When Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) on September 17, 2025, the move sent ripples across West Asia and beyond. The pact, which many compare to NATO’s Article Five, marks a significant upgrade from the longstanding but largely informal security relationship between the two countries. For decades, Pakistani troops have served in Saudi Arabia, but this new treaty transforms that arrangement into a binding collective defense commitment. According to The Media Line, the timing—just days after the September 9 Israeli strike in Doha—was symbolic, but experts say the pact had been in the works for some time.
India, a key regional player with deepening economic and diplomatic ties to Riyadh, responded with measured restraint. Over the past decade, New Delhi has cultivated a substantive partnership with Saudi Arabia, and Saudi officials reportedly kept India in the loop about their talks with Pakistan. As noted by The Hindu, this transparency helped India avoid an overblown public reaction, in sharp contrast to the heated debates playing out on social media.
So, what’s driving this realignment? For Riyadh, the answer lies in a changing security landscape. Political risk expert Ali Zafar told The Media Line that the SMDA is "reassuring" for Saudi Arabia because it "hedges against perceived US gaps without undermining US ties." Recent signals from Washington have suggested that the US is no longer the ironclad security guarantor it once was for the Arab Gulf. Israel’s increasing military assertiveness and America’s inability to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions have only added urgency for Saudi leaders to diversify their defense partnerships. Naadirah Vali, a GCC policy researcher, explained, "The US has long been a key security guarantor for Saudi Arabia and the region more broadly; Saudi Arabia’s efforts to balance its preference for a US-heavy security relationship with its more eastern-facing connections reflects a certain geopolitical agility amid perceived shifts in the international order."
But what exactly does the pact cover? Ausaf Sayeed, India’s former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, told The Hindu that "this particular Pak Saudi defence pact transforms an informal security relationship into a binding treaty, which we can compare to NATO’s Article Five. Article 5 states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both." However, Sayeed was quick to clarify that "the agreement does not explicitly extend Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia. However, it creates sufficient ambiguity to allow for multiple interpretations." Official statements from Islamabad deny any nuclear cooperation, but both sides have left enough room for speculation—deliberately, it seems—to bolster Saudi Arabia’s sense of security without violating non-proliferation norms or diluting Pakistan’s India-centric nuclear doctrine.
The practical focus, according to Zafar, is on "training, joint drills, and intelligence sharing—building on decades of military cooperation." The first year of the agreement, he said, will prioritize "joint training and air-defense exercises, send defense advisers to strengthen Saudi command systems, and establish a secure intel-sharing channel for aerial and maritime threats." Pakistani technicians will provide maintenance and logistics support, but there will be "no permanent basing—only rotational trainers and liaison officers—emphasizing the pact’s defensive, nonnuclear character."
Still, the specter of nuclear involvement lingers. As Zafar put it, "The pact inevitably carries a nuclear shadow, given Pakistan’s unique status as the Muslim world’s only nuclear power. Even without nuclear provisions, the collective-defense clause signals strategic reassurance for Riyadh. While this boosts Saudi confidence at little cost to Islamabad, it risks stirring unease among neighbors." For India, this ambiguity is particularly troubling. As Sayeed noted, "The explicit extension of the nuclear capabilities to Saudi Arabia under this mutual defense agreement creates unprecedented complications for Israel’s strategic planning." Moreover, the agreement could revive the "India-Pak hyphenation" that New Delhi has worked hard to avoid, complicating its response options in the event of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism or a military confrontation.
Pakistan, meanwhile, is not acting out of pure altruism. The economic ballast is just as important as the strategic one. Islamabad is seeking "clear dividends in return," Zafar explained. "Energy tops the list—preferential oil supplies and deferred payments to ease foreign-exchange stress. It will also push for expanded Saudi investment, especially in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and mining projects like Reko Diq. Just as important, Pakistan will look for more worker visas and improved labor terms in the Gulf, safeguarding remittances from Saudi Arabia, already one of Pakistan’s largest inflow sources." These economic incentives are crucial for Pakistan’s domestic stability, especially as it seeks to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions and manage its foreign exchange reserves.
The agreement also fits into Saudi Arabia’s broader Vision 2030 plan, which aims to localize the defense industry and diversify the kingdom’s international partnerships. Vali observed, "Saudi’s bold investment in military industries falls under the Kingdom’s economic modernization efforts; strategic partnerships, market expansion, and strategies that preempt geopolitical and security developments surrounding it all ensure a more resilient, robust defense outlook for Saudi." The SMDA supplements, rather than replaces, the US security umbrella, providing Riyadh with short-term reassurance and practical support while it continues to seek a more formalized defense pact with Washington.
Regionally, the pact is being woven into the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) broader security fabric. Vali stressed the importance of "more integrated defense between the Gulf states—leveraging their combined financial, security, and military capabilities would lead to a level of defense cooperation in the GCC that would provide added fortification of the region." Zafar added that Saudi–Pakistan cooperation must be "woven into existing GCC frameworks" to avoid duplication and ensure transparency. This integration is seen as vital for managing real-time threats and maintaining the defensive—not competitive—nature of the pact.
Saudi Arabia’s recent SR1.38 billion (about $368 million) aid package to Yemen’s Aden-based government—covering budget support, petroleum derivatives, and hospital operating funds—also reflects a strategy of stabilizing the southern flank and ensuring maritime security through the Bab el-Mandeb. For Pakistan, any involvement in Yemen will remain "low profile—capacity building, training Yemeni forces, bolstering coast guard capacity, and technical support," Zafar said, emphasizing that Pakistan will avoid combat involvement and operate only within multilateral frameworks.
On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Saudi Arabia has warned that any West Bank annexation would have "major implications in all fields," a message widely interpreted as a signal that normalization with Israel could be off the table if the status quo changes. For Pakistan, the red lines remain clear: "No permanent bases, no expeditionary combat deployments, and no nuclear transfers. Islamabad will confine itself to training, advisory roles, maritime security, and crisis diplomacy," Zafar asserted.
In the end, the SMDA is as much about managing domestic pressures as it is about projecting power abroad. For Saudi Arabia, it’s a step toward greater strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. For Pakistan, it’s a calculated move to secure economic lifelines and maintain strategic relevance without crossing dangerous thresholds. India, for its part, must now weigh whether its traditional caution in Gulf security affairs still serves its interests—or whether the time has come for a more active role in the region’s evolving security architecture.
