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22 November 2025

Pakistan Centralizes Nuclear Arsenal Under Munir’s Command

A sweeping constitutional amendment grants Field Marshal Asim Munir sole authority over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, reshaping regional dynamics and raising global concerns about unchecked military power.

Pakistan’s political and military landscape has been upended by a sweeping constitutional amendment that places the country’s formidable nuclear arsenal under the exclusive command of Field Marshal Asim Munir, a move that has sent shockwaves through regional capitals and global power centers alike. The 27th constitutional amendment, approved in November 2025 by Pakistan’s National Assembly, Senate, and endorsed by President Asif Ali Zardari, has centralized nuclear decision-making in the hands of a single, unelected military leader for the first time in the nation’s history, according to The Wire.

This dramatic shift evokes comparisons to North Korea’s absolute command structure, where the Supreme Leader alone dictates the fate of strategic weapons. The echoes between Islamabad and Pyongyang run deeper than mere institutional design. Both countries developed their nuclear programs under the shadow of sustained Chinese technical, financial, and diplomatic support. In the 1990s, Pakistan and North Korea’s strategic partnership deepened through the clandestine A.Q. Khan proliferation network, which, with Pakistani military assistance and tacit Chinese approval, exchanged nuclear technology for ballistic missiles. According to The Wire, these covert deals accelerated both nations’ nuclear capabilities while largely evading international scrutiny.

For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear command structure was a complex web involving military, political, and civilian actors. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), established in 2000, was designed to ensure collective deliberation before authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), with the prime minister holding a casting vote. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) provided technical oversight and acted as a bridge between military and civilian leadership. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), a post created in 1976, was intended to prevent the concentration of military power in a single branch.

All of that has now changed. The 27th amendment abolishes the CJCSC position and replaces the NCA with the National Strategic Command (NSC), headed by Munir, who is also the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and Army chief. The SPD is now subordinate to Munir, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s role is reduced to appointing NSC management at Munir’s discretion. With about 170 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons under his direct control, Munir’s authority is now virtually unchecked, eliminating the institutional safeguards that once helped prevent rash or unilateral action.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has always been India-centric. Even before its 1998 nuclear tests, Islamabad’s strategy was shaped by the perceived need to deter India’s conventional military superiority. Over time, Pakistan adopted a ‘first-use’ posture, developing tactical systems like the Nasr/Hatf-IX missile, with a range of 60-70 kilometers, and longer-range assets capable of targeting strategic sites across India. According to The Wire, this approach is designed to maintain credible deterrence and operational leverage, signaling that even limited conflicts could escalate to the nuclear threshold.

In stark contrast, India’s nuclear weapons remain under civilian control, with a no-first-use policy and ultimate authority vested in the prime minister. India’s system is deliberately structured to prevent individual discretion from shaping escalation dynamics, a point that now highlights the divergence between the two rivals’ nuclear command philosophies.

The amendment’s passage has not only consolidated Munir’s power but has also fueled debate about the wisdom of concentrating such authority in a single leader, especially given the volatile history of India-Pakistan relations. Analysts warn that this centralization heightens the risk of impulsive escalation, rapid decision cycles, and personalized strategic choices. The history of crises between the two countries—from the Kashmir conflict to the 1971 war, the Kargil skirmishes, and recent confrontations—has only deepened Pakistan’s threat perceptions and driven the Army to tighten its grip on national security.

Understanding Asim Munir’s background and worldview is now more than an academic exercise—it is a strategic imperative. Born in Rawalpindi in 1968, Munir’s rise through the ranks has been anything but typical. He joined the Pakistan Army in 1986 through the Officers Training School, earned an MPhil in Public Policy & Strategic Security Management, and memorized the Qur’an during a posting in Saudi Arabia, earning the title Hafiz-e-Quran. His career includes stints as Director General of Military Intelligence and head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), positions that placed him at the heart of Pakistan’s security apparatus. Notably, he was removed from the ISID by then-Prime Minister Imran Khan after reportedly raising corruption allegations involving Khan’s wife, a slight that left a lasting enmity between the two men.

Munir’s reputation is that of a disciplined, deeply religious, and ideologically driven leader with a hard-line stance toward India. He often invokes the two-nation theory—the idea that Muslims and Hindus are fundamentally distinct peoples who require separate homelands—as central to Pakistan’s identity. In recent months, Munir has reinforced this worldview with nuclear signaling. At a black-tie dinner in Tampa, Florida, in August 2025, he reportedly warned that if Pakistan believed it was facing an existential threat, it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, stating, “If we believe we are going down, we will take half the world down with us.” This stark rhetoric underscores the gravity of the new command structure.

Munir’s ascent has coincided with a dramatic shift in Pakistan’s global standing. Following a clash with India in May 2025, Pakistan’s profile has surged, with US President Donald Trump publicly praising Munir as a “great guy” and claiming he brokered a ceasefire that averted a South Asian catastrophe, according to Bloomberg. Trump’s relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has soured, with the White House imposing some of the world’s highest tariffs on India. As a result, US-Pakistan relations have improved significantly, upending more than two decades of US policy that prioritized India as a bulwark against China.

“We defended ourselves and we won,” said State Minister for Finance Bilal Azhar Kayani, framing the May confrontation as a victory for Pakistan and praising its diplomatic conduct. The clash has also created a firmer alignment between Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, according to Jay Truesdale, chief executive at geopolitical risk consulting firm TDI. Islamabad has moved quickly to prioritize areas of interest to Trump, including cryptocurrency and counterterrorism, while the US has lowered tariffs on Pakistani goods to 19%, well below India’s.

Pakistan has not limited its outreach to Washington. The country recently inked an economic pact with Saudi Arabia and signed a mutual-defense agreement, further boosting its regional clout. Meanwhile, the US is showing interest in Pakistan’s mineral wealth, with US Strategic Metals signing a memorandum of understanding to develop rare earth resources—a deal that followed an August meeting between Munir and US business executives in Florida.

Despite this renaissance, questions remain about Pakistan’s ability to balance relations with both the US and China, its top supplier of weapons, infrastructure, and aid. “China has been a longstanding partner, so has the US,” said Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb. “They both know that we are well engaged on both ends.”

As Munir’s authority grows, so too does scrutiny of his motives and methods. Critics describe him as austere and doctrinal, emotionally invested in restoring the Army’s supremacy. His assumption of total control over nuclear weapons is seen not just as a strategic move, but as a symbolic assertion of the Army’s role as the ultimate guardian of Pakistan’s destiny. With nuclear escalation now concentrated in Munir’s hands, the world watches closely, aware that the fate of South Asia—and perhaps much more—could hinge on the decisions of a single man.

In a region where history is never far from the present, Pakistan’s new nuclear order marks a turning point, with consequences that will ripple far beyond its borders.