On the sidelines of a major regional summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, a fresh diplomatic push unfolded this weekend as special envoys from China, Iran, Russia, and Pakistan gathered to discuss the ever-tense situation in Afghanistan. The meeting, held during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on September 11–12, 2025, comes against a backdrop of renewed violence and escalating rhetoric between Islamabad and Kabul, raising the stakes for stability in South and Central Asia.
The SCO—led by China and Russia and including Central Asian states, India, and Pakistan—has made Afghanistan a focal point since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. With the Taliban’s grip now entering its fourth year, concerns about terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and cross-border crime have only grown more acute. Earlier this year, the SCO announced the creation of a contact group on Afghanistan, a move driven by what Ghulam Farooq Aleem, a former Afghan prosecutor, described as “centered on counterterrorism, regional stability and stopping the export of militancy, narcotics and arms trafficking.” As Aleem told Arab News, “That is why they see some form of engagement with the Taliban as unavoidable.”
China’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong, confirmed his participation in the quadrilateral meeting, expressing on X (formerly Twitter) that all parties “emphasized the necessity of engagement with Afghanistan and helping its reconstruction.” While he didn’t elaborate further, the subtext was clear: regional powers are searching for a way to manage the risks emanating from Afghanistan, even as formal recognition of the Taliban remains off the table.
Both China and Russia have hosted Taliban delegations and maintain limited diplomatic missions in Kabul. Yet neither has extended formal recognition, wary of the international backlash and the unpredictable nature of the Taliban regime. Iran, for its part, has walked a tightrope—maintaining dialogue but frequently clashing with Kabul over water rights and border incidents. Pakistan, meanwhile, has posted an ambassador to Kabul, signaling a desire for engagement, but relations are anything but smooth.
The latest flashpoint came on September 13, when Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, visiting the city of Bannu in the country’s northwest, delivered a blunt ultimatum to the Afghan government. “Today, I want to give a clear message to Afghanistan to choose between Pakistan and TTP,” Sharif declared, referencing the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for a surge in deadly attacks. “Terrorists entered Pakistan from Afghanistan and, together with the outlawed TTP, carried out attacks that martyred soldiers, brothers, sisters and ordinary citizens.”
The prime minister’s remarks followed a bloody week in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where Pakistani security forces clashed with militants, leaving at least 19 soldiers and 45 fighters dead, according to Dawn and Arab News. Sharif paid tribute to the fallen soldiers and vowed, “We will not sit in peace until the militants are eliminated.” He added that an anti-militancy plan would be presented to the federal cabinet for immediate implementation, stressing, “All decisions taken in the cabinet meeting will be implemented immediately.”
The escalation in rhetoric is not new, but it has reached a fever pitch. Since the Taliban seized control in Kabul, Pakistan has repeatedly accused them of allowing TTP militants to operate from Afghan territory—a charge the Taliban have consistently denied. In April, Taliban deputy spokesman Hamdullah Fitrat insisted Kabul should not be held responsible for Islamabad’s “failed policies” and that “it did not permit any group to use Afghan soil for any activity or operation against Pakistan.”
Yet, the cycle of accusation and denial has only deepened mistrust. Afghan-Pakistani relations hit a new low after a wave of suicide bombings in Pakistan two years ago, which Islamabad blamed on the TTP. In response, Pakistan began deporting undocumented foreigners—mostly Afghans—arguing that the large refugee population posed a security risk. Over the past two years, 1.4 million Afghan nationals have been expelled, worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, as reported by Arab News.
Experts warn that this tit-for-tat approach is self-defeating. Naseer Ahmad Nawidy, a political science professor at Kabul’s Salam University, noted, “Islamabad is trying to justify the mass deportations by alleging refugee involvement in destabilizing activities—a claim that lacks sufficient substantiation.” Nawidy cautioned, “Further escalation of tensions serves no purpose. Both nations require economic development, regional connectivity, and constructive relations with the international community. Ongoing hostility only harms the broader region.”
Security concerns are hardly one-sided. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has repeatedly highlighted the threat posed by Afghanistan-based terrorist groups, calling for “collaborative efforts” to counter them. “Groups like Fitna al Khwarij represent a common threat to the peace and stability of our region, necessitating collective action to counter their malign influence,” a spokesperson said at a recent media briefing. Political leaders in Pakistan have urged the military to engage with Afghanistan to address internal security problems, but, as Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly told them, “They don’t listen to us.”
For Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, engagement with regional powers offers a crucial alternative to the Western recognition that remains elusive. Since 2021, the United States and its allies have imposed sanctions and withheld formal diplomatic ties, citing widespread human rights violations, especially the Taliban’s restrictions on girls’ education and women’s work. With little sign of a breakthrough from the West, the Taliban have turned increasingly to their neighbors—hoping that China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan might help break their isolation, or at least offer economic lifelines.
Yet, even among these regional players, consensus is fragile. Iran’s relationship with Afghanistan is described by experts as “pragmatic but wary,” with cooperation often overshadowed by disputes and security incidents along their shared border. China and Russia, for all their engagement, have stopped short of formal recognition, wary of the risks to their own security and international standing. Pakistan, arguably the most exposed to Afghan instability, finds itself caught between the need for engagement and the imperative to contain cross-border militancy.
Amid this web of suspicion and necessity, the SCO’s efforts to foster dialogue stand out as a rare point of consensus. As Yue Xiaoyong put it, “All parties emphasized the necessity of engagement with Afghanistan and helping its reconstruction.” But translating that consensus into practical action remains a tall order, especially as the security situation on the ground continues to deteriorate and political trust is in short supply.
Earlier this year, during a visit by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, Afghan acting premier Mullah Hasan Akhund assured that Afghanistan’s territory would not be used against its neighbors. But as recent events have shown, such assurances are not enough to calm the fears and frustrations on both sides of the border.
The stakes for the region could hardly be higher. With millions displaced, economies under strain, and extremist groups exploiting every gap in security, the path forward demands both courage and compromise. Whether the latest round of regional diplomacy can overcome the legacy of suspicion and violence remains to be seen. But for now, the message from Dushanbe is clear: engagement, however difficult, is seen as the only way out of the impasse.
