The dust is still settling after Iraq’s November 11, 2025, parliamentary elections, but the nation is already grappling with the aftermath: a mix of political maneuvering, legal disputes, and a shocking eruption of violence. As the Independent High Electoral Commission confirmed on Wednesday, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition emerged on top, securing 1.317 million votes—more than any other group in the contest. Yet, if anyone thought this decisive result would bring immediate calm, they were sorely mistaken.
According to Reuters, Sudani’s coalition’s strong showing marks a significant moment for the embattled leader, who was seeking a second term. He’s tried to present himself as the man who can finally steer Iraq toward stability after decades of political turbulence and economic mismanagement. In a televised speech after the initial results, Sudani proclaimed, “The voter turnout is clear evidence of another success, reflected in the restoration of confidence in the political system.” The turnout indeed reached 56.11%, a notable jump from the 41% recorded in the October 2021 elections, as confirmed by the electoral commission and Rudaw.
Sudani’s coalition, known as the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, is projected to take 45 to 46 seats in Iraq’s 329-member legislature, according to preliminary figures cited by Rudaw and local officials. But in a country where no single party can govern alone, coalition-building is the name of the game—a process that’s often fraught with political wrangling and can drag on for months.
Just days after the polls closed, the political chess game began in earnest. On November 15, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen al-Mandalawi sat down with Faleh al-Fayyadh, chief of the Popular Mobilization Forces and head of the National Contract list, which ran in alignment with Sudani’s coalition. Their meeting, reported by Shafaq News, was part of a broader round of post-vote engagements aimed at charting the course for the next government. Al-Mandalawi, whose Al-Asas Party secured eight seats, and al-Fayyadh both emphasized that political groups now share a “responsibility” to swiftly convene the sixth parliamentary term and get a government in place. “Completing constitutional procedures without delay is essential to reassuring the public, protecting stability, and reflecting the voters’ will,” al-Mandalawi stressed.
The officials underscored the need for “establishing an environment of mutual understandings among political forces and adopting responsible dialogue” to tackle the complex challenges ahead. The message was clear: Iraq’s fractious political landscape needs collaboration, not confrontation, if it’s to avoid sliding back into chaos.
But while the politicians talked unity, the reality on the ground was far more turbulent. In Kirkuk’s Dibis district, violence erupted in the wake of the vote, underscoring just how high tensions remain. Armed men linked to newly elected lawmaker Muhaiman al-Hamdani stormed the home of Zeravani Peshmerga member Ahmed al-Khalaf on November 15, firing on the property, assaulting family members, and even attempting to kidnap one of the sons, as reported by local officials and relatives to Shafaq News and other outlets. The attack, which left dozens of bullet holes and a battered car in its wake, followed threats Hamdani had posted on Facebook after learning the family hadn’t supported him at the ballot box.
Khalaf, who was away during the assault, said the attack was politically motivated: “I was targeted because I am a Zeravani Peshmerga.” His mother recounted a harrowing ordeal in which Hamdani’s men tried to force her grandson into a car trunk and even put a pistol to his head—until she intervened. “I put the pistol on my own chest,” she said. The attackers reportedly declared, “Here I am the state. I am above everyone,” before beating an Iraqi army captain who tried to intervene. In the aftermath, residents gathered in solidarity, but Khalaf lamented, “There is no one to protect us. There is no state. If a parliamentarian does this, is there a state? No, there isn’t.”
Authorities responded by surrounding Hamdani’s office in Dibis, leading to the arrest of seven guards and Hamdani’s eventual surrender after a standoff. The Security Media Cell confirmed the charges: storming the house, opening fire, attempted kidnapping, and assaulting an army officer. The incident only added fuel to the fire in Kirkuk, a province already on edge after the Takaddum Front—Hamdani’s party—secured the second-largest vote tally in the area, trailing only the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
Meanwhile, the legal fallout from the elections began to unfold. On November 16, Haifa Hussein Hatem al-Jabri, a losing candidate and sitting lawmaker, filed Iraq’s first formal legal challenge to the 2025 results in Dhi Qar province. Al-Jabri’s campaign, after reviewing original tally sheets from every station in her district, claimed to have found “clear and significant discrepancies” with the commission’s preliminary figures. She vowed to pursue “all legal avenues” to recover what she called the “genuine votes,” escalating the case to the highest judicial authority.
Al-Jabri called on the head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council to launch investigations into alleged irregularities, including vote-buying, misuse of government posts, and the influence of political money—practices she said distort results and erode public trust. The electoral commission, for its part, announced it had finished counting all outstanding ballots and was preparing to publish final results by November 17. According to IHEC spokesperson Jumana al-Ghalai, most of the 102 complaints received so far were minor and unlikely to affect the results, but the appeals process would remain open for three days after the final announcement, with a further review by the Electoral Judicial Panel and, ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court.
This election was Iraq’s sixth parliamentary contest since the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. The higher-than-expected turnout has been hailed by Sudani and his allies as a sign of renewed public faith in the system, but skepticism lingers—especially among younger Iraqis, many of whom see the process as little more than a means for established parties to divvy up the country’s oil wealth.
With seat allocations underway—including quotas for women and minorities—and the final results imminent, the next few weeks will be critical. If Iraq’s leaders can navigate the maze of coalition talks, legal appeals, and simmering tensions without further violence, it may yet mark a step forward for the country’s fragile democracy. But as events in Kirkuk and Dhi Qar show, the path to stability is anything but straightforward.
For now, Iraq’s political future hangs in the balance—caught between old rivalries, new alliances, and a public that’s watching, waiting, and hoping for real change.
