Pakistan is once again at the center of a stormy constitutional debate, as the government’s proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment has triggered fierce opposition, legal controversy, and fears of a return to military dominance in governance. The bill, tabled in the Senate after cabinet approval on November 8, 2025, is slated for a decisive vote in Parliament on Monday, November 11. If passed, it would fundamentally restructure the country’s military command and overhaul the judiciary—changes that many say echo the era of General Zia-ul-Haq, when sweeping amendments entrenched military control under a civilian veneer.
The amendment’s most headline-grabbing feature is the abolition of the post of chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC), replacing it with a newly created and far more powerful role: chief of defence forces (CDF). According to Dawn and other Pakistani outlets, the CDF post will be held by the serving chief of army staff—currently General Asim Munir—who is to become the constitutional head of the army, navy, and air force. This move formalizes Munir’s recent promotion to Field Marshal and, as The Express Tribune and Firstpost report, would make him the most powerful military officer in Pakistan’s history, with privileges and authority that could last for life.
The amendment doesn’t stop with the military. It also seeks to establish a new federal constitutional court (FCC), shift some powers from the Supreme Court to this new body, and alter the process for appointing high court judges. One of the most controversial provisions grants the president lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution. Law Minister Azam Nazir Tarar presented the bill in the Senate, where Chairman Yusuf Raza Gilani referred it to a committee led by Farooq Naek for review before the upcoming vote.
Supporters of the amendment in government circles argue that these changes are necessary to modernize Pakistan’s justice system and defense structure. Senior counsel Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar described the 27th Amendment as “a major and long-awaited structural shift” that could bring “greater clarity, efficiency and constitutional coherence.” He points out that having two apex courts—one for appeals (the Supreme Court) and one for constitutional cases (the FCC)—is in line with practices in some modern constitutional democracies. Khokhar also maintains that the new defense structure, which puts all armed forces under a single advisory framework accountable to the prime minister, defense minister, and National Security Committee, could enhance civilian oversight and streamline command.
The government’s confidence is evident. Officials believe they can secure the required two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the National Assembly. But opposition parties are far from convinced. A broad coalition, the Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Ayeen-e-Pakistan (TTAP)—which includes Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), and the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC)—has announced nationwide protests starting Sunday, November 9. The opposition’s message is clear: the amendment represents a direct threat to Pakistan’s Constitution and democratic institutions.
Allama Raja Nasir Abbas, head of the MWM, declared, “Democratic institutions have been paralysed within Pakistan… the nation must step up against the [proposed] 27th Amendment.” PkMAP leader Mahmood Khan Achakzai warned that the opposition alliance had no choice but to launch a protest movement, saying, “The government’s move is shaking the foundations of the Constitution.” The protests are set to begin with the slogan: “Long live democracy, down with dictatorship.”
Legal experts are deeply divided. Critics warn that the amendment would reduce the Supreme Court’s powers, effectively making it “irrelevant” and tightening executive control over the judiciary. A senior counsel told Dawn, “Left with a limited jurisdiction of deciding ordinary civil, criminal and statutory appeals, the Supreme Court has now become all the more a ‘Supreme District Court’.” Tariq Mehmood Khokhar, former additional attorney general, cautioned that the FCC would be empowered at the expense of the Supreme Court, and that the CDF would gain constitutional authority for life.
Perhaps the most dramatic warning came in a letter sent on November 10, 2025, by senior lawyers and retired judges to Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Yahya Afridi. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah urged the CJP to engage with the executive and convene a Full Court meeting to discuss the amendment, stating that the proposed FCC “does not arise from any genuine reform agenda but is a political device to weaken and control the judiciary.” Shah wrote, “A court born of executive will cannot be independent… a controlled constitutional court may serve transient political interests but will permanently damage the Republic.” The letter, endorsed by former judges and legal luminaries, described the amendment as “the biggest and most radical restructuring of the Supreme Court of Pakistan since the Government of India Act, 1935.” It was released to the media “in the interest of transparency.”
The legal community’s concerns don’t end there. The new Article 175A, critics note, would allow the chief justice of the FCC to outrank the chief justice of the Supreme Court and serve until the age of 68—three years longer than the current retirement age. The amendment also introduces executive magistrates and changes in judges’ transfers, further centralizing power in the federal executive and military command.
Opposition lawmakers have also raised procedural objections, accusing the government of rushing the bill through Parliament during a period when the opposition leadership is in flux. PTI’s Ali Zafar argued that debating such a consequential amendment was inappropriate when the seat of the leader of the opposition remained vacant. He accused the government of being in a hurry to pass the bill, bypassing broader consensus-building.
The timing and rationale behind the amendment have also come under scrutiny. According to reports in Firstpost and The Express Tribune, the changes were motivated in part by lessons from the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025, when India targeted terrorist hideouts in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The government argued that the evolving nature of modern warfare demands an integrated operational response—hence, the need to concentrate military authority in a single figure, the Field Marshal.
If the amendment passes, General Asim Munir would not only become Field Marshal for life, but would also be granted unprecedented powers, including authority over the National Strategic Command. The president would appoint the Army Chief and CDF on the advice of the prime minister, while the head of the National Strategic Command would be appointed by the CDF in consultation with the prime minister—a process that critics say further sidelines civilian oversight.
As the nation braces for Parliament’s vote, the stakes could hardly be higher. Supporters frame the amendment as a step toward efficiency and modernization, while critics see it as a dangerous lurch toward authoritarianism and the subordination of the judiciary. The coming days will determine whether Pakistan’s constitutional order is set for a historic transformation—or a new era of political turmoil.
With protests planned, legal opinions sharply divided, and the future of Pakistan’s highest court in question, the country faces a pivotal moment that will shape its democracy and civil-military balance for years to come.
