When Taiwan’s President William Lai took the stage on October 10, 2025, to mark the 114th anniversary of the Republic of China, he unveiled a vision that’s as bold as it is controversial: a “T-Dome” missile shield, modeled after Israel’s famed Iron Dome and America’s proposed Golden Dome. The aim? To create a multilayered air defense network that could shield Taiwan’s critical infrastructure and densely populated cities from a barrage of missiles and drones, particularly those that might originate from Beijing. According to the South China Morning Post, Lai’s announcement was intended to demonstrate his government’s resolve and loyalty to the U.S. strategic agenda in the region. But the plan’s feasibility—and the urgency behind it—has sparked debate both in Taipei and across the world.
It’s not hard to see why. Lai’s plan, while ambitious, arrived with scant technical detail and, more puzzlingly, no mention in the Taiwanese defense ministry’s own National Defence Report released just a day earlier. Nor did the government’s proposed 2026 budget allocate a single dollar to the T-Dome. As a result, many in Taiwan’s defense establishment were caught off guard, with some wondering aloud whether the T-Dome would ever become more than a political talking point.
Yet Lai’s call for a missile shield comes at a moment when the threat posed by drones and missiles is anything but theoretical. Across Europe, governments are scrambling to respond to a rapidly evolving drone threat that barely existed a decade ago. The European Union, for example, has announced plans for a “drone wall” spanning its 3,000-kilometer eastern front by 2027, explicitly inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome. This move follows a series of alarming incidents, including a failed jihadist-inspired drone attack in mid-October targeting Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s home in Antwerp. Prosecutors described the incident as an attempted terrorist attack, involving a suspected improvised explosive device, steel balls for shrapnel, and a 3D printer found during searches. The plot, which reportedly also targeted Antwerp’s mayor and a Dutch anti-Islam politician, underscored just how accessible and dangerous drone technology has become.
Belgium’s defense minister, Theo Francken, did not mince words when speaking to Flemish broadcaster VRT: “It is terrible for Bart [De Wever] and his family, and of course it’s Islamists again.” Francken added that drone technology is “more and more dangerous,” noting that Belgium had already opened 80 terrorism investigations in 2025—outpacing the total for all of 2024. Three suspects, all barely out of their teens (or not even), were arrested, though the eldest was later released due to lack of evidence. The incident laid bare the frightening reality that anyone with a few hundred euros, a drone, and some DIY know-how can now attempt an attack that, not long ago, would have required a small army.
But it’s not just lone actors or terror cells causing headaches. In September 2025, NATO scrambled F-35 and F-16 jets, helicopters, and a Patriot missile defense system—hardware worth billions of dollars—to intercept Russian Gerbera drones swarming above Poland. As The Financial Times reported, these drones, whether used by militaries or terror groups, are cheap, easy to operate, and can be loaded with explosives. They don’t require the operator to be anywhere near the target, and they can be bought off the shelf or modified from consumer models. In Ukraine, drones have been responsible for up to 80% of all casualties in the ongoing war, with both sides deploying military-grade and jury-rigged commercial drones alike.
Attempts at countering these threats have often fallen flat. In 2024 and 2018, European security forces failed to intercept drones over military installations and airports, causing major disruptions. The 2018 incident at Gatwick Airport, for instance, grounded flights for 30 hours because authorities couldn’t neutralize what was presumed to be a single nuisance drone. Even Britain’s prisons have “ceded the airspace,” according to chief inspector Charlie Taylor. Drones have delivered contraband, weapons, and even so-called Zombie knives to inmates at high-security facilities like HMP Manchester and HMP Long Lartin. Taylor warned, “It’s entirely possible that they could get a gun in, then the prisoner can use that to potentially take hostages or to threaten staff in order to be able to get out. There is also the possibility that someone could be picked up by a drone to help them escape.”
The scale of the problem is daunting. A recent drone display in China demonstrated that 10,000 drones could be controlled simultaneously with laser-accurate precision. Such technological leaps mean that entire fleets of armed drones could be unleashed by a malicious group, not just a nation-state. Karl Rosander, CEO of Nordic Air Defence, described the threat in stark terms: “Drones will very soon be used not just to intimidate civilian areas in the west, but also used in directed explosive attacks. Drone technology is now readily available at all levels of affordability and sophistication, putting it in the hands of both major governments, rogue states and smaller terror cells. What’s being tested in Ukraine today will be replicated in London, Berlin or Paris tomorrow… The threat is real – the wake-up call could come in the form of unspeakable tragedy.”
Rosander’s company, one of the few focused on drone defense, has developed a portable launcher that fires guided, non-explosive projectiles to disable drones without endangering civilians below. But such innovations remain rare. Silvia Pfeifer, aerospace and defense correspondent for the Financial Times, noted that while investment has poured into drone production—there are now more than 500 defense drone startups in Europe alone—far less has gone into counter-drone technologies.
Affordability and practicality are major sticking points. As Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space, put it after the NATO response over Poland: “A €10,000 drone shot down with a million Euro missile – that’s not sustainable.” Especially when, as in Poland’s case, 20 drones can arrive at once. The economics simply don’t add up, and defense planners are scrambling for solutions that are mobile, affordable, and easy to deploy.
Back in Taiwan, the challenges are even more complex. Analysts have pointed out that the threats facing Taiwan—ranging from sophisticated ballistic missiles to swarms of AI-guided drones—are far more varied and numerous than those faced by Israel. And with the T-Dome still little more than a concept, with no budget or detailed plan, skepticism is rife. Is this a genuine step toward modernizing Taiwan’s defenses, or a symbolic gesture aimed at reassuring allies and voters?
For now, the world is left to ponder whether ambitious missile shields like T-Dome and Europe’s drone wall can keep pace with the rapidly evolving threats of the 21st century. As Bart De Wever, the Belgian prime minister targeted in the failed drone attack, jokingly posted on Instagram alongside his cat Maximus, “Maximus, can you catch a drone?” It’s a question with no easy answer—and one that defense planners everywhere are racing to solve.