For decades, the United States has relied on the global market for the metals and minerals that power its economy, from the smartphones in Americans’ pockets to the advanced weaponry that underpins national defense. But as of November 2025, that reliance has reached what many experts call a dangerous tipping point. The U.S. is now dependent on foreign nations for 50 to 99 percent of 34 vital metals and minerals—and for 15 of those, it relies entirely on imports, according to CFACT.ORG. The stakes are enormous: these resources are essential for everything from electric vehicles and medical devices to lasers, communication networks, and the very infrastructure that supports modern life.
At the heart of this global supply web sits China. As reported by both CFACT.ORG and recent summit coverage, China controls roughly 70 to 80 percent of global rare earth mining and more than 90 percent of refining and processing for all 17 rare earth metals. Even more striking, China dominates almost the entire production of high-performance magnets—critical components for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and precision-guided munitions. Virtually all graphite, both natural and synthetic, is processed in China before being exported to battery manufacturers worldwide.
This dominance is no accident. Over the past decade, China has methodically consolidated its grip on these resources, developing not only the mining capacity but the downstream processing and manufacturing capabilities that turn raw minerals into the building blocks of the modern economy. Each time geopolitical tensions rise, Beijing’s ability to weaponize this advantage becomes clear. During the week of November 6, 2025, the Trump-Xi summit at APEC in Gyeongju resulted in a one-year pause: China agreed to delay for one year the latest round of rare earth export controls, a move that temporarily eased fears in Washington and markets from Detroit to Düsseldorf.
Yet, as the Financial Times and CFACT.ORG both note, this “truce” is a double-edged sword. It offers a brief window of opportunity, but also underscores just how precarious global dependence on China remains. The threat isn’t just theoretical. Beijing had planned to impose stringent export controls on “every element of production” associated with rare earth elements (REEs). If “even a single gram” of any rare earth mined, processed, or refined in China was in a U.S. product, China could veto its sale worldwide. The Trump administration, recognizing the risk, has begun to act. President Trump recently announced investment deals with Australia—already home to 89 active rare earth exploration projects—to build less-polluting processing plants and improve supply chains. Similar deals are being pursued with other allies, and plans are in motion to set “price floors” to protect domestic mining from market manipulation by foreign producers.
Still, the United States faces a daunting challenge at home. Environmental regulations and opposition have delayed mining and exploration on hundreds of millions of acres of public lands, primarily in Alaska and 11 western states—a region larger than Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming combined. These lands, managed by federal agencies, are often closed to exploration and mining, sometimes by acts of Congress, other times by presidential or bureaucratic decree, or through endless studies and litigation. The result: vast swathes of potentially mineral-rich land remain under lock and key, with little to no assessment of their subsurface value. This, critics argue, has left America vulnerable to political, economic, and military pressure from abroad.
“America can no longer let environmental alarmists and ideologies override vital national defense, economic, and security needs,” CFACT.ORG argues. The Trump administration is now reexamining land use and withdrawal policies, streamlining permit processes, and issuing long-delayed permits. There’s also a push to limit or resolve environmental lawsuits that have blocked world-class deposits, and to spur research into cleaner refining technologies.
But the solution to China’s dominance doesn’t rest with the U.S. alone. Increasingly, eyes are turning to India. India possesses rich rare earth deposits in its beach sands—monazite, bastnaesite, and other minerals. For years, however, its processing capabilities and environmental regulations lagged behind. That’s changing quickly. In June 2025, India announced negotiations with companies and a fiscal incentive scheme to boost domestic rare earth magnet manufacturing, aiming to reduce reliance on China. Indian companies such as Sona Comstar are already setting up magnet production lines, while state-owned Indian Rare Earths Ltd. is expanding refining capacity. The Indian Space Research Organization is adapting high-purity separation technology initially designed for satellites for use in rare earth processing.
India isn’t going it alone. Under the Quad framework—a strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, and Australia—India is accelerating joint exploration, co-financing, and technology-transfer projects. Unlike smaller producers, India brings both scale and credibility: it’s the world’s fifth-largest economy, a trusted U.S. partner, and already central to global semiconductor, defense, and clean energy supply chains. Its manufacturing base is large enough to absorb downstream industries—magnets, motors, batteries—that countries like Australia or Brazil cannot fully host. With strong political will and a burgeoning tech ecosystem, India could soon emerge as the third pillar—alongside the United States and Japan—of a democratic rare earth network.
Australia and Brazil remain vital players, too. Australia’s Arafura and Lynas projects are years ahead in mining and early-stage processing, while Brazil’s Serra Verde mine, which began shipments last year, brings much-needed Western Hemisphere diversification. The United States itself has made progress: MP Materials has started producing neodymium-praseodymium metal in California and magnets in Texas. Yet, as the Financial Times points out, these ventures depend heavily on long-term offtake agreements and subsidies. No single country can offset China’s dominance—but a coordinated alliance might.
India’s rare earth strategy aligns with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) agenda, which enjoys bipartisan support. The article urges the United States to go further: co-finance magnet plants in India, establish reciprocal stockpiles, fast-track technology sharing, and embed rare earth cooperation into the Quad’s core agenda. “If China uses the next 12 months to tighten control while others hesitate, the world will emerge more dependent than before,” the Financial Times warns. “If instead the United States, Japan, Australia, and Brazil rally behind India’s rise as a credible supplier and processor, they can lay the foundation for a truly pluralistic rare-earth market—and with it, greater geopolitical resilience.”
Ultimately, the Trump-Xi summit bought the world some breathing space. Whether the U.S. and its allies can use it wisely—to build a more secure, diversified, and resilient supply chain for the metals and minerals that make modern life possible—remains to be seen. The clock is ticking, and the next year may prove decisive.
