In a rare and striking display of public introspection, three prominent Iranian figures closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have openly expressed regret over pivotal decisions that, they say, have left Iran politically isolated and economically hamstrung. Their remarks, published across Iranian media on October 12, 2025, have set off ripples of speculation about possible shifts within the country’s political establishment—though whether these admissions will translate into real change remains to be seen.
The trio—Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, a former chief inspector in Khamenei’s office; Ali Shamkhani, a former security chief and current senior military adviser to the Supreme Leader; and Massih Mohajeri, managing editor of the influential newspaper Jomhouri Eslami—each reflected on past actions that, in their view, have steered Iran onto a challenging path both at home and abroad. Their statements, as reported by Donya-ye Eghtesad and Jomhouri Eslami, have been interpreted by observers as a sign of growing unease within the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic.
Nateq Nouri, once widely believed to be Khamenei’s favored candidate for the presidency in 1997, did not mince words when discussing the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran—a watershed moment that would see relations between Iran and the United States spiral downward for decades. “That was the starting point of many of our troubles,” he told Donya-ye Eghtesad. “Don’t other embassies have intelligence sections? We seized the US embassy, and the Americans responded by seizing ours and freezing our assets. What followed was a chain of problems, actions and reactions that continue to this day.”
His frankness did not stop there. Nateq Nouri further pointed to more recent incidents, such as attacks on the UK and Saudi embassies in 2011 and 2016, as having “led to pressures and challenges in foreign policy that have brought us to this point.” These episodes, he suggested, compounded Iran’s diplomatic woes and deepened its isolation on the world stage—a theme echoed by his peers.
Ali Shamkhani, who has long been a fixture in Iran’s security apparatus, offered his own candid assessment, particularly regarding the country’s military posture and international standing. “We developed our missile industry, but we failed to invest in air defense,” Shamkhani admitted. “Due to sanctions, no foreign country cooperates with us in the area of armament.” He didn’t shy away from the consequences of Iran’s pariah status, adding, “The fact is, we are isolated. But we could have been less isolated.”
Perhaps most notably, Shamkhani revealed a sense of missed opportunity and even regret over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “Iran should have had nuclear bombs,” he said with a sigh. “I should have facilitated that when I was defense minister under President Khatami.” His remarks hint at the internal debates and strategic miscalculations that have shaped Iran’s trajectory, particularly as the country faces renewed scrutiny and sanctions from the West.
The third voice in this chorus of regret came from Massih Mohajeri, whose editorial in Jomhouri Eslami broke starkly with the official line on one of the most contentious episodes of recent years: Hamas’s incursion into Israel on October 7, 2023. “Despite many opinions and views, Operation Al-Aqsa was a mistake,” the editorial declared. This assessment stands in sharp contrast to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s earlier praise for the attack, in which he said he “kisses the hands” of those responsible. Mohajeri’s editorial described the operation as “a storm with no winner,” arguing it brought losses not just to Gaza, but also to Iran and its regional allies, including Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Qatar.
These public expressions of regret do not exist in a vacuum. On October 14, 2025, Tehran Times reported on the shifting sands of Iran’s diplomatic landscape, particularly highlighting the European troika—Britain, France, and Germany—being sidelined in the nuclear issue after invoking the snapback mechanism to reinstate UN sanctions. According to Shargh, this move has transformed the troika from mediators to “pressure partners,” diminishing Iran’s incentive to negotiate with Europe and prompting Tehran to seek deeper cooperation with non-Western powers such as Russia, China, and regional neighbors.
The economic consequences of these diplomatic choices have been profound. As Etemad outlined, Iran’s placement on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist has severely restricted its trade and banking activities, effectively excluding the country from the international financial system. The newspaper argued that joining FATF could be a step toward rebuilding trust in global markets, but cautioned that such a move would only be effective if accompanied by a broader political will to re-engage with the world.
Meanwhile, the hardline daily Vatan-e-Emrooz cast Iran’s predicament in stark, existential terms, asserting that the country stands at a crossroads between “surrender or resistance.” The paper insisted that, despite Western pressure and what it called “miscalculations” by the US and Israel, Iran has not backed down from its “red lines” on nuclear policy and continues to defend its national interests with resolve. It also maintained that Iran has observed all necessary security precautions regarding its uranium reserves, reaffirming the official stance that its nuclear program is not intended for weaponization.
In a broader regional context, Iran newspaper interviewed foreign policy expert Mostafa Najafi, who depicted the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gaza War as a region in flux. Najafi observed, “After the ceasefire, we are witnessing an increase in the role of the United States in the political and security arrangements in the region. Therefore, Iran will be the most important issue for the United States in the Middle East.” He argued that Iran’s challenge now is to strike a balance between joining a regional order shaped by external powers and helping to shape a new order in partnership with others. “The future of the region will be determined not by winning wars but by the ability of countries to manage the transition of order,” Najafi concluded.
All told, these developments paint a picture of a nation at a crossroads—grappling with the legacy of past decisions, the realities of international isolation, and the daunting task of navigating a rapidly changing regional environment. Whether the rare candor from figures close to Khamenei signals the beginning of a genuine policy recalibration or merely a fleeting moment of self-reflection is a question that remains unanswered, but the conversation within Iran’s corridors of power is undeniably shifting.
