On the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City on September 23, 2025, Arab leaders gathered for a multilateral meeting that would set the stage for one of the most ambitious diplomatic pushes in recent Middle East history. The focus: Gaza, battered by a brutal two-year war, and the prospects for a durable peace. Now, as of November 6, 2025, Washington is racing ahead with a bold plan to stabilize the territory—a plan that could redefine both the region’s power dynamics and the future of Palestinian self-governance.
According to Reuters, the United States has been quietly circulating a draft resolution at the UN that would authorize an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza. This force, if approved, would operate under a renewable mandate through at least the end of 2027. It’s not your typical UN peacekeeping mission. Instead, diplomats describe it as an “enforcement mission,” with contingents from countries like Indonesia, Azerbaijan, possibly Egypt, Pakistan, and others. Notably, Turkey has offered troops as well—but that’s where the consensus fractures.
The draft resolution is more than just a military arrangement. It proposes a civilian technocratic administration to handle day-to-day governance in Gaza, alongside a US-led “Board of Peace” to steer reconstruction and funding priorities. The Board, publicly chaired in concept by President Donald Trump, would set the tone for both security and development. The goal is to provide humanitarian lifelines and stability without reviving the specter of an open occupation—a needle so narrow, it’s left diplomats tiptoeing around the edges.
As reported by Arab News, US Ambassador Michael Waltz took the reins on November 5, 2025, convening the ten elected, non-permanent members of the UN Security Council—Algeria, Denmark, Greece, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, South Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and Somalia—along with regional heavyweights Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The gathering was a clear demonstration of regional support for the resolution, but also a showcase of the diplomatic minefield that lies ahead.
One of the most contentious issues is Turkey’s role. Ankara, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has long sought a central part in Palestinian affairs, leveraging its ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish officials argue that these connections give them unique leverage with Gaza’s factions. Yet, as i24 and Reuters highlight, this very history is why Israel and several Arab capitals—especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—are deeply suspicious of Turkish involvement. Israel insists on veto authority over ISF participants and has made it clear: Turkey will not have a role on the ground.
For the Gulf states, the stakes are high. Their willingness to fund Gaza’s reconstruction—potentially to the tune of tens of billions—hinges on credible disarmament and the exclusion of armed militias from power. The idea of a “state-within-a-state” in Gaza, where militias answer to external patrons and exercise sovereign functions, is simply unacceptable to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. As Dalia Ziadeh, a Middle East scholar and Washington coordinator at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, told i24, “It’s obvious to everyone that Turkey feels jealous of not being the star of the show… Egypt has led crucial coordination with Israel over Gaza’s future—deliberately ensuring that Turkey remains sidelined.”
The opposition to Turkey isn’t just personal; it’s structural. Egypt, which controls the vital Rafah crossing and has long acted as the chief Arab interlocutor on Gaza, views Ankara’s ambitions as a direct challenge. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of whom have quietly deepened ties with Israel and view Islamist movements as destabilizing, are unwilling to risk their reconstruction investments on a formula that could empower pro-Hamas actors. As Reuters notes, Ankara’s record of sheltering or supporting Brotherhood-linked figures only amplifies these anxieties.
Yet, the US and European capitals argue that regional buy-in is indispensable. The fragile ceasefire and the humanitarian relief it has enabled could unravel quickly without a robust security and governance framework. The US draft aims for a multilateral formula that keeps American troops out of Gaza while giving the US a central coordinating role—hence the Board of Peace and a US-led civil-military coordination center for humanitarian operations. European diplomats, with Germany at the forefront, have urged swift action, warning that delays could plunge Gaza back into chaos.
According to the US Mission to the United Nations, the proposed ISF would operate under a unified command, as agreed by the Board of Peace, Egypt, and Israel, pending status-of-mission agreements. Its mission: secure borders, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian corridors, train a vetted Palestinian police force, and oversee the systematic destruction and buy-back of non-state weapons caches. The transitional governance body—the Board of Peace—would transfer control of Gaza out of Hamas’ hands and impose demilitarization. As the US mission emphasized, “under President Trump’s bold leadership, the United States will again deliver results at the UN—not endless talk.”
The diplomatic choreography, however, masks a deeper challenge: ensuring that those shaping Gaza’s future are truly detached from Hamas and other militant networks. If the participating countries maintain a clear distance from armed or ideological agendas and commit fully to disarmament, many of the practical questions now clouding the mission—authority, command structures, local legitimacy—could start to resolve themselves. As Reuters put it, “disconnecting from Hamas is not just a political choice—it is the precondition for clarity, credibility, and peace.”
Turkey’s exclusion, then, is less about rivalry and more about principle. Ankara’s overtures, from hosting summits to offering troops, clash with the emerging consensus among Arab powers: genuine peace in Gaza requires a complete break from armed or ideological proxies. While Turkey may still find a role in humanitarian coordination or limited diplomatic engagement, its diminished influence over Hamas and the distrust it faces among regional capitals have left it on the outside looking in. “Turkey wants to prove it’s still part of the story,” Ziadeh observed, “but it no longer holds real leverage over Hamas. Today, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE set the tone—and they’ve made clear that only those detached from militancy can shape Gaza’s future.”
The road ahead is anything but simple. Adoption of the draft resolution will require at least nine affirmative votes from the 15-member UN Security Council, with no vetoes from permanent members—the United States, Britain, France, Russia, or China. The US has made it clear that no American troops will be deployed in Gaza, and the success of the mission will hinge on whether Arab funding, UN legitimacy, and Palestinian participation can be aligned under the single principle of “disarmament before development.”
In the end, the emerging postwar order in Gaza will likely be defined not by who is most visible at summits, but by who can deliver real, lasting stability. If the coalition backing the International Stabilization Force can translate this principle into action, Gaza may finally step out of the shadow of perpetual conflict. If not, the territory risks slipping back into the limbo of “no war, no peace”—a fate no one at the UN table claims to want.
