The specter of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan hangs heavily over South Asia, as fresh warnings from Islamabad and a deep dive into the historical tangle of U.S.–Pakistan relations reveal the region’s enduring volatility. On November 22, 2025, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif sounded the alarm about the persistent risk of another war with India, pointing to ongoing proxy conflicts and recent military confrontations that have left both nations on edge. His remarks, delivered on a private television program, underscore not only the immediate threats but also the complex legacy of international alliances and strategic doctrines that have shaped the region’s security landscape for decades.
According to reporting by IANS, the roots of today’s tensions can be traced back to the early years of the Cold War, when the United States sought to counter Soviet influence in Asia by forging close ties with Pakistan. Between 1954 and 1965, Washington provided Islamabad with more than $2.5 billion in economic and military assistance, about 60% of which was directed towards bolstering the armed forces. This influx of American weaponry—ranging from F-86 Sabre jets to M-47 Patton tanks—rapidly enhanced Pakistan’s military capacity and, crucially, cemented the Pakistan Army’s central role in national politics, often at the expense of civilian authority.
This dynamic only intensified with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The CIA’s Operation Cyclone, one of the largest covert programs in U.S. history, funneled approximately $3.2 billion into Pakistan throughout the 1980s, with Saudi Arabia matching these contributions. The funds, channeled largely through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), supported the training and arming of more than 100,000 mujahideen fighters. While the immediate goal was to bog down Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the long-term effects were far-reaching. Pakistan’s security establishment selectively nurtured Islamist factions that aligned with its strategic interests, particularly those capable of projecting influence into Afghanistan and Kashmir. As a result, a permanent infrastructure of militant camps, radical madrassas, and logistical networks took root, shaping the region’s security environment for generations.
By the late 1980s, this environment gave rise to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which drew on the resources and expertise developed during the Afghan jihad. While the U.S. never directly funded LeT, the broader military-intelligence ecosystem—strengthened by decades of American patronage—enabled the group to evolve into a highly disciplined organization capable of executing complex cross-border operations. The consequences of this strategy became starkly apparent in November 2008, when LeT operatives carried out the deadly Mumbai attacks, killing 166 people over three days. According to IANS, the attackers received training in Pakistan and maintained alleged links to the country’s security establishment, highlighting the dangers of a policy that distinguishes between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ militants.
In his recent remarks, Defence Minister Asif emphasized that the risk of direct conflict remains acute. He recounted how, in May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force shot down seven Indian aircraft—including advanced Rafale jets—and destroyed an S-400 defense system, actions that followed India’s missile strikes inside Pakistan. These strikes, he noted, resulted in the deaths of several civilians and triggered a four-day conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbors. “As long as India exists as a threat, the proxy war never truly ended,” Asif stated. “They are attempting to trouble us via Afghanistan after suffering losses on the battlefield.”
Asif also highlighted the role of the United States in recognizing Pakistan’s defensive successes and intervening diplomatically to prevent further escalation. Yet, as the IANS analysis makes clear, U.S. involvement in the region has been a double-edged sword. After 9/11, Washington designated Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally” and provided over $33 billion in aid between 2002 and 2018, including $14.6 billion in Coalition Support Funds intended for counterterrorism. However, multiple U.S. audits revealed that much of this aid was diverted to conventional military upgrades—such as F-16 improvements and naval modernization—rather than efforts to combat internal militancy. This allowed Pakistan’s military to maintain its traditional posture against India, even as militant networks like the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, LeT, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) continued to operate with varying degrees of official tolerance.
“We want to give every chance to peace efforts, but we are prepared for all eventualities,” Asif asserted, reflecting a sentiment shaped by decades of conflict and shifting alliances. Pakistan’s approach to regional developments remains cautious, taking into account the influence of friendly nations such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and China. Yet, the underlying security dilemmas persist. The IANS report points out that while Pakistan has suffered tremendously from terrorism—over 70,000 Pakistanis, including civilians and soldiers, were killed in terror violence between 2001 and 2020—its major military operations, such as Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017), have primarily targeted anti-state militants. Groups used for external leverage, especially against India, have often survived these campaigns, maintaining a structural distinction that continues to fuel regional instability.
Despite international pressure, especially from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) between 2018 and 2022, efforts to dismantle the militant infrastructure have been uneven and reversible. The ideological and logistical networks that support groups like LeT remain largely intact, sustained by radical madrassas, veteran trainers, and diaspora-linked financing channels. “The organizational DNA of groups like LeT—a disciplined chain of command, military-style training, and operational secrecy—has not been erased,” the IANS analysis warns. These conditions, coupled with Pakistan’s strategic incentives and the region’s evolving geopolitical landscape, mean that the risk of future large-scale attacks, similar to Mumbai’s 26/11, cannot be dismissed.
Meanwhile, India’s rising global profile—economically, diplomatically, and militarily—has intensified Pakistan’s reliance on asymmetric strategies. The Pakistan Army’s dominance over foreign policy ensures that these approaches are deeply embedded and not easily abandoned. Even as Islamabad makes public commitments to counterterrorism, the durability of these reforms remains uncertain. Past behavior suggests that once external scrutiny eases, the security establishment may recalibrate its policies rather than undertake meaningful reform.
Ultimately, the long arc of U.S.–Pakistan relations reveals a troubling pattern: international patronage has consistently strengthened Pakistan’s military institutions while doing little to align their strategic priorities with broader global security concerns. This misalignment has allowed militant networks to thrive, often under a shield of plausible deniability. As South Asia confronts the prospect of renewed conflict and ongoing proxy wars, the lessons of history loom large—and the stakes could not be higher.
