On November 20, 2025, the Sindh High Court (SHC) in Karachi issued formal notices to Pakistan's ministries of law and justice and parliamentary affairs, marking the latest legal challenge to the sweeping 27th Constitutional Amendment. The move came in response to two petitions filed by practicing lawyers Asif Waheed and Abdul Ahad Ahmar Khan, who contend that the amendment fundamentally undermines the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the rule of law—cornerstones of Pakistan’s constitutional framework, according to Dawn.
The SHC’s two-judge constitutional bench, comprising Justice Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry and Justice Muhammad Jaffer Raza, asked a federal law officer to submit comments by December 18. The petitioners argue that the amendment creates a parallel judicial structure and subordinates the Supreme Court, violating the Constitution’s basic structure doctrine. They assert that the changes enhance executive influence over judicial appointments, particularly to the newly established Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and the Supreme Court, posing what they describe as a direct threat to judicial independence.
At the heart of the controversy are provisions that introduce a forced retirement mechanism: if a judge refuses to become chief justice, that refusal is treated as retirement, which the petitioners claim amounts to constructive removal and infringes on constitutional protections. The amendment also reconfigures jurisdictional boundaries, allowing executive-dominated bodies to decide the transfer of high court judges—a move the lawyers argue destabilizes decades of judicial precedent. Perhaps most controversially, the amendment grants lifetime immunity to the President, which the petitioners allege violates fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 4, 25, and 10A of the Constitution.
Following a preliminary hearing, the SHC bench directed the federal ministries to file their responses before the next hearing. The legal battle is just beginning, but the political and institutional tremors are already being felt across Pakistan’s judiciary and beyond.
Meanwhile, the 27th Amendment’s impact extends far beyond legal technicalities. As reported by The Wire, the amendment was approved near-unanimously by Pakistan's National Assembly and Senate and endorsed by President Asif Ali Zardari in mid-November 2025. It vests exclusive control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal—estimated at some 170 tactical and strategic weapons of mass destruction—in Field Marshal Asim Munir. This centralization of nuclear authority in a single, unelected leader has drawn comparisons to North Korea’s model, where strategic weapons are similarly commanded by an absolute, unaccountable figure.
Previously, Pakistan’s nuclear command involved multiple actors, including the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), with the Prime Minister holding a casting vote, and the chiefs of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). The amendment abolishes the CJCSC post and replaces the NCA with the National Strategic Command (NSC), subordinating the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) to Munir’s authority. The Prime Minister is now presented with the fait accompli of appointing the NSC’s management at Munir’s discretion, further consolidating military control.
Field Marshal Asim Munir, 57, who became Army Chief in November 2022, has seen his term extended to 2030 by the amendment. He assumed the ceremonial rank of Field Marshal in May 2025 and was appointed Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) last week. The amendment grants him legal immunity from prosecution for actions taken in office, cementing his operational, strategic, and political control over Pakistan’s military, nuclear assets, and the broader establishment.
Munir is widely regarded as a deeply religious, pragmatic, yet hard-line figure, especially regarding India. His background is marked by both discipline and doctrinal fervor. Born in Rawalpindi in 1968, Munir’s early education included religious studies at the Markazi Madrasah Dar ul Tajweed madrassa. He joined the Pakistan Army in 1986 via the Officers Training School at Mangla—a less prestigious route than the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, something he reportedly worked hard to overcome. He went on to win the OTS Sword of Honour, serve in the Frontier Force Regiment, and ascend through a series of key military and intelligence postings, including Director General of Military Intelligence and a brief, tumultuous stint as head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID).
Munir’s worldview is shaped by a strong sense of the Army’s role as the ultimate guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic identity and survival. He has not shied away from nuclear signaling, including stark warnings about the potential use of strategic weapons. At a dinner in Tampa, Florida, in August, he declared, “Pakistan was a nuclear-armed country and if it believed it was ‘going down’, it would take half the world—a euphemism for India—down with it by employing these apocalyptic weapons,” according to The Wire. Analysts see this as evidence of Munir’s conviction that nuclear arms are not just tools of war, but existential instruments central to Pakistan’s security doctrine.
The amendment’s overhaul of the nuclear command structure eliminates collective deliberation and institutional safeguards, concentrating decision-making in Munir’s hands. Critics warn this heightens the risk of impulsive escalation, especially in the emotionally charged context of India-Pakistan relations—a region already shaped by decades of mistrust, unresolved borders, and repeated crises.
Concerns over the amendment’s impact on judicial independence have also played out in Islamabad. On November 20, four Islamabad High Court (IHC) judges—Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Babar Sattar, Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, and Saman Rifat Imtiaz—attempted to challenge the 27th Amendment by filing a petition under Article 184(3). The Supreme Court, however, turned them away and directed them to approach the newly created Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), as reported by Dawn. The removal of Article 184(3), formerly used by the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights, is itself a product of the 27th Amendment, reflecting the constitutional changes now reshaping Pakistan’s legal landscape.
The judges’ draft petition, reviewed by Dawn, argued that a forum created by the disputed amendment cannot “judge its own birth,” insisting that only the Supreme Court should have the inherent authority to interpret the Constitution. They claim the amendment violates Articles 9, 10A, and 25 by placing the judiciary under executive control, disrupting the separation of powers, and altering the service conditions of sitting judges. The appointment of the FCC’s chief justice by the President, solely on the Prime Minister’s advice and without judicial consultation, is cited as contrary to landmark rulings. The petition also raises alarms about the appointment of FCC judges, alleging executive “handpicking” even before the amendment took effect, and warns that the FCC’s authority to withdraw cases from high courts could enable executive interference in constitutional matters.
Further, the amendment’s changes to the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) and the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)—now dominated by non-judicial members or judges appointed under the new framework—are seen as replacing merit-based selection with political influence. The transfer of high court judges without their consent, enabled by amendments to Article 200, is viewed as exposing the judiciary to pressure and manipulation.
As the legal and political battles over the 27th Amendment intensify, Pakistan finds itself at a crossroads. The issues at stake—judicial independence, the separation of powers, and the concentration of nuclear authority—are not just constitutional abstractions but matters that could shape the country’s governance, security, and future stability. The coming months will test the resilience of Pakistan’s institutions and the resolve of those determined to defend their foundational principles.
