As the war in Ukraine grinds into its fourth year, two stark realities are coming into sharper focus across Europe: Ukraine’s remarkable efforts to innovate on the battlefield and the continent’s own alarming lack of readiness for modern conflict. At the center of this unfolding story is Ukraine’s newly unveiled Flamingo FP-5 cruise missile, a technological leap that has both emboldened Kyiv and exposed the limits of Western support. Meanwhile, leading defense experts are sounding the alarm about Europe’s outdated military systems, sluggish procurement, and strategic vulnerabilities in the face of rapidly evolving threats from Russia and beyond.
On August 27, 2025, Ukraine announced the Flamingo FP-5—a jet-powered cruise missile developed by the upstart Ukrainian firm Fire Point. According to The National Interest, the FP-5 represents a significant step in Ukraine’s push for self-reliance in advanced weaponry, especially as Western countries impose restrictions on the use of supplied missiles against Russian territory. The missile’s unveiling came just after a high-profile summit in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, a meeting that many analysts believe could mark a shift in diplomatic momentum away from Kyiv.
The FP-5 is nothing short of a technical marvel by Ukrainian standards. Weighing in at approximately 13,227 pounds at takeoff, it’s powered by an AI-25TL turbofan engine—originally sourced from L-39 jet trainers—and boosted off the ground by a solid rocket. The missile cruises at speeds between 528 and 559 miles per hour, with a top speed of 590 mph, and boasts an astonishing range of 1,864 miles. This means it can reach targets deep inside Russia, even as far as Novosibirsk, striking at strategic assets like oil refineries and military depots.
But it’s the warhead that really sets the FP-5 apart. At 2,535 pounds—potentially adapted from high-explosive bombs like the FAB-1500 or the U.S.-sourced Mk 84—it packs about two and a half times the punch of the American Tomahawk missile. Guidance relies on GPS/GNSS with inertial backup and jamming-resistant antennas, giving it a fighting chance against Russia’s formidable electronic warfare capabilities. The missile can be launched from mobile trailers after just 20 to 40 minutes of preparation, and it flies at altitudes of up to three miles.
Production is ambitious, to say the least. Fire Point currently turns out 30 FP-5s a month, but the company claims it will ramp up to 210 per month by October and potentially thousands monthly by next year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already called the FP-5 Ukraine’s “most successful missile” yet, with early deployments reportedly causing Russian airport closures and fuel price hikes. Compared to earlier Ukrainian drones like the FP-1—which had a smaller warhead and shorter range—the FP-5 is a significant upgrade, offering both greater reach and destructive power.
Yet, for all its promise, the Flamingo FP-5 is unlikely to shift the war’s trajectory in Ukraine’s favor. As Brandon J. Weichert notes in The National Interest, Russia’s ground advantages remain overwhelming. Russian artillery outguns Ukraine five to one in some sectors, unleashing more than 10,000 shells daily compared to Ukraine’s 2,000. Russia’s war economy churns out 1.5 million shells annually, and fortified lines in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia—backed by minefields and drones—have enabled recent Russian advances, including the capture of Avdiivka and Vuhledar.
Perhaps most critically, Russia’s air defenses are among the most sophisticated in the world. Systems like the S-400, S-300, Buk-M3, Tor-M2, and Pantsir-S1 create layered protection, with S-400 radars able to detect targets at 373 miles and engage them at 249 miles. Over the past three years, both sides have become adept at intercepting incoming missiles and drones. Russia has intercepted nearly 1,000 Ukrainian projectiles since late 2024, and its electronic warfare systems—such as Krasukha-4 and Murmansk-BN—can jam GPS signals and disrupt missile guidance, further blunting the potential impact of the FP-5.
This dynamic is reminiscent of late-World War II Germany, which deployed advanced “wonder weapons” like the V-1 and V-2 rockets in a desperate bid to change its fortunes. As Weichert points out, such weapons failed to alter the outcome, offering only fleeting hope while the fundamentals of the conflict—manpower, artillery, and industrial capacity—remained firmly in the enemy’s favor. In Ukraine’s case, the FP-5 can disrupt Russian logistics and cause headaches, but it cannot compensate for shortages in ground forces or reverse the basic “math problem” posed by Russia’s larger population and resources.
Against this backdrop, Europe’s own vulnerabilities have become impossible to ignore. Kate McKenna, a strategic consultant for Ukraine’s defense and intelligence sector, delivered a sobering assessment in The Recursive: “Europe is not prepared or ready to defend itself.” She points to slow and outdated procurement processes—especially in Germany—and a dangerous reliance on military equipment that, in many cases, dates back to before 1990. According to McKenna, 50% of Europe’s land systems and 80% of its land-based air systems are more than three decades old. R&D investment is lagging, with Europe roughly €120 billion behind the United States as of 2023.
Fragmented procurement and dependence on external suppliers further hobble Europe’s efforts. More than 75% of EU defense acquisitions since 2022 have come from outside the bloc, with 63% sourced from the United States. This not only raises costs but also creates interoperability headaches—one need only look at the ten different howitzer types sent to Ukraine, compared to the U.S.’s single model, to see the inefficiencies. Meanwhile, Russia is producing up to 1,500 tanks annually, while Europe struggles to keep up.
Perhaps most alarming is the lack of adequate air defenses against Russian hypersonic missiles, which could strike critical infrastructure in cities like Berlin within minutes. While Poland stands out as a NATO member with a robust, modernized military—boasting over 200,000 active personnel—most of Europe remains ill-prepared for a large-scale, high-tech conflict. NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force can deploy within days, but full mobilization of the alliance’s 3.5 million troops would take weeks or even months.
McKenna argues that Europe must urgently modernize its defense capabilities, learn from Ukraine’s rapid adaptation to high-tech warfare, and incorporate Ukraine as a key player in any new security architecture. Traditional frameworks, like NATO’s Article 5, are losing credibility in the face of modern hybrid threats that blend drones, cyber attacks, and information warfare. “Europe risks falling behind if it does not act decisively,” she warns.
The stakes are high. As Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran ramp up their own military and technological capabilities, Europe faces a stark choice: adapt or risk irrelevance. Ukraine’s experience—its ingenuity under fire and willingness to innovate—offers a model, but also a warning. As Western support becomes more uncertain and production constraints bite, neither wonder weapons nor outdated alliances will be enough to guarantee security on the continent.
In the end, the story of the Flamingo FP-5 is about more than just hardware. It is a symbol of Ukraine’s determination and Europe’s urgent need to rethink its approach to defense. The future of the continent may well depend on how quickly—and how boldly—its leaders respond to the lessons of this war.
