In a move that has sent shockwaves through both China’s military establishment and political circles, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the expulsion of nine of its top generals in mid-October 2025. The purge, which includes the ousting of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong and Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, represents one of the largest public crackdowns on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in decades. According to Xinhua and the Ministry of National Defense, these senior officers were removed from both the Party and the military for what officials described as “serious job-related crimes” and “serious violations of party discipline and law.”
What makes this episode extraordinary is not just the scale—nine generals at the apex of the PLA—but the fact that many were considered close confidants of President Xi Jinping. Their abrupt dismissal comes just days before a key Central Committee plenum, a timing that has fueled speculation about the deeper motivations behind the purge.
The Ministry of National Defense’s statement on October 17, 2025, was unambiguous about the gravity of the offenses. The nine generals, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutong, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Houbin, and Wang Chunning, were accused of forming an improper network centered around Miao and He. The statement cited “serious job-related crimes” and “particularly large sums” involved, with the offenses having “caused extremely adverse effects” on the military’s reputation and unity. The PLA Daily, the military’s official newspaper, went further, accusing the officers of a “total collapse of beliefs,” and stating their actions had “dealt a serious blow” to the army’s unity and the Communist Party’s authority over the armed forces.
According to China Brief, the core of the scandal lies in the PLA’s personnel management and promotion system. He Weidong, as vice chairman of the CMC, oversaw personnel affairs, while Miao Hua and He Hongjun held top positions in the CMC Political Work Department, which manages promotions across the entire military. The statement suggests that problems in the evaluation and promotion of general officers are at the heart of the matter, with the nine generals forming a network that allegedly manipulated the system for personal gain and influence.
The links among the expelled officers are not merely organizational but deeply personal. Seven of the nine had previously served in the Eastern Theater Command area, and several—including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Lin Xiangyang—spent significant time in the former 31st Group Army, now the 73rd Group Army. This geographic and operational overlap likely fostered close personal ties, which, according to the Ministry, were exploited to form an improper network facilitating promotions and appointments.
The timing of the purge is as significant as its scale. As BBC and AP report, the dismissals come just before the CCP’s Fourth Plenum in Beijing, where major economic and leadership decisions are set to be discussed. The Central Committee plenum is a critical moment for Xi Jinping, who is expected to outline China’s next economic development plan and possibly pave the way for further consolidation of his rule. The removal of these senior military figures, many of whom were considered Xi’s loyalists, opens the door for a reshuffling of key positions, ensuring that only those absolutely loyal to Xi remain at the helm.
He Weidong’s fall is particularly noteworthy. As the second-highest-ranking official in the military and a member of the Politburo, his dismissal marks the first time since the Cultural Revolution that a sitting Politburo member has been subjected to a military investigation. He had not been seen in public since March, fueling speculation about his fate. The government has described the crackdown as a decisive step in its ongoing fight against corruption within the PLA, but observers, including analysts cited by The New York Times and Asia Society Policy Institute, see it as a calculated political maneuver to eliminate potential dissent and reinforce Xi’s authority.
Defence Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang confirmed that the nine generals were involved in “extremely serious crimes” and “exceptionally large sums of money,” with their cases referred to military prosecutors. The officers are expected to face military trials in the coming months. The PLA Daily editorial did not mince words, describing their conduct as a “mutation” of the corruption left behind by previously disgraced generals Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both convicted or investigated for massive bribery. The editorial emphasized, “This is not just about graft, it’s about loyalty.”
The impact of the purge is already being felt at the highest levels of China’s military. At least three of the seven seats on the CMC are now vacant, creating instability within the PLA’s top command. This shake-up comes at a time when Xi is pushing to make the PLA “combat-ready” by 2027—a strategic goal that coincides with his likely bid for a fourth term as Party leader. Analysts warn that while the system may become more obedient, it could also become more brittle and cautious, potentially affecting China’s military readiness during a period of rising tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
This is not the first time Xi has launched such a sweeping anti-corruption campaign. The latest purge follows a series of high-profile disappearances and removals across China’s political and military elite. Former Defence Ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were expelled last year on similar charges. The head of the Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear arsenal, was also removed amid reports of substandard missiles and procurement failures. Civilian officials have not been immune; former Foreign Minister Qin Gang vanished in 2023, and his apparent successor, Liu Jianchao, has also disappeared from public view.
According to the official statement released on October 17, the purge “once again demonstrates the firm resolve of both the Party Central Committee and the CMC to carry the anti-corruption struggle through to the end,” and it emphasized that “corruption will find no shelter within its ranks.” While the announcement signals the end of one set of investigations—those that began with the CMC Equipment Development Department in 2023—similar probes and purges are likely to continue as Xi seeks to further tighten his grip on the military.
As the dust settles, the key question remains: if Xi Jinping can no longer trust the confidants who rose with him through the ranks in the old 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, who can he still trust? For now, the message from Beijing is clear—no rank, however high, shields anyone from Xi’s campaign or his control.
