practices, such as selling candidate rankings for hefty sums, only added to the disillusionment with newer parties among the electorate, thereby catalyzing disenchantment.
Interestingly, this election also presents questions about the changing relationship between the Islamist party and the political regime. Historically, when faced with crises, the Brotherhood has oscillated between cooperation and confrontation with the government. During earlier tumultuous periods marked by demands for reform, the regime’s approach toward the Brotherhood became one of containment rather than eradication—reflecting lessons learned from other nations experiencing Islamist party ascension.
Analysts are cautiously observing how this Islamist resurgence might influence future legislative dynamics. The present parliament could witness almost two-thirds of its members identified as party-affiliated, and as the dust settles after the elections, the substantial allocation of seats to Islamist parties raises the prospect of legislative changes, particularly concerning sensitive issues tied to regional geopolitical relations.
One could ponder if this political shift might lead to significant alterations to longstanding diplomatic agreements—especially the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel. Public sentiment leans heavily toward reviewing such treaties, with several polls indicating substantial support for cutting ties. Yet, the regional geopolitical environment complicates this stark potential. While reinstatement of economic ties could be threatened, broader calls to cancel treaty arrangements are expected to falter against pressing strategic concerns.
Nevertheless, skepticism remains glimmering around the election outcomes themselves. Historically, Islamist parties have portrayed fluctuated governance effectiveness when empowered, with examples from Tunisia to Egypt showcasing similar phenomena of underperformance. Many political analysts suggest this pattern may be repeated, wherein Islamist parties, once assuming governance, yield disappointing results.
Contrastingly, research indicates ideological stances among political parties show negligible differences, particularly on social and economic fronts, which may lead to unexpected collaboration rather than consistent opposition. This clears the path for the possibility of both Islamist and centrist parties working cohesively rather than adversarially, possibly diluting the expected fervor of the IAF’s mandate.
Though the future looks unpredictable, what is evident is Jordan’s ever-evolving electoral climate and its complex interplay with regional occurrences. The outcome embarks Jordan on another political chapter, where the relationship dynamics between the IAF and other parties hold considerable weight both within national borders and across the region.
