On November 20, 2025, the long-awaited UK Covid-19 Inquiry delivered a sweeping verdict on how Scotland’s government, led by former First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, handled the coronavirus crisis. The 760-page report, chaired by Baroness Hallett, paints a complex portrait: Sturgeon is praised for her seriousness and sense of responsibility, yet sharply criticized for concentrating power within a small circle and sidelining broader cabinet involvement at crucial moments.
The inquiry, as reported by the BBC, found that the Scottish government was “significantly under-prepared” for what was to come and “too reliant on UK ministers to lead the response.” In the early months of 2020, as Covid-19 swept across the globe, Scotland’s main strategy was simply to monitor the virus’s spread. There was, the report states, “no real strategy” between January and March of that year.
Baroness Hallett’s report didn’t mince words about the broader UK context, either. She described a “toxic and chaotic culture” at the heart of Boris Johnson’s government, with a “lack of trust” between ministers in Edinburgh and London coloring decision-making throughout the crisis. Political spats between the Scottish and UK administrations were frequent, with both sides accusing the other of using the pandemic to further their own agendas. Michael Gove, then Chancellor to the Duchy of Lancaster, claimed that Scottish ministers sometimes viewed decisions “through a political lens” to see if diverging from the UK approach would bolster the case for independence.
Despite the political tension, the inquiry found no evidence that pandemic-related decisions were swayed by party interests. Still, the relationship between Sturgeon and her UK counterparts was described as “poor,” with neither side making efforts to improve the situation. This perception of maneuvering, the report said, “hindered intergovernmental relations at a time when trust between the administrations was paramount.”
One of the most striking criticisms leveled at Sturgeon was her leadership style during the crisis. The report acknowledged her as a “serious and diligent leader who took responsibility for decisions,” but argued this approach often excluded other ministers and advisers from key discussions. Instead, a so-called “Gold Command” group—comprised of Sturgeon, her deputy John Swinney, and a handful of senior advisers—met in advance of Scottish cabinet meetings. These gatherings, crucially, were not formally minuted.
Sturgeon insisted to the inquiry that these were “not decision-making meetings.” But Baroness Hallett’s report disagreed, concluding that the use of this informal group “diminished the role of the Scottish cabinet and reduced the transparency of decision-making.” The closure of schools in Scotland, for example, was decided by Sturgeon and Swinney alone—a move the report says “should not have sidelined” the full cabinet.
Unlike Wales, where the government’s cabinet was “fully engaged throughout the pandemic” and decisions were made by consensus, the Scottish cabinet often found itself merely ratifying decisions already made elsewhere. The report highlighted that Sturgeon fronted 98% of Scottish government briefings, suggesting that sharing the communications burden could have “reduced the risk of polarisation among members of the public.”
Responding to the report, Sturgeon was candid about the challenges. “I have no doubt that I made my share of [mistakes],” she told journalists at the Scottish Parliament, adding, “And that’s a burden I will carry for the rest of my life.” She defended her approach as one made in “good faith” under “unprecedented and uncertain” circumstances, stating: “I made a conscious decision at the start of the pandemic to lead from the front and to make very clear that the buck stopped with me. I stand by that decision and if time could be turned back I would make that decision again.”
But not everyone is convinced. Scottish Conservative MSP Murdo Fraser accused the government of a “policy of secrecy and cover-up,” pointing to the deletion of WhatsApp messages by ministers and the absence of formal minutes from Gold Command meetings. “Nicola Sturgeon promised in 2021 that nothing would be off limits in providing evidence to a public inquiry – yet we know now that both she and John Swinney shamefully deleted their WhatsApp messages in an orchestrated effort to evade scrutiny,” Fraser said. “That’s on top of the fact that no minutes were kept of the Gold Command meetings between senior ministers and advisers where the key pandemic decisions were taken.”
Scottish Labour’s deputy leader Jackie Baillie echoed concerns about preparedness, stating, “It is clearer than ever that the Scottish government was not prepared for a pandemic and failed to take action quickly enough.” She added, “This report cements the central role John Swinney played in the SNP government’s pandemic response and it is disappointing that he failed to come to the Parliament to make a statement and take questions on the report himself. The first minister owes the people of Scotland a real apology for the decisions he took at this time.”
The report also scrutinized the use of private messaging apps for official business. Although Sturgeon sometimes exchanged direct messages on X (formerly Twitter) with health expert Professor Devi Sridhar, the inquiry criticized the use of private channels for pandemic discussions. In response, the Scottish government has now banned ministers from using mobile messaging apps for official business, mandating the use of corporate devices instead.
Perhaps most sobering were the findings on the timing and impact of lockdowns. The report concluded that the responses of all four UK governments “repeatedly amounted to a case of ‘too little, too late.’” Had sweeping restrictions been imposed just one week earlier, it estimates, 23,000 deaths could have been avoided in England alone. The devolved administrations, including Scotland, were found to be “too reliant on the UK government to lead the response,” failing to conduct their own adequate planning.
Once lockdowns were imposed at the end of March 2020, the report noted, “none of the four governments had a strategy for when or how they would exit the lockdown.” The UK government’s “high-risk” approach to easing restrictions in England that summer was contrasted with the more gradual strategies adopted by Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The Scottish government was praised for “the quick introduction of stringent, locally targeted measures” in autumn 2020, but ultimately, all four governments “failed to recognise” the threat of new variants and “did not take action until infection levels were critical.”
John Swinney, for his part, posted on X: “My thoughts and heartfelt sympathies continue to be with everyone who lost a loved one to Covid-19 and who suffered so much disruption to their lives. It is vital we learn lessons and @scotgov will give the inquiry’s findings and recommendations full and thorough consideration.”
Baroness Hallett’s report closes with a call for unity and transparency in future crises: “In a future emergency, leaders of each of the four nations should seek to minimise political division and prioritise collective working in the public interest.” For now, the debate over Scotland’s Covid-19 response—and the lessons to be learned—remains very much alive.
