On November 10, 2025, a photograph captured a moment that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago: Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and U.S. President Donald Trump shaking hands at the White House. For many, this historic meeting signaled Syria’s tentative reemergence from years of war, isolation, and economic collapse. Yet beneath the surface optimism, the reality is far more nuanced—some would say fraught with new forms of dependency and external control, even as the country takes its first steps toward recovery.
According to the official Syrian Arab News Agency, the meeting was not just a diplomatic gesture but a powerful symbol. It marked a turning point in Syria’s engagement with the United States, hinting at the possibility of a new political chapter after years of punishing sanctions and diplomatic pariah status. The optics—formal discussions, handshakes, and public statements about cooperation—sent a clear message to the world: Syria is seeking to reposition itself and open new doors for investment, reconstruction, and political normalization. As reported by AFP, the encounter suggested that Syria is no longer locked in the international cold, and that the United States may be willing to acknowledge and work with the new Syrian leadership.
But as Middle East Eye and other regional analysts point out, this new era is shaped as much by external interests as by Syrian agency. The process of so-called “rehabilitation” is, in practice, heavily managed by the very powers that once helped bring Syria to its knees. Western policy institutes, donor platforms, and Gulf investment forums have all made it clear: while certain sectors like logistics and agriculture are being revived, key strategic areas—especially energy, major infrastructure, telecommunications, and defense—remain tightly controlled by conditions tied to sanctions relief and regional alignment.
Energy, in particular, stands as the decisive lever. As outlined by the European Institute of Peace and echoed in IMF technical workshops, Syria’s access to its own oil and gas fields, refining capacity, and electricity generation is now regulated by external actors. This means that while Syria’s diplomatic normalization is presented as a step toward stability, it is also designed to entrench dependency. Sanctions relief affecting the energy sector is granted only if Syria complies with Western regional priorities. In this setup, aid becomes less a tool for reconstruction and more a mechanism of political supervision.
The new Syrian government, under President al-Sharaa, has adopted a pragmatic and outward-facing approach, especially toward the Gulf states. Unlike the previous Assad regime’s often tense relations, the current leadership has prioritized rebuilding trust with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. These Gulf monarchies have offered not only political support but also signaled readiness to assist with reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and economic development. According to Al Arabiya, this alignment is mutually beneficial: Syria gains much-needed investment and a path to regional reintegration, while Gulf countries secure a more stable neighbor and a partner in shaping the Middle East’s security architecture.
Yet, as The New Arab notes, this support is not unconditional. Gulf funding is funneled through corporate vehicles tied to national energy strategies, with liquidity conditioned on political conformity. In other words, the money comes with strings attached, folding Syria into a Gulf-Israeli energy framework that privileges external interests over genuine national renewal. The limits of Syria’s permitted recovery are already evident in the language of Western policy: low-risk sectors may revive, but strategic sectors remain locked behind a wall of political conditions.
President al-Sharaa’s political posture reflects this new reality. Since 2020, as Arab normalization with Israel accelerated under the Abraham Accords, al-Sharaa has signaled a willingness to read the shifting regional landscape carefully. In an internal address quoted by Syrian and Lebanese outlets, he told his cadres, “The world is changing. Arab states are normalizing relations with Israel. We must read these realities carefully.” His refusal to criticize the Accords and his public silence during Israel’s destructive campaigns in Gaza from 2023 to 2025—and during Israel’s consolidation of control over the Syrian Golan Heights—suggest an acceptance of a regional structure built around Israeli military primacy and Gulf-Israeli energy integration.
In a 2021 PBS Frontline interview, al-Sharaa attempted to recast himself as a statesman, declaring, “We are not a threat to the West…we want to build a balanced relationship with all countries that respect our identity.” The language of “balance” signals an understanding that Syrian legitimacy now depends on frameworks designed outside Syria, especially those governing the energy sector. Sovereignty, in this context, is more performance than reality, increasingly displaced to foreign centers of power.
This alignment extends to Syria’s policies toward Palestinian movements. In a 2022 internal address, al-Sharaa insisted, “We will not allow external groups to drag Syria into wars that serve other agendas.” While couched in the language of sovereignty, this conforms to Western and Gulf expectations that Palestinian factions in Damascus be restricted, particularly those linked to Iran or Hezbollah. This is not a break from Syrian history. As historians like Rashid Khalidi and Patrick Seale have observed, Syrian regimes have long treated Palestinian factions as both assets and liabilities. Al-Sharaa’s stance reproduces this pattern, now in a landscape dominated by external powers.
Meanwhile, Israel’s military strategy in Syria has shifted toward “calibrated containment,” treating permanent Syrian fragmentation as a security objective. Israeli strikes on Syrian air-defense systems, command centers, power stations, and fuel depots have kept Syria militarily incapacitated and economically vulnerable. Intelligence operations have amplified internal divisions, such as Druze separatism in Suwayda, further weakening the state. As Israel launches periodic strikes with apparent impunity, it sends a clear message: regional hegemony remains firmly in its hands.
Turkey, too, has entrenched a parallel form of dependency in northern Syria, transforming the area into an extension of its border economy. Turkish currency, contractors, and energy distributors now dominate, institutionalizing long-term dependence on Ankara. Russia and Iran, though still militarily present, find their influence shrinking as the new architecture is shaped by Western, Gulf, and Israeli priorities.
With sanctions lifted in some areas and Syria re-entering regional and international conversations, the government’s focus has turned to economic rebuilding. Attracting foreign investment is a top priority, especially from the Gulf. Investment in infrastructure, energy, real estate, and manufacturing could inject capital and create jobs, helping to stabilize the workforce and reduce poverty. Large-scale reconstruction—rebuilding homes, schools, roads, and hospitals—is underway, creating thousands of jobs and stimulating local industries. Tourism, too, is identified as a sector with immense potential, with efforts to restore sites and infrastructure to generate new revenue streams.
Yet, as external actors continue to set the parameters for Syria’s recovery, questions linger about the country’s true sovereignty. The path forward is fraught with contradictions: the promise of renewal is shadowed by the reality of managed dependency. For Syrians, the implications are profound. A state that once claimed centrality in the Arab liberation project now risks becoming a conduit for the erasure of Palestinian presence and a pawn in a regional order built on foreign control and energy dependency.
Still, the foundations of recovery are visible, and for the first time in many years, Syria’s future holds a glimmer of promise—albeit one shaped as much by the interests of others as by its own people.