The United States Space Force is poised to take a bold step in the ever-evolving race for missile defense, as it prepares to release a solicitation for space-based interceptors (SBIs) capable of kinetic midcourse missile defense. According to a pre-solicitation published by Space Systems Command (SSC), the official request for proposals will be posted on December 7, 2025, with the intention of awarding multiple fixed-price prototype agreements by February 2026. This move marks a significant milestone in President Donald Trump’s ambitious Golden Dome initiative, a sprawling plan to establish a comprehensive missile defense shield for the homeland, aiming to be fully operational by 2028.
The Golden Dome initiative, as reported by Breaking Defense and SpaceNews, envisions a layered architecture combining both legacy systems and cutting-edge space-based technologies. The inclusion of SBIs is central to this vision, promising the capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) during the longest phase of their flight—when they traverse the vacuum of space before reentering Earth’s atmosphere. The Space Force’s upcoming solicitation focuses specifically on kinetic options, meaning the interceptors would destroy their targets through direct collision, rather than by explosive means.
While the executive order that set the Golden Dome project in motion called for a constellation of SBIs designed for boost-phase interception—the earliest stage of a missile’s flight, when it is most vulnerable—the addition of midcourse interceptors is intended to provide a critical second layer of defense. The idea is that by targeting missiles during their midcourse, defenders have a longer window in which to act, albeit with greater technical challenges due to the deployment of decoys and the presence of multiple warheads.
According to the SSC’s pre-solicitation, companies interested in competing for the prototype contracts must apply for additional bidding documents by December 4, 2025. The solicitation may also include prize competitions, mirroring the approach the Space Force has taken with its boost-phase SBI program, in an effort to spur innovation among defense contractors.
But as the United States doubles down on space-based missile defense, critics and analysts are raising pointed questions about the feasibility, cost, and strategic wisdom of the Golden Dome plan. In a recent opinion piece for SpaceNews, Najam Ul Hassan of the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies in Lahore outlined the daunting technical and strategic barriers that have long bedeviled such efforts—barriers that echo the challenges faced by the Strategic Defense Initiative’s “Brilliant Pebble” program decades ago.
“The fundamental hurdle—physics, not technology—remains to be effectively overcome,” Hassan wrote. He explained that while advances in launch capacity, reduced costs for sending mass into orbit, and improved data transfer rates have rekindled hope for space-based missile defense, the laws of physics still pose a formidable obstacle. For boost-phase interception, satellites must be stationed in low Earth orbit (LEO) to reach missiles during the brief three-to-five-minute window after launch. However, objects in LEO cannot remain fixed over any one point on Earth, as they complete an orbit every 90 to 120 minutes. This means that to ensure global coverage, a vast constellation—Hassan cites an estimate of 950 satellites—would be required.
The financial implications are staggering. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of such a constellation at $542 billion, far exceeding the $175 billion figure cited by President Trump. And that’s just the beginning of the operational challenges. The system is highly susceptible to saturation; simultaneous missile launches could overwhelm the interceptors, and adversaries could target the satellites themselves with anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. “Even if each satellite were to carry more than one interceptor, the system still saturates quickly,” Hassan noted. “Once that happens, instead of a linear increase in required satellites to intercept additional hostile launches, the requirement jumps exponentially, which is untenable.”
Moreover, the deployment of SBIs could trigger a dangerous arms race in space. The kinetic kill vehicles required for missile interception could just as easily be used as ASAT weapons, raising alarms in rival capitals. China, for instance, has already fielded its own “Golden Dome” prototype—though focused on early warning and big data integration rather than interceptors—and has sharply criticized the American approach. Beijing warns that U.S. plans for SBIs would upset “global strategic balance and stability” and risk turning “space into a war zone.” Russia, too, has called the initiative “very destabilizing.”
These concerns aren’t merely theoretical. The mere prospect of SBIs in orbit could prompt adversaries to develop more missiles, deploy decoys, or invest in counter-space capabilities, further complicating the security environment. “Challenging the effectiveness of an adversary’s deterrent would have profound strategic implications,” Hassan observed, “at least insofar as it would either find qualitative ways to evade the newly developed defense architecture, or increase the number of their missiles to overwhelm the systems, or both.”
The Space Force, for its part, appears undeterred by these criticisms, pressing ahead with its solicitation and prototype competitions in the hope that American innovation will ultimately prevail. Proponents argue that technological progress—especially in satellite miniaturization, propulsion, and networked data systems—could eventually tip the balance in favor of workable space-based missile defense. They point to the urgency of countering emerging threats, such as hypersonic glide vehicles and multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which add complexity to missile interception and reduce the effectiveness of ground-based systems.
Yet, as Hassan and other skeptics caution, the underlying physics of missile flight and orbital mechanics have not changed. The “absenteeism problem”—the fact that satellites in LEO are not always in position to intercept a missile during its vulnerable boost phase—remains as intractable as ever. And while intercepting missiles in the midcourse phase offers a longer engagement window, it is fraught with its own difficulties, including the need to distinguish real warheads from decoys and the risk of escalation in the weaponization of space.
As the U.S. moves forward with its Golden Dome initiative, the world will be watching closely. The stakes are high—not just in terms of dollars spent or technological milestones reached, but in the potential to reshape the global security landscape for decades to come. Whether space-based interceptors can deliver on their promise, or whether the project will ultimately fall victim to the same pitfalls that doomed earlier efforts, remains to be seen. For now, the Space Force’s December solicitation marks the latest chapter in a saga where science, strategy, and politics collide—sometimes with breathtaking ambition, and sometimes with sobering reminders of the limits imposed by nature and human rivalry alike.
With the clock ticking toward 2028, the challenge is clear: to balance the drive for technological supremacy with the need for global stability, lest the race for the ultimate shield become the spark for a new era of insecurity in space and on Earth alike.
