Divided over Ukraine and defense spending, the bickering Dutch have been effectively sidelined in Europe, writes Gordon Darroch.
In December 2023, Mark Rutte, as caretaker prime minister, faced a critical test of his leadership on Ukraine. The European Union had drawn up a fresh €50 billion aid package, two-thirds of it in the form of loans. As a fiscal conservative, Rutte was against expanding the EU budget, but he was prepared to flex the rules in the case of Ukraine, not least because he was closing in on the NATO secretary-general’s job and had a reputation to uphold as one of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s closest allies.
However, in the Dutch parliament, a majority of the newly-elected MPs were threatening to support a motion against the aid package that had been tabled by the orthodox Protestant SGP party. Some, like Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party (PVV), were inherently skeptical of spending more money on Ukraine at all. Others such as the farmers’ party BBB and Pieter Omtzigt’s center-right NSC objected to the use of debt finance. They argued that the package should be funded by making savings elsewhere in the EU budget, but Rutte dismissed the idea as unworkable.
Then came the bombshell: the prime minister told MPs it was pointless to pass the motion anyway, because he would simply ignore it. “If this motion is passed and you want me to enact it, I’m telling you now I won’t,” he said. “You’ll have to table a no-confidence motion and the entire cabinet will resign, you can be sure of that.” It was a bold “back me or sack me” ultimatum, even if the implications were unclear.
Rutte and his cabinet had already resigned in July, triggering elections in which barely a quarter of voters backed the parties in his coalition. His government was on life support. But the bluff succeeded: the SGP backed down, MPs voted for the aid package, and Rutte went to Brussels with his ambitions and his reputation intact.
Fast forward to last week when Dick Schoof found himself in a similar quandary over the European Union’s €800 billion rearmament plan. Although Schoof was, as with Rutte, a firm supporter of raising EU spending to protect Ukraine from Russian aggression, the political dynamics were very different this time.
MPs tabled a motion opposing the plan due to concerns about reckless borrowing in the form of Eurobonds. Unlike Rutte, Schoof was unable to call parliament’s bluff. The non-partisan prime minister simply lacked the authority to threaten to walk out and take his ministers with him.
The vote went ahead, with three of the four parties in his coalition stating the Netherlands should reject the plan. Schoof faced a tough moment as he was called to heel by coalition party leaders who hold real power in his government. They berated him for supposedly not listening to their concerns before he went to Brussels and signed off on Ursula von der Leyen’s plan to ramp up European defense spending.
For a moment, it appeared a full-blown crisis might erupt as Schoof faced off against PVV, BBB, and NSC, complaining that they had left him in an impossible position in Brussels. However, Geert Wilders ultimately chose not to force an election on the issue of national security. Instead, they negotiated a classic Dutch compromise.
Schoof would not have to disown his support for the rearmament plan and would be given more scope to negotiate the details. However, the cabinet would cast a critical eye over the plans and vote no or abstain on anything that echoed too strongly of Eurobonds. “Defense is a structural challenge that requires structural funding,” three ministers wrote in a letter following late-night crisis talks with Schoof, but they followed it up with: “Debt is not the solution.”
The outcome indicates that the Netherlands, once one of Ukraine’s most forthright backers during Rutte’s premiership, is now taking a more restrained approach.
As one diplomat told NRC, the Netherlands has become one of the unpredictable factors in negotiations, writing that, “in order to serve Dutch interests as effectively as possible, the cabinet will not take a pre-determined position into the negotiations.”
The situation is alarming in that the Netherlands is increasingly out of step with European thinking on defense and security. The row has echoes of the start of the pandemic in 2020 when the Dutch opposed Eurobonds to fund the recovery, upsetting peers in Mediterranean countries.
Though Wopke Hoekstra had to soften his language during that debacle, the Dutch ultimately ensured that the coronavirus emergency fund utilized non-mutualized loans. Back then, the Netherlands was supported by its “frugal four” partners: Denmark, Sweden, and Austria. However, these nations have shifted in response to heightened threats from Russia and elsewhere, with Sweden joining NATO and Denmark facing sovereignty issues in Greenland.
In this context, the Dutch risk becoming isolated. The other EU nations are transitioning to a new reality in which the likes of Donald Trump view Russia as a partner and treat Europe as a rival. Even Germany is willing to reconsider its fiscal policies to bolster defense funding.
The incoming conservative Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has transitioned from an advocate for a strict debt brake policy to a leader willing to do “whatever it takes” to defend peace and freedom in Europe. If this evolution means leaving the budget-conscious Dutch to bicker and argue among themselves on the sidelines, then so be it.
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