Pakistan is no stranger to seismic shifts in its political and constitutional landscape, but the events of November 2025 have ushered in a transformation that even seasoned observers find staggering. The passage of the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments, coupled with the dramatic promotion of General Asim Munir to Field Marshal and the newly minted post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), mark a decisive turn in the country’s balance of power. These changes are not just tweaks to an already complex system—they are a fundamental restructuring of who holds sway over Pakistan’s future.
The story begins with the 26th Amendment, a measure that might have appeared, on the surface, as a procedural reform. But as The Express Tribune reported, this amendment fundamentally changed the appointment, confirmation, and tenure process for judges in both the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Previously, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and senior members of the judiciary played a leading role in judicial appointments, acting as a bulwark for judicial independence. The new rules, however, shifted the primacy in these appointments to the Executive, diluting the judiciary’s influence and, in the words of one constitutional expert, “realigning institutional authority.”
Yet, the 26th Amendment was merely the opening act. The 27th Amendment Bill, passed just days later, took the restructuring even further. Drawing on the Charter of Democracy (2006) for its justification, the amendment proposed bifurcating the superior judiciary into two distinct bodies: the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a newly established Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). According to The Express Tribune, the FCC would be granted exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution and adjudicate federal-provincial disputes, powers previously held by the Supreme Court. The President would appoint the Chief Justice of the FCC on the advice of the Prime Minister, a move that, in practice, hands effective control over this crucial post to the Executive branch.
But the real bombshell came with the 27th Amendment’s military provisions. As reported by Dawn and corroborated by military analysts, the amendment abolished the longstanding position of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), replacing it with the all-powerful Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). This new role, held concurrently by the Chief of Army Staff, consolidated command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force into a single office. For the first time, the head of the military became the undisputed commander of all three branches, with constitutional safeguards making their removal nearly impossible—requiring a joint parliamentary session and a two-thirds majority for impeachment under Article 44.
General Asim Munir’s promotion to Field Marshal and appointment as the inaugural CDF came hot on the heels of a bruising military episode. Operation Sindoor, launched by India in response to cross-border terrorism, devastated Pakistan’s proxy networks and exposed serious weaknesses in its military posture. Pakistan’s attempted counterstrike, Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos, collapsed within hours, plagued by disarray and retreat among commanders. Despite this failure, Munir was elevated to national hero status by state media and military propaganda, a move widely seen as an effort to recast defeat as triumph and consolidate the military’s narrative dominance.
This symbolic elevation was more than mere pageantry. The title of Field Marshal, last bestowed on President Ayub Khan in 1965, is historically reserved for leaders who have achieved decisive victories. In Munir’s case, the honor was interpreted as a political statement—an assertion of military supremacy over civilian institutions. The new constitutional arrangement further entrenched this power, as the Field Marshal’s position is now subject to parliamentary impeachment, but with such a high bar for removal that it effectively ensures unchallenged authority.
Not everyone has accepted these changes quietly. The passage of the 27th Amendment sparked a wave of protests and boycotts. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, refused to participate in the parliamentary session, denouncing the move as an “illegal constitutional coup.” Supreme Court lawyers resigned en masse, warning that the amendment threatened judicial independence and concentrated power dangerously within the military. Civil society groups and opposition parties echoed these concerns, arguing that the reforms undermine democratic principles and erode the checks and balances essential for accountable governance.
One of the most controversial elements of the 27th Amendment is its overhaul of the judicial system. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was sharply curtailed, limited to civil and appellate matters. All constitutional questions—including those involving the CDF—are now routed to the FCC. As legal scholars noted in The Express Tribune, this move was designed to prevent the Supreme Court from challenging military authority, as it did in the case of former army chief Pervez Musharraf. By transferring constitutional matters to the FCC—whose leadership is appointed under executive influence—the amendment effectively shields the military from judicial scrutiny.
The implications of these changes extend far beyond Pakistan’s borders. With the CDF now wielding de facto control over the country’s nuclear arsenal, there is a critical lack of public accountability for nuclear command decisions. As Dawn highlighted, this opacity raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation, especially during periods of crisis. The amendment also increases the likelihood of future nuclear weapons testing, a development that could further destabilize an already volatile region.
Internally, the consolidation of power with the army chief has generated friction within the armed forces. The amendment guarantees that the CDF will always be an army officer, sidelining the Air Force and Navy in strategic planning. As modern warfare evolves, with greater reliance on air power and drones, this imbalance could spark internal dissent and further destabilize Pakistan’s political environment.
The international community’s response has been muted, with major powers largely silent on Pakistan’s constitutional overhaul. This lack of external pressure may embolden the military to consolidate its gains, setting a precedent that could influence other countries in the region. The changes have also diminished prospects for meaningful dialogue between India and Pakistan. With the military firmly in control and diplomatic flexibility curtailed, the chances for conflict resolution or even basic engagement have dropped to near zero. India now faces new threats, including increased risks of terrorism fueled by networks operating from Pakistan, while civilian oversight and accountability have become little more than aspirations.
Pakistan’s constitutional crossroads is not just a matter for legal scholars or political elites. The 26th and 27th Amendments have redrawn the architecture of the Republic itself, centralizing power in the hands of the Executive and the military, weakening the judiciary, and unsettling the delicate equilibrium that has, for decades, prevented the rise of unrestrained state authority. The future, for now, looks set to be shaped not in parliament or the courts, but in the barracks and offices of those who wear the uniform.
