Pakistan is bracing for a seismic shift in its political and legal landscape as the government moves forward with the 27th Constitutional Amendment, a controversial package of reforms that critics say would dramatically expand the power of the military and central government—especially that of Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir. The proposed changes, which have set off alarm bells among legal experts, opposition parties, and civil society, are being touted by the government as necessary for modernization and stability, but many fear they represent a step toward the erosion of democratic institutions and provincial autonomy.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has spent the first week of November 2025 in a whirlwind of high-stakes meetings, working to build consensus among his coalition partners. According to Dawn, these talks have included the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement–Pakistan (MQM-P), and the Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid (PML-Q). The goal: secure the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to pass the amendment, which is expected to be tabled in the Senate within days.
At the heart of the controversy lies Article 243 of Pakistan’s Constitution, the clause that defines the command structure of the armed forces. The government, according to The Diplomat, is considering changes that could create a position akin to a Chief of Defence Staff—a move that would centralize authority over all military branches under Field Marshal Munir. While the government has been tight-lipped about the exact language of the amendments, speculation is rife that Munir’s role would be elevated, giving him unprecedented control over Pakistan’s military apparatus. As one expert told The Express Tribune, "debates over judicial independence are now largely irrelevant, especially since the 26th Amendment. The judiciary’s role is now to act as a rubber stamp, providing legal cover for the executive branch’s efforts to organise and consolidate power."
The amendment package doesn’t stop at the military. According to ThePrint, sweeping changes are also being proposed for the judiciary. The Supreme Judicial Council could be empowered to transfer judges without their prior consent, and a new independent Constitutional Court would be established—ostensibly to limit judicial overreach, but critics argue it could be used to ensure that only government-friendly judges hear constitutional cases. The reforms would also revive executive magistrates at the district level, tasked with handling minor crimes and maintaining public order, a move that some see as an attempt to expand executive influence over the judicial process.
On the fiscal front, the 27th Amendment proposes to remove constitutional protections for provincial shares of federal revenue under the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award. This would allow Islamabad to reduce provincial budgets during economic crises—a sharp reversal from the 18th Amendment of 2010, which devolved significant powers and resources to the provinces. PPP Chairperson Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, after meeting with a delegation led by PM Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari on November 3, warned that the proposed changes "touch on several issues settled under the 18th Amendment." According to Dawn, the PPP remains deeply divided, wary of appearing complicit in what some see as a rollback of hard-won provincial rights.
Other notable elements of the amendment include plans to streamline the appointment of Election Commission members—removing obstacles that have previously left key posts vacant and delayed elections. There is also talk of returning education and population planning to the federal government, though Parliamentary Affairs Minister Tariq Fazal Chaudhry told the National Assembly on November 5 that there was "no plan to take control of provincial educational institutions or boards. We are just talking about a uniform syllabus." He dismissed opposition concerns as "negative and false propaganda," insisting that the reforms are aimed at improving governance, bolstering defense, and strengthening federal-provincial relations.
The opposition, led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), has vowed to fight the amendment "tooth and nail." PTI Chairman Barrister Gohar Ali Khan warned that the changes would "jeopardise the independence of the judiciary" and threaten the integrity of the federation. Pushtun leader Mohsin Dawar called the amendment "a blatant attempt to undo the 18th Amendment, long the bane of Punjab’s civil-military elite." Civil society groups, too, have voiced strong reservations. PILDAT, a prominent political think tank, questioned on X, "Can the Constitution be changed without asking the people it governs? Is Pakistan’s Constitution still a people’s document or a negotiation among powerholders?"
Despite the outcry, the numbers appear to favor the government—at least in the lower house. The ruling coalition currently holds 233 out of 336 seats in the National Assembly, comfortably above the two-thirds threshold needed to pass the amendment there. In the Senate, the government claims to have 64 of the 96 seats, just enough to meet the required supermajority. According to Dawn, the government is pushing to pass the amendment next week, with all coalition partners except the PPP reportedly offering conditional support, provided the 18th Amendment’s core provisions are not entirely undone.
The proposed changes to Article 243 are the latest chapter in Pakistan’s long-running tug-of-war between civilian and military power. As journalist Zarrar Khuhro noted on X, Article 243 has been amended five times since the 1973 Constitution, each time reflecting a shift in the balance of power. The original language vested control of the armed forces in the federal government. General Zia-ul-Haq shifted authority to the presidency—and by extension, the military—before Nawaz Sharif and later General Pervez Musharraf swung the pendulum back and forth. The 18th Amendment sought to restore civilian supremacy, but as Khuhro put it, "It’s been push and pull. And now, it’s pull time."
Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has sought to allay fears, telling Geo News that "no step will be taken that weakens the federation or the provinces." Still, many observers see the 27th Amendment as a watershed moment—one that could cement the military’s dominance over Pakistan’s political system and further marginalize the judiciary and provinces. As Ayesha Siddiqa, a senior fellow at King’s College London, wrote for ThePrint, "The 27th Amendment is really about Munir’s power consolidation—and Pakistan slipping further toward the unravelling of democracy."
In the coming days, as the bill moves through the Senate and National Assembly, all eyes will be on Islamabad. Will the government succeed in pushing through reforms that critics call the "death of justice"? Or will opposition parties and civil society manage to stall what they see as a dangerous power grab? The outcome will not only shape Pakistan’s immediate political future but could also have far-reaching consequences for the country’s fragile democratic institutions.
As Pakistan stands at this crossroads, the stakes could hardly be higher. The decisions made in the next week will chart the course for the balance of power between civilian government, military leadership, and the provinces for years to come.
