The end of an era arrived quietly on Monday, August 25, 2025, as China Evergrande – once the poster child for China’s property boom – was formally delisted from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. For a company that once symbolized the promise and peril of China’s meteoric rise, the moment passed without fanfare. Yet, for thousands of creditors, homebuyers, and investors around the globe, the consequences are anything but quiet.
According to AzerNEWS and AP, the removal of Evergrande’s shares from the exchange marked the final act in a tumultuous 20-month drama that began when a Hong Kong court ordered the liquidation of the company after it failed to produce a viable debt restructuring plan. The exchange’s own rules require the cancellation of a company’s listing if its shares are suspended for 18 consecutive months—a fate Evergrande sealed after its last day of trading on January 29, 2024.
Evergrande’s story is a cautionary tale writ large. Founded in 1996 by Hui Ka Yan (also known as Xu Jiayin), the developer rocketed to fame as China’s second-largest property company, embodying the country’s economic ambitions. Its shares, first listed in Hong Kong in 2009, attracted global investors eager for a piece of China’s real estate juggernaut. But behind the glittering façade, the company was amassing a mountain of debt that would eventually exceed $340 billion, according to AP.
The company’s collapse in 2021, under the weight of its liabilities, didn’t just rattle Evergrande’s own stakeholders—it sent shockwaves through China’s entire financial system. As The New York Times reported, Evergrande’s downfall “brought China’s financial system to the brink” and exposed the vulnerabilities of an economy deeply reliant on real estate. In fact, before the regulatory crackdown, real estate and its ripple effects accounted for as much as a third of China’s economic activity.
What triggered Evergrande’s spectacular fall from grace? The answer lies in a mix of aggressive borrowing and a regulatory swerve. For years, Chinese authorities watched as developers like Evergrande borrowed heavily to fuel rapid expansion. But by 2020, Beijing’s patience wore thin. The government imposed the so-called “three red lines” policy, restricting further borrowing by companies already deeply indebted. These controls, as AP explains, prohibited developers from taking on new debt to pay off maturing bonds and loans, leaving Evergrande and others with few options but to default.
Fears of a catastrophic default by Evergrande in 2021 sent global markets reeling. But China’s central bank quickly moved to reassure investors, insisting the problems were contained. Despite these efforts, the damage was done. The credit crunch forced many developers to halt construction, leaving 1,300 unfinished Evergrande projects in over 280 cities and hundreds of thousands of homebuyers stranded, according to The New York Times.
For most Chinese families, their main source of wealth is their home. The property market’s downturn—exacerbated by Evergrande’s troubles—has sapped consumer confidence and spending. Construction slowdowns have rippled outward, affecting everything from steel and copper producers to appliance and vehicle manufacturers. Even as Beijing has tried to prop up the sector with billions in lending and subsidies, and by relaxing mortgage requirements, the recovery has been shaky at best. Analysts at HSBC Global Investment Research recently described the government’s moves as “surprising” and earlier than expected, but still predicted further declines in sales and prices.
Evergrande’s demise also tested the Chinese government’s “too big to fail” policy. For years, Beijing had shown a willingness to bail out its largest corporations. But Evergrande’s collapse shattered that assumption, signaling a new era of tougher oversight and less tolerance for unchecked borrowing.
As for the company’s creditors, the picture is bleak. The Hong Kong court appointed Alvarez & Marsal, a firm renowned for its work unwinding Lehman Brothers, to oversee Evergrande’s liquidation. But the process has been slow and fraught with challenges. With more than 90 percent of Evergrande’s assets on the Chinese mainland, enforcing repayment to overseas creditors has proven tricky. As of July 31, 2025, liquidators had received debt claims totaling $45 billion—far higher than the $27.5 billion in liabilities reported in December 2022. Yet, only about $255 million worth of assets have been sold, a figure liquidators themselves called “modest,” according to AP and The New York Times.
To make matters worse, many of Evergrande’s assets are tied up in legal disputes or have been seized by local governments and investors. The company’s labyrinthine structure, with thousands of subsidiaries, means liquidators must painstakingly take control of each entity one by one. So far, they’ve managed to secure more than 100 companies with a combined asset value of $3.5 billion as of January 29, 2024, but even these valuations are in doubt. The liquidators have warned there is “serious doubt on the amounts, if any, that may ultimately be realized for the benefit of the company’s creditors.”
The hunt for recoverable assets has even extended to Evergrande’s former leadership. Legal proceedings in Hong Kong, closed to the public, have targeted $6 billion in assets allegedly paid to former chairman Hui Ka Yan, his wife Ding Yu Mei, and ex-CEO Xia Haijun. Hui was detained in 2023, fined $6.5 million, and accused of “organizing fraud.” Meanwhile, Xia was fined $2 million and banned from financial markets for securities fraud, though he claims to own nothing worth more than $6,400. Yet, court filings allege his wife purchased a $14.5 million mansion in Newport Beach just months before his fine, and that Xia himself is hiding $24 million in luxury homes and cars in California.
Evergrande’s international entanglements further complicate matters. The company filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy protection in New York City in 2023, seeking to shield its U.S. assets from creditors, but later withdrew the case. Creditors from London to New York are still fighting for their share of what’s left—a process that could drag on for years.
For many observers, Evergrande’s delisting is more than just a corporate footnote. It is a stark reminder of the risks that come with rapid growth fueled by debt, and of the far-reaching consequences when such a giant stumbles. As the dust settles, hundreds of thousands of homebuyers and investors remain in limbo, while China’s leaders face the daunting task of restoring faith in a sector that once seemed unstoppable.
Evergrande’s fall may have ended quietly, but its echoes will be felt in China’s economy—and in global financial markets—for a long time to come.
