On October 3, 2025, Turkish authorities intensified their long-running crackdown on foreign espionage, detaining several individuals accused of selling personal data and conducting surveillance on behalf of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency. The latest arrests, part of a broader series of operations over the past three years, have drawn renewed attention to the shadowy world of international spy networks operating within Turkey’s borders.
The Istanbul operation, codenamed "Metron Activity," was a joint effort by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Counterterrorism Police Department, according to security sources cited by AhlulBayt News Agency and Daily Sabah. The main suspects included lawyer Tugrulhan Dip and private detective Serkan Cicek, also known by his real name, Muhammet Fatih Keles. Both men are accused of collaborating with Mossad-linked operatives to gather sensitive information on Palestinian activists and other targets inside Turkey.
Authorities allege that Dip created an unauthorized data inquiry panel, allowing him to illegally access personal data from public records. This information was then sold to private detectives, including Cicek, who were allegedly working at the direction of Mossad. "Dip illegally accessed personal data from public records through a system he had created — described as an unauthorized data inquiry panel — and sold the information for profit to detectives linked to Mossad," security officials told Mehr News Agency.
The operation also led to the detention of Serkan Cicek, who, according to Turkish intelligence, had been conducting surveillance in Istanbul on a Palestinian activist critical of Israeli policies. Cicek reportedly admitted to carrying out Mossad-directed surveillance activities. Security officials stated, "Cicek had been in direct contact with Faysal Rasheed, a member of Mossad’s Online Operations Center, and confessed to carrying out Mossad-directed surveillance activities." The surveillance assignment, which took place from August 1 to August 4, 2025, targeted a Palestinian activist living in Basaksehir, on the outskirts of Istanbul. Cicek was paid $4,000 in cryptocurrency for this task, authorities said.
The web of espionage extended further. Turkish authorities noted that Cicek, after accumulating significant business debts, changed his name and established the Pandora Detective Agency in 2020. He worked closely with Musa Kus, a private detective previously sentenced to 19 years in prison for spying for Israel, and with lawyer Tugrulhan Dip, both of whom had been found guilty of selling personal data from public records for personal gain. Despite knowing Kus’s fate, Cicek accepted the Mossad assignment, authorities revealed.
According to Anadolu Agency, the operation on October 3 was just the latest in a series of actions by Turkish intelligence agencies against Mossad spy networks. Over the past three years, MIT has conducted six such operations, detaining dozens of people accused of selling information and conducting espionage in Turkey. In December 2022, an operation targeted Mossad’s private detectives and tactical operatives, resulting in the detention of 68 people. That same year, an investigation uncovered that nine suspects had sold information—including addresses and flight details—to Mossad for financial gain, with seven detained in Istanbul and Izmir.
The scale and sophistication of these spy networks have alarmed Turkish officials. In January 2024, authorities uncovered Mossad’s plans to conduct reconnaissance, tracking, assault, and even kidnapping operations against Palestinian residents and Israeli activists opposed to Israel’s actions in Turkey. Police conducted simultaneous raids in multiple cities, detaining 34 suspects. The investigation found that Mossad officials often contacted suspects through social media, seeking access to information about specific individuals. Security sources warned that these activities could constitute "international espionage."
One particularly striking case involved Hamza Turhan Ayberk, a former public employee turned private detective. According to police records, Ayberk received Mossad training in Belgrade in 2019 and was paid in cryptocurrency to avoid detection. He not only leaked information but also engaged in threatening and tracking activities, transferring real-time locations of targeted individuals to Mossad through tracking devices he placed in their vehicles. Ayberk and his team, which included other public employees, compiled information about Middle Eastern individuals and companies in Turkey based on Mossad’s instructions.
Financial operations were also a key focus of Turkish investigations. In September 2024, Liridon Rexhepi was detained for managing Mossad’s financial network in Turkey. Authorities determined that Rexhepi conducted drone photography on Mossad’s orders, carried out psychological operations against Palestinian politicians, and transferred money to field operatives in Turkey and Syria through Western Union and cryptocurrency. Police tracked Rexhepi’s activities from his arrival in Turkey on August 25, 2024, to his detention on August 30, 2024. In his police statement, Rexhepi acknowledged making the money transfers and was subsequently arrested by the court.
The methods used by Mossad to recruit agents in Turkey have also evolved. Security sources told Daily Sabah that Mossad frequently uses online communication applications to recruit agents tasked with spying on Palestinians and other foreign nationals living in Turkey. The agency’s reliance on cryptocurrency payments and secret communication channels has made tracking their operations more challenging for Turkish authorities.
The crackdown has not been limited to Israeli-linked networks. In October 2024, authorities in Istanbul charged seven suspects with espionage for Chinese intelligence, while in September 2025, 37 people accused of working for Mossad were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to eight years. These actions underscore Turkey’s determination to root out foreign spy networks operating within its territory, regardless of their origin.
Despite the successes, the challenge remains daunting. As Turkish intelligence agencies continue to uncover new layers of espionage, the threat posed by foreign intelligence services—particularly Mossad—shows little sign of abating. The cases of Dip, Cicek, Kus, Ayberk, and Rexhepi reveal a complex web of private detectives, lawyers, and financial operatives working in concert to gather intelligence and conduct operations on Turkish soil.
As one security official put it, "Turkey’s intelligence in recent years has uncovered several spy networks operated by independent groups, terrorist organizations such as Daesh, or foreign intelligence agencies in Turkey." With each new investigation, Turkish authorities are gaining a clearer picture of the tactics and networks employed by foreign spies, even as those networks adapt and evolve in response.
The events of October 3, 2025, serve as a stark reminder that the world of espionage is alive and well in Turkey—a world where personal data, cryptocurrency, and covert surveillance are the tools of a high-stakes international game.
