After months of relative calm in Syria’s coastal governorates, violence erupted once again in the Latakia countryside on June 6, 2025, when Ministry of Defense forces came under attack by groups described as “regime remnants.” According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the targeted Syrian army vehicle sustained damage but, fortunately, no human casualties were reported. The incident shattered a period of stability that had been carefully maintained through increased deployments of army and public security units across rural and border areas of the region.
The Ministry of Defense’s August 14 statement, reported by SANA, painted a picture of mounting tension. Over the three days leading up to the announcement, assaults against army forces in both Latakia and Tartus had escalated. The ministry did not mince words: it reaffirmed its commitment to “fulfilling its duty to protect all components of the Syrian people and preserve civil peace,” and warned that it “would not tolerate any attack against its forces or civilians.” The message to the so-called “remnants of the defunct regime” was clear—any attempts to destabilize security in Syria’s coastal region would be met with force.
Local officials echoed this stance. Noor al-Din Primo, head of media relations in the Latakia governorate, told Enab Baladi that the security situation remained “very good” aside from the isolated attack on the Ministry of Defense vehicle. He highlighted that military positions had been reinforced, with heightened alert levels and an uptick in mobile patrols, all aimed at “securing the area, protecting residents and civil peace, and preventing any attempts to disrupt security.”
Yet, the calm that had prevailed was fragile. The Ministry of Interior has been periodically announcing arrests of individuals accused of belonging to “regime remnants,” particularly those linked to the so-called “coastal events” that erupted on March 6, 2025. Those events marked the beginning of a bloody period in the coastal cities of Tartus and Latakia, with violence that, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), left 803 dead—including both public security forces and civilians. The SNHR attributed many of these deaths to fighters affiliated with pro-government factions, often citing sectarian motives.
To address the chaos and seek accountability, a national fact-finding committee was formed. On July 22, 2025, during a conference attended by Enab Baladi, the committee presented its findings. The investigation identified 265 fighters from armed groups linked to the “remnants of Assad,” as well as 298 members of military factions suspected of abuses against civilians and disobeying orders. The committee verified a grim toll: 1,426 deaths, including 90 women and a majority of civilians. Among the dead were also some former military personnel who had reconciled with the new authorities. While the committee acknowledged that some of the deceased may have belonged to regime remnants, it concluded that most killings occurred outside or after the main military clashes had ended.
The story of Syria’s coastal violence, however, is not just a local affair. On August 11, 2025, the United Nations’ Independent International Commission of Inquiry released a damning report that tied Syrian government forces, pro-Assad militias, and foreign fighters to war crimes committed against both the Alawite community and Sunni Arabs during the March massacres. The report, as detailed in a policy brief by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), found that the killings left about 1,400 people dead—mostly civilians—alongside widespread looting, burning, and forced displacement. The sectarian nature of the atrocities underscored the immense challenges facing interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa in his quest to ensure accountability and restore stability to a fractured nation.
The UN report’s recommendations were unambiguous: “ensuring that all perpetrators are held accountable, regardless of their affiliation or rank, as well as intensifying efforts to ensure non-repetition, beginning the process of reparations, and regaining the trust of affected communities.”
In the days following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, Sharaa had declared, “All military factions will be integrated into a single institution under the administration of the Ministry of Defense in the New Syrian Army.” But as the UN report observed, the rushed integration left many anti-Assad militias operating independently under their former leaders. The report was careful to note that there was “no evidence that Syria’s central government directed its forces to commit violations” and even praised government efforts in some locations to prevent violence against civilians. Still, it implicated pro-government Islamist factions—such as Ahrar al-Sham, the Othman Brigade, and the Muawiyah Brigade—as well as Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militias like al-Amshat, al-Hamzat, and Sultan Murad in the atrocities. Foreign fighters were also cited as participants.
These findings matched reporting from Reuters, which confirmed that these militias played a direct role in the massacres against the Alawite community. In the aftermath, Sharaa promoted commanders of implicated groups—namely Mohammad al-Jasem (Abu Amsha) of al-Amshat and Sayf Bulad of al-Hamzat—to leadership positions in the new Syrian army. Both men had previously been sanctioned by the United States in 2023 for human rights abuses against the Kurdish community.
In response to the massacres, Sharaa established a fact-finding committee that identified 256 members of armed groups linked to the Assad regime and 298 individuals linked to the new government as suspects. These names were referred to the Attorney General, Hassan bin Yousef al-Torbah, appointed on June 2, 2025. Yet, as the UN commission noted, most witnesses interviewed “were not aware of any investigations or arrests by the local authorities of those allegedly responsible.” During the commission’s visit to the coast, officials indicated that “42 individuals reporting to the Ministry of Defense had so far been arrested for alleged abuses committed in March.”
The slow pace of justice has not gone unnoticed. The FDD’s Ahmad Sharawi argued that the United States should pressure Sharaa to ensure that all perpetrators are held accountable, rather than rewarding militia leaders with questionable records. He called for Washington to press for the removal of foreign jihadists from the armed forces and to consider further sanctions against military units and commanders responsible for the massacres.
As Syria’s judicial system remains in its infancy, the lack of transparency and decisive action threatens to undermine public trust. The UN commission’s collaboration with Syria’s fact-finding committee is a step forward, but many in the affected communities are still waiting for concrete results and genuine accountability.
The events in Latakia and Tartus serve as a stark reminder that the path to peace in Syria is fraught with setbacks, competing interests, and lingering wounds. With international scrutiny mounting and local tensions simmering, the coming months will test whether Syria’s new leadership can deliver on its promises of justice and stability—or whether the cycle of violence will continue to haunt the country’s coastal heartland.