For decades, the shadowy world of nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been a source of tension, suspicion, and, at times, outright crisis. Recent revelations and renewed diplomatic sparring have once again put the nuclear ambitions and policies of both Pakistan and India under the global spotlight—raising urgent questions about the true nature of regional security and the legacy of Cold War-era decisions.
Richard Barlow, a former CIA counterproliferation officer, has reignited debate over the United States’ role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program during the 1980s. In a candid interview with ANI, Barlow alleged that successive U.S. administrations knowingly turned a blind eye as Pakistan advanced its nuclear capabilities, even as intelligence made it clear that U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter jets were being adapted to deliver nuclear warheads. "We knew all about the Pakistani nuclear weapons design, and we knew all about the F-16s... they were capable of delivering the Pakistani nuclear weapons as they existed at that time, without any doubt," Barlow declared, as reported by ANI.
This was not merely an oversight, Barlow explained, but a calculated political trade-off. During the Soviet–Afghan War, Pakistan’s cooperation was seen as vital to U.S. interests in the region. The Pressler Amendment, a piece of U.S. legislation, required annual certification by the President that Pakistan did not possess nuclear devices in order for military aid to continue. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, arms transfers and support persisted throughout the 1980s. "All we could do was present the intelligence... what elected leaders chose to do after that was beyond our control," Barlow reflected, highlighting the limits of intelligence officers in shaping policy.
Barlow’s claims are not isolated. According to The New Yorker and journalist Seymour Hersh’s 1993 investigation, U.S. satellites had indeed detected Pakistan moving nuclear weapons to airbases housing F-16s, directly contradicting official certifications that Islamabad was not a nuclear power. These revelations suggest a pattern in which strategic priorities were allowed to override concerns about nuclear proliferation.
The consequences of these decisions became starkly apparent during two major crises. In the late 1980s, Operation Brasstacks—a massive Indian military exercise—was interpreted by Pakistan as a possible prelude to invasion. By this time, according to Barlow, Pakistan had already assembled deployable nuclear weapons. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program, went so far as to claim in 1987 that Pakistan had developed a bomb capable of deterring India. Satellite intelligence from this period confirmed that nuclear weapons were being paired with F-16s, raising the stakes of any potential conflict.
Another flashpoint arrived in the early 1990s, when yet another crisis brought India and Pakistan perilously close to war. The U.S. responded by sending Defence Secretary Robert Gates to the region in a bid to defuse tensions. Barlow described this episode as “the most dangerous crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis,” citing the fragility of Pakistan’s command-and-control systems and the real risk of miscalculation. During this tense period, Barlow noted, Pakistan’s civilian government—then led by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto—had little say over nuclear decision-making, which was firmly in the hands of military authorities such as General Mirza Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. This concentration of power, he warned, increased the danger of unauthorized use or accidental escalation.
Barlow’s commitment to truth-telling came at a steep personal cost. While working at the CIA and later at the Pentagon, he was pressured by senior officials to downplay or alter his reports on Pakistan’s nuclear advancements. When he refused, he lost his security clearance and was ultimately dismissed. Barlow recalled being instructed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Edward “Skip” Gnehm to assess Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, including the F-16 deployment potential. “They wanted me to change my report, but my analysis matched the CIA’s conclusions,” he recounted. His claims were later validated by the State Department’s Inspector General, who confirmed the existence of systemic suppression of unwelcome intelligence.
Reflecting on the era, Barlow warned that the 1980s and early 1990s were the most precarious years in South Asia’s nuclear history, marked by secrecy, limited oversight, and unstable command systems. “There were still people in the U.S. government who wanted to certify under the Pressler Amendment even after the bombs were built. They were panicking because they knew aid would be cut off,” he said. Barlow’s revelations serve as a cautionary tale about the long-term consequences of prioritizing short-term geopolitical gains over global security.
Meanwhile, the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to shape regional dynamics. On November 7, 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Office (FO) issued a sharp rebuke to India, accusing New Delhi of distorting former U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent comments on nuclear testing and running a “malicious disinformation campaign.” According to TDI, Pakistan’s FO stated, “India is clearly twisting facts and misrepresenting the US President’s remarks,” adding that the U.S. side had already clarified its position to the media.
Pakistan reiterated that its last nuclear tests were conducted in May 1998 and emphasized its longstanding support for United Nations resolutions calling for a global ban on nuclear testing. In contrast, the FO criticized India for abstaining from these resolutions, suggesting “ambiguous and questionable intentions regarding future tests.” The statement further asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear program operates under a strong command and control system, supported by comprehensive export controls and a spotless non-proliferation record.
Turning the spotlight back on India, Pakistan accused its neighbor of making “baseless and malicious claims” about clandestine or illegal nuclear activities, characterizing these allegations as attempts to divert attention from India’s own “reckless behavior.” The FO highlighted India’s poor record on nuclear safety and security, citing multiple incidents of theft and illegal trafficking of sensitive materials over recent decades. Notably, the statement pointed out that as recently as 2024, radioactive equipment from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, along with highly radioactive Californium worth over $100 million, was found on sale in India.
Pakistan’s FO warned that such repeated breaches reveal the existence of a “thriving nuclear black market” in India, calling on the international community to take serious note of these alarming security gaps. “The international community must take serious note of these alarming gaps, which pose a grave threat to regional and global security,” the statement concluded.
The latest round of accusations and counter-accusations underscores just how fraught—and unresolved—the nuclear question remains on the subcontinent. As new details continue to emerge about past decisions and present vulnerabilities, one thing is abundantly clear: the nuclear legacy of South Asia is as complex and consequential as ever, demanding vigilance, transparency, and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths.
