In late October 2025, Sudan’s civil war reached a grim new milestone as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized control of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. The city’s fall, after an 18-month siege, marked the collapse of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) last major stronghold in western Sudan and triggered a fresh wave of violence and displacement that has drawn urgent international condemnation.
El Fasher’s capture did not occur in isolation. According to an analysis published on November 20, 2025, the RSF’s advance came just two months after its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—better known as Hemedti—declared a parallel government in Nyala, South Darfur. This east–west divide within Sudan is now nearly complete, with the RSF consolidating power in the west even as the SAF clings to the east. The consequences for civilians have been catastrophic: tens of thousands have fled El Fasher, and thousands more are reported dead. The United Nations now estimates that more than 100,000 people have escaped the city since its fall, seeking refuge in nearby towns and sprawling displacement camps.
UN aid chief Tom Fletcher, who recently visited Sudan, described the situation in Darfur as “an absolute horror show.” In a video shared on social media, Fletcher said, “El Fasher, based on the testimonies I heard from many survivors, is basically a crime scene. The deliberate attacks on civilians—and I heard so many stories of these—must stop and we want those who commit these crimes to face justice.” His words echoed the mounting outcry from rights groups and witnesses, who have reported mass killings, kidnappings, and widespread sexual violence during the RSF’s campaign to take the city.
The United Nations Human Rights Council responded to these reports by ordering an investigation into the atrocities in El Fasher on November 14, 2025. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk did not mince words, stating, “There has been too much pretence and performance and too little action. It must stand up against these atrocities, a display of naked cruelty used to subjugate and control an entire population.” The RSF has denied targeting civilians, blaming any abuses on rogue actors, but mounting evidence—including satellite imagery showing bodies buried in mass graves—suggests otherwise.
For many Sudanese, the horrors of El Fasher are just the latest chapter in a war that has devastated the country since April 2023. The RSF’s victory in western Sudan has been fueled by a vast and shadowy international network. As reported by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the group relies on illicit trade and organized crime to sustain its operations. Military supplies and gold are trafficked through a web of logistics corridors stretching across Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Libya.
Chad, once a key rear base for the RSF, has seen its role shift over the course of the conflict. Early on, airports in Amdjarass and Abéché were reportedly used for UAE-supported cargo flights supplying the RSF. This drew the ire of Chad’s Zaghawa community, whose members straddle the Sudanese border and have suffered at the hands of the RSF. Mounting domestic opposition and SAF threats to strike inside Chad forced the government in N’Djamena to scale back its cooperation in 2025. Flights from the UAE subsequently shifted north to Kufra in eastern Libya and directly into Nyala, South Darfur, often under cover of darkness. The RSF’s June 2025 capture of the border area where Sudan, Libya, and Egypt meet, aided by a Libyan militia aligned with Khalifa Haftar, further opened up ground supply routes from Kufra.
Chad’s changing stance has not closed all doors for the RSF, but it has complicated their logistics. Some arms and materiel still transit through Chad’s northern regions, but the country is no longer the group’s primary hub. Instead, attention has shifted both north and south. In recent months, South Sudanese and Kenyan-registered aircraft have been spotted landing in Nyala, offloading supplies and transporting wounded RSF fighters. Kenya’s involvement has drawn scrutiny: in February 2025, it hosted meetings that produced a charter for the RSF’s parallel government in Nyala, and in June, the SAF accused Kenya of supplying arms to the RSF—a charge Nairobi has strongly denied. The United States Senate has since called for a review of Kenya’s “major non-NATO ally” status, granted in 2024.
Uganda, too, has been implicated. In May 2025, the SAF destroyed a Kenyan-registered Boeing 737 in Nyala, allegedly carrying RSF military supplies. The Global Initiative confirmed that the aircraft was operated from Entebbe, Uganda, by a local owner and pilot. Meanwhile, South Sudan has emerged as a central node in the RSF’s gold economy. In March 2024, several hundred kilograms of gold from RSF-controlled mines in Songo were transported to Wau, flown to Juba, and then shipped by private jet to the UAE. Reports also suggest that artisanal gold from RSF territory is being smuggled through South Sudan, strengthening the group’s financial base.
The Central African Republic (CAR) has also surfaced as a potential conduit for RSF support. Early in the conflict, weapons reportedly flowed from the northeast CAR to the RSF, allegedly with help from the Russia-backed Wagner Group. However, relations have since soured amid accusations of Wagner incursions into Darfur. Now, Abu Dhabi is courting Bangui with proposals to refurbish Birao airport near the Sudan border, raising fears that the site could become a new supply hub for the RSF.
With Sudan’s Civil Aviation Authority now overseeing South Sudan’s airspace, the SAF has gained valuable intelligence on suspicious flights, including those from Kenya and Uganda. In response, the RSF is adapting by constructing dozens of makeshift airstrips across Darfur and Kordofan, designed for light aircraft and located near gold extraction sites. These strips bypass formal air-control networks and are harder for SAF drones to target, allowing the RSF to replenish arms and smuggle gold with greater ease.
As the RSF presses eastward into Kordofan, the humanitarian toll continues to mount. Since early November, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has reported intensified air strikes, drone attacks, and heavy troop mobilization in towns like Babanousa, Dilling, and Kadugli. Residents face rapidly deteriorating access to food, water, and health services, with civilian casualties particularly high in Bara, Babanousa, Ghubeish, and Umm Krediem. Displacement is ongoing, with families fleeing both within Kordofan and across state borders to Khartoum, Northern, and White Nile States.
International observers agree that coordinated action is desperately needed. The forthcoming report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime will provide further analysis of how Sudan’s war has activated new regional supply nodes and reshaped trafficking infrastructures. As Tom Fletcher put it, “We have a moment of opportunity if the world is ready to seize it. Civilians must be protected. Access must be expanded. Flow of arms must be limited.”
Sudan’s war, fueled by regional complicity and criminal networks, has left El Fasher and much of Darfur in ruins. The world now faces a stark choice: intervene decisively, or risk allowing the cycle of violence and suffering to spiral even further out of control.
