Russia’s Sukhoi fighter jets, long a symbol of the country’s military prowess, are facing mounting challenges behind the scenes. Despite a wartime surge in production, a new report from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London has exposed deep-rooted vulnerabilities in the supply chains that keep these advanced warplanes—such as the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57—airborne. The findings, released on November 12, 2025 and highlighted by outlets including Defense Express and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), paint a picture of a defense industry that is far from self-sufficient, and still heavily reliant on Western technology and foreign suppliers.
For years, Western sanctions have aimed to sever Russia’s access to critical military technologies. Yet, as RFE/RL’s investigative project “Schemes” revealed in April 2024, more than 2,000 foreign-made electronic components—mostly from Japan and the United States—continue to find their way into Russian aircraft production. These parts, essential for the complex avionics and control systems of the Sukhoi fleet, are funneled through third countries and front companies, evading the reach of sanctions regimes that were designed to cut them off.
The RUSI study, which Defense Express described as an “in-depth analysis of Russia’s aircraft manufacturing network,” identified around 1,300 companies entangled in the military aviation supply chain. Many of these firms are not currently targeted by Western sanctions, a gap that has allowed Russia to sustain, and even slightly increase, its production of Sukhoi aircraft since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.
“Russia’s defense production lines can and should be disrupted,” the RUSI report asserts. The authors argue that simply targeting the main assembly plants isn’t enough; the real weak spots lie among the second- and third-tier suppliers who provide everything from specialized cutting tools to high-tech microchips. Without these critical nodes, the entire production line could grind to a halt—or at least slow down considerably.
One telling example is the Skif-M plant in Belgorod, which produces specialized cutting tools for titanium processing, a key component in aircraft manufacturing. Despite its critical role, Skif-M has continued to import advanced German equipment such as Cemecon’s CC800 HiPIMS coating systems, reportedly worth about $7.6 million annually. As of late September 2025, Ukrainian forces struck the Skif-M facility, disrupting its output, according to Defense Express. Yet, the company remains outside the scope of Western sanctions, highlighting the patchwork nature of current restrictions.
Another supplier, Kulon in St. Petersburg, manufactures ceramic capacitors—essential for modern avionics—and continues to import components without restriction. Meanwhile, Ruspolymet GmbH, based in Düsseldorf, exports metalworking equipment and special alloys to its Russian parent company under the guise of scrap metal shipments, further illustrating how Russian industry circumvents sanctions through creative subterfuge.
Major Sukhoi factories in Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, and Komsomolsk-on-Amur remain beyond the reach of Ukrainian strikes, but several key suppliers have not been so lucky. According to RUSI’s interactive map, facilities such as Electrodetal in Bryansk, Signal in Stavropol, and Aviaavtomatika in Kursk have all come under Ukrainian attack. These targeted strikes, when combined with economic measures, could significantly disrupt Russia’s ability to deliver new aircraft to the front lines.
The ongoing flow of Western technology into Russia’s military sector is not limited to passive components. Earlier reports cited by Defense Express detailed how Alphachip, a shadowy intermediary, smuggled US-made chips into Russia’s military-aviation supply chain, including parts destined for Su-34 and Su-35 jets. This steady trickle of high-tech components underscores the challenges facing sanctions enforcement.
The RUSI report doesn’t just dwell on the problems—it offers a roadmap for action. First, it calls for expanding sanctions to cover the hundreds of second- and third-tier suppliers that currently escape scrutiny. “Expanding sanctions to these lower-tier nodes would have a significant effect in slowing production,” the authors argue. Second, they stress the need for far stricter enforcement. As the US Special Envoy for Ukraine, Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, put it, current sanctions are “about a 6” out of 10 in terms of design, but enforcement “is only about a 3.” In other words, rules are only as strong as the will and resources devoted to upholding them.
But the recommendations go further. The report urges Western governments to coordinate military and economic strategies, aligning Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns with targeted economic measures to maximize disruption. Encouraging the emigration of skilled Russian engineers—what the report calls “accelerating brain drain”—would erode Russia’s long-term aerospace capabilities. And on the global stage, the West is advised to compete aggressively in export markets, offering affordable and maintainable alternatives to Russian and Chinese combat aircraft in order to erode Moscow’s influence abroad.
Despite these vulnerabilities, Russia’s defense industry has proven remarkably resilient. The RUSI report notes that, during the ongoing war, production of Sukhoi aircraft has actually risen slightly, defying expectations that sanctions would cripple output. This is made possible by the persistent flow of foreign-made components, which, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pointed out last year, also play a role in Russia’s missile attacks. Zelensky estimated that around 1,500 foreign-made components were used in Russian missile strikes on Kyiv—a number that appears unchanged as of late 2025.
For all the complexity of Russia’s military-industrial network, the core challenge remains straightforward: as long as critical suppliers remain unsanctioned and enforcement remains lax, Moscow will find ways to keep its war machine humming. Yet the RUSI analysis makes clear that targeted pressure—whether through expanded sanctions, military strikes, or market competition—could raise costs, slow deliveries, and ultimately erode Russia’s ability to project airpower over the long term.
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, the fate of Russia’s Sukhoi fighters may well hinge on the West’s willingness to adapt its strategy, close loopholes, and strike at the heart of the supply chains that keep these aircraft in the sky. The stakes are high, and the window for decisive action may not remain open forever.
