When Ahmed al-Sharaa, a man once known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani and long associated with jihadist violence, strode into the White House on November 10, 2025, the world took notice. The moment was historic: for the first time, a Syrian leader was welcomed into the heart of American power, shaking hands with President Donald Trump in a gesture that would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier. The image—al-Sharaa, who led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to overthrow Bashar al-Assad in 2024 and end the Assad family’s half-century rule, standing alongside Trump—was splashed across global headlines. For some, it signaled hope for a new era in Syria; for others, it was a shocking departure from American principles and a dangerous gamble with global repercussions.
Al-Sharaa’s journey to the White House is nothing short of remarkable—and controversial. According to The Conversation, he rose from the ranks of insurgency, once fighting US forces in Iraq, to lead one of the largest Syrian Islamist armed groups. His roots trace back to al-Qaeda, and he was once imprisoned for planting roadside bombs targeting American soldiers, serving six years in notorious detention centers such as Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca. After his release in 2011, with support from ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, he founded the al-Nusrah Front, an al-Qaeda branch in Syria. Within a year, the US designated the group a terrorist organization, and by 2016, the UN Security Council had also blacklisted al-Julani (al-Sharaa) for his direct ties to al-Qaeda and his role in orchestrating attacks that killed civilians and soldiers alike.
Yet, al-Sharaa’s story is not just one of violence. As the Syrian civil war dragged on—claiming over 600,000 lives and displacing more than 6.5 million people, according to The Conversation—HTS, under his leadership, began to shift tactics. The group publicly broke with al-Qaeda, rebranding itself as a nationalist force focused on toppling Assad rather than waging global jihad. HTS consolidated its power in the northwestern province of Idlib, seeking legitimacy through governance and a public persona of moderation. Al-Sharaa himself was recently photographed playing basketball with US military commanders, a surprising image for a man with such a militant past.
But not everyone is convinced by this transformation. Critics point to HTS’s conservative policies during its rule in Idlib and ongoing sectarian violence in Syria, including clashes between Druze and Sunni Bedouin groups and a spate of targeted killings against the Alawite community, the traditional base of Assad’s support. As STRATEGIECS notes, some American leaders describe Trump’s embrace of al-Sharaa as “ill-considered at the very least and, off the record, as downright un-American.” The unelected Syrian interim government, critics argue, has failed to uphold commitments to political reform and respect for diversity, instead consolidating power among HTS loyalists and foreign jihadist fighters.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration has chosen pragmatism. Since HTS’s ascension, the US has revoked most sanctions imposed during the civil war and suspended additional penalties following al-Sharaa’s White House visit. Trump himself praised al-Sharaa, saying, “People say he’s had a rough past? We’ve all had rough pasts. But he has had a rough past, and I think, frankly, if he didn’t have a rough past, you wouldn’t have a chance. ... I like him; I get along with him.” (STRATEGIECS) This stance represents a seismic shift in US foreign policy, moving away from institutional caution toward a more personal, leader-to-leader engagement. On July 8, 2025—just four months before the historic meeting—the US State Department removed HTS from its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, a move followed by a US-backed draft resolution at the UN Security Council to delist al-Sharaa from its terrorism sanctions.
Why such a dramatic reversal? The incentives are manifold. For al-Sharaa, the legitimacy conferred by a White House invitation is invaluable. He stands to gain not only diplomatic recognition but also the prospect of unlocking World Bank reconstruction contracts for Syria—estimated between $216 billion and $345 billion, according to STRATEGIECS. With Israel still occupying the Golan Heights and carrying out strikes inside Syria, al-Sharaa needs international allies. Trump’s administration, meanwhile, sees strategic opportunities: securing an airbase in Damascus to counter Russian influence, possibly expanding the Abraham Accords (though unlikely as long as Israel holds the Golan), and, crucially, turning Syria away from Iran—its longtime regional patron.
The regional calculus is equally complex. Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan hope for an end to conflict on their borders and the return of millions of refugees. Saudi Arabia is eager to lure Syria from Iran’s orbit. Even Israel, historically an enemy of Syrian Islamist groups, has reportedly engaged in talks with al-Sharaa about a military and security agreement. Al-Sharaa has also visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, seeking to balance his new Western ties with traditional regional powerbrokers. Yet, Shia-led Iraq and Iran remain wary, if not openly hostile, to the new Syrian order. The Kurdish population in northeastern Syria, who fought bitterly against ISIS and have felt abandoned by the US in the past, are likely to view al-Sharaa’s reunification plans with suspicion.
Domestically, Trump’s approach has drawn fire from across the political spectrum. Lawmakers in both parties criticized the lifting of sanctions as “premature,” and Congress refused to repeal the 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which imposes tough penalties on the Assad regime and its successors. The episode has fueled broader concerns about the Trump administration’s penchant for engaging with strongmen and controversial leaders—whether Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un—often at the expense of longstanding US alliances and democratic norms. The American public, too, has registered its discomfort: protests erupted in cities nationwide, with millions voicing opposition to what many see as a betrayal of American values and a risk to national security.
For all the grand gestures, the reality on the ground in Syria remains fraught. Sporadic violence continues, and the interim government’s commitment to democratic transition is widely questioned. As STRATEGIECS observes, “any U.S. engagement or direct support for the interim government must be approached with caution and close monitoring to avoid repercussions that could negatively affect Washington’s efforts in combating terrorism, global security, or its international standing as a leader of the democratic world order.” The path forward is uncertain, and the stakes—for Syrians, Americans, and the broader Middle East—could hardly be higher.
In the end, the meeting between Trump and al-Sharaa may mark a turning point in Middle Eastern diplomacy, but whether it brings peace, stability, or further upheaval remains to be seen.
