In a move that has reverberated across the Middle East and South Asia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a landmark Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in Riyadh on September 17, 2025. The pact, formalized during Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s high-profile visit to the kingdom, marks a shift from decades of quiet cooperation to an explicit, NATO-style collective security guarantee between the two Muslim-majority powers.
The agreement’s most striking clause declares that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” According to reporting by The Brookings Institution, this language goes well beyond the platitudes that usually accompany regional security deals. It formalizes and deepens a partnership that, while robust for decades, had previously operated in the shadows of regional diplomacy.
For many, the announcement was unexpected—even by those accustomed to the region’s dramatic twists. The deal’s implications are far-reaching, not just for the two signatories but for their neighbors and global partners. As Asia Times noted, the agreement effectively sharpens the strategic triangle among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India, introducing new uncertainties into a region already fraught with tension.
Pakistan’s military has maintained a significant presence in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, at times deploying over 10,000 troops, including during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Today, more than 1,500 Pakistani personnel continue to serve in training and advisory roles within the kingdom. In return, Saudi Arabia has periodically provided Pakistan with critical financial support, including oil supplies and loans during times of economic distress.
Yet what’s new is not the cooperation itself, but the public, formal commitment to mutual defense. This shift is underpinned by a changing regional landscape. As Brookings analysts observed, Saudi Arabia’s motivation for the pact is rooted in its mounting concerns over Israel’s assertive military actions and doubts about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. The recent Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Qatar, and the apparent unwillingness of the United States to restrain its ally, reportedly pushed Riyadh to accelerate the agreement with Islamabad. At the same time, Saudi leaders are wary of Iran’s ambitions and the unpredictability of U.S. policy in the region.
For Pakistan, the calculus is different but equally compelling. The country’s military leadership, unsettled by shifting U.S. priorities and the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, has sought to avoid over-reliance on a single patron—namely, China. The new agreement with Saudi Arabia thus serves to diversify Islamabad’s strategic partnerships, potentially securing more consistent financial support and offering fresh leverage in its ongoing rivalry with India.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the pact is its nuclear dimension. Pakistani defense officials suggested—albeit ambiguously—that the country’s nuclear capabilities could be extended to Saudi Arabia under the agreement. This assertion, reported by Asia Times, has raised alarms from Tel Aviv to New Delhi. While the idea of operationalizing a Saudi nuclear umbrella remains shrouded in ambiguity, the mere possibility has shifted regional perceptions and injected an element of nuclear-tinged uncertainty into the security calculations of rivals and allies alike.
Not surprisingly, India’s response has been measured but vigilant. On September 24, 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs underscored India’s “wide-ranging strategic partnership” with Saudi Arabia and stated that it would “study the implications” of the new pact, expressing hope that Riyadh would keep “mutual interests and sensitivities” in mind. According to Asia Times, this signals that New Delhi is hedging its bets, choosing not to escalate tensions publicly but remaining on high alert.
India’s concerns are not unfounded. Over 2 million Indian nationals live and work in Saudi Arabia, making the kingdom a critical partner for New Delhi’s energy security and investment ambitions. Saudi Arabia is also central to India’s flagship India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a project designed to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. A closer Saudi–Pakistan defense axis could complicate India’s efforts to shape the corridor’s routing, standards, and commercial priorities—especially if Riyadh finds itself balancing Indian expectations against Pakistani sensitivities.
On the military front, the Indian Navy has expanded its presence in the Gulf and Arabian Sea, conducting anti-piracy operations and convoying ships threatened by Houthi attacks. A formalized Saudi–Pakistan defense partnership could further complicate deconfliction protocols, particularly if an India–Pakistan crisis were to coincide with a Gulf security flare-up. As Asia Times points out, even routine Saudi–Pakistani military exercises could now be interpreted as strategic signaling, raising the risk of misunderstandings in an already crowded maritime theater.
The agreement may also have implications for Saudi Arabia’s defense industrial ambitions. Under its Vision 2030 plan, Riyadh aims to localize more of its defense procurement, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. Pakistan, with its experience in co-producing systems with China and its growing defense industrial base, could be an attractive partner—though integrating Chinese or Pakistani technology may complicate Saudi efforts to build a networked, Western-style military architecture.
Still, the nuclear issue looms large. While Pakistani officials have walked back earlier statements about providing a nuclear umbrella, ambiguity itself can be a form of deterrence. As Brookings analysts argue, the pact’s lack of specificity on nuclear cooperation generates “its own kind of deterrence,” useful for both parties as they navigate a region rife with shifting alliances and latent conflicts.
The risks are real. For Saudi Arabia, a visible tilt toward Pakistan could complicate its hard-won trade and investment ties with India, and over the longer term, could limit its room for maneuver in future normalization efforts with Israel. For Pakistan, the danger lies in overextension—being drawn into Saudi regional campaigns or relying too heavily on the perception of Saudi financial support, which could dampen incentives for much-needed economic reforms.
Other regional players are watching closely. The United States, which has seen its role as the region’s security guarantor questioned in recent years, may view the Saudi–Pakistan pact as a sign of growing hedging behavior among its traditional partners. Meanwhile, India must now navigate a more complicated strategic triangle, balancing its deepening ties with both Saudi Arabia and Israel against the backdrop of a formalized Saudi–Pakistan defense axis.
In the end, the Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement is less about imminent conflict and more about shifting alignments in a region where old certainties are fading fast. For India, the answer may lie in doubling down on its own partnerships, articulating clear red lines, and ensuring that its growing presence in the Gulf is seen as stabilizing rather than threatening. For Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the pact is both a hedge and a signal—a public declaration that, in a volatile world, they intend to stand together, come what may.
