U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has thrown his support behind South Korea’s push to reclaim wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States, describing the move as “great” and hailing South Korea as a “combat credible” partner. Hegseth’s remarks, delivered during a press briefing aboard a flight to Malaysia on October 29, 2025, come at a pivotal moment for the U.S.-South Korea alliance as Seoul seeks to assert greater autonomy over its military operations amid persistent security threats from North Korea.
Speaking to reporters, Hegseth responded directly to questions about South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s administration and its goal to regain wartime OPCON within its current five-year term, which concludes in 2030. According to Yonhap News Agency, Hegseth said, “I think it’s great. The more capabilities of our allies the better. We’ve been strong allies for many, many decades. That has not changed.”
For decades, the operational control of South Korean forces during wartime has rested with the United States, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War. While South Korea regained peacetime OPCON in 1994, the authority to direct its military during wartime remains in U.S. hands. The current administration in Seoul is determined to change that, and Hegseth’s endorsement marks a significant moment in the evolving alliance.
Hegseth emphasized that South Korea’s willingness to increase its defense spending is “critically important” given its proximity to what he called a “real-time and persistent threat”—a clear reference to North Korea. “They live right next to a real-time and persistent threat, but they also understand the totality of the neighborhood that they are in,” he noted, highlighting the complex regional dynamics that shape South Korea’s security environment.
Describing South Korea as a “combat credible partner,” Hegseth pointed to Seoul’s strong military posture and its role as a dependable host for U.S. troops. “I think South Korea is a great example of a combat credible partner who’s postured strongly, who has been a great host for our troops, but also wants to and should be increasingly willing to take the lead. It’s what we are asking of our partners in Europe to take the lead,” he said, according to both Yonhap and IANS.
Crucially, Hegseth pushed back against the notion that the U.S. would be retreating from its commitments if South Korea assumes greater control. “It doesn’t mean we are backing away. It doesn’t mean we are not supporting. It is frankly common sense. Why would you want a relationship that requires only U.S. leadership in contingencies when you’ve got a wealthy, strong, motivated nation capable of doing that?” he argued.
The transfer of wartime OPCON is expected to be a central topic when Hegseth meets with South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back at the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul, scheduled for November 4, 2025. The meeting comes as the Trump administration continues to encourage allies to shoulder a greater share of their own defense responsibilities—a theme echoed throughout Hegseth’s comments.
Observers have noted that the administration’s position aligns with its broader push for burden-sharing among allies, not just in Asia but also in Europe. This approach, while sometimes controversial, reflects a shift in U.S. defense policy that prioritizes empowering partners to take the lead in their own security affairs.
Seoul and Washington have been working on a conditions-based OPCON transition for years, but the process has often been complicated by concerns over readiness, interoperability, and the evolving threat landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The fact that South Korea handed over wartime OPCON to the U.S. during the Korean War and only regained peacetime control in 1994 underscores the deep historical roots of the current arrangement.
During the same press briefing, Hegseth addressed recent speculation about the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy. Some reports had suggested that the updated strategy might establish a U.S. defense line that includes Japan but excludes South Korea and Taiwan. Hegseth dismissed these claims, stating, “I am not aware of that ... It’s not something I am familiar with. I don’t think that report is accurate.”
He also clarified that the Trump administration is not seeking to create a NATO-style multilateral alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. Instead, the U.S. is focusing on strengthening bilateral and trilateral relationships based on mutual interests. “We are working through bilateral, trilateral relationships, whether it’s a mutual interest between the two countries, and it could be multiple countries as well,” Hegseth explained. “But we are not looking to create a formal broad alliance. Just a recognition that there’s mutual interest and they overlap, (we) work together, which I think makes a lot of sense.”
This nuanced approach to security cooperation reflects the unique dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region, where historical rivalries and differing threat perceptions can make multilateral arrangements more challenging. By emphasizing flexible partnerships rather than a rigid alliance structure, the U.S. hopes to foster a more adaptable and resilient security architecture in the face of evolving challenges.
Hegseth also addressed concerns that the Pentagon’s new strategy might signal a shift away from countering China as the primary “pacing threat” for the U.S. military. He described such reports as a “mischaracterization,” insisting that the seriousness with which the U.S. approaches the challenge posed by China remains unchanged. “A shift away would be the wrong characterization, and I don’t want to get ahead of the national security strategy, and we haven’t released it yet, but just because you recognize the need to focus on our own hemisphere does not mean we’re distracted from the pacing threat and the reality of what deterring China really means,” he said.
He further explained that enhancing security at home does not come at the expense of commitments abroad. “Getting a hold of the U.S. border and of its own hemisphere means a lot of assets that maybe have been far-flung around the world could be a little closer to home. But it doesn’t change how our building calibrates our pacing threat and the seriousness with which we take it. So, I look forward to rolling it out so that some of the mischaracterizations are addressed.”
Hegseth’s Asia tour, which includes stops in Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea, underscores the enduring importance of U.S. engagement in the region. With tensions on the Korean Peninsula never far from the surface and broader strategic competition with China intensifying, the stakes for both Washington and Seoul could hardly be higher.
As South Korea moves closer to regaining wartime operational control, the alliance faces a period of adjustment—but also of opportunity. The willingness of both sides to adapt and share responsibilities may well determine the future strength and resilience of their partnership in a rapidly changing world.