In South Asia, two of the region’s largest democracies are wrestling with the question of how constitutional design and political will shape the quality of governance. Recent debates in Pakistan and India—one about carving new provinces, the other about synchronizing elections—offer a window into the challenges that come with reforming systems deeply rooted in history, politics, and the delicate balance of power.
In Pakistan, a sudden surge of enthusiasm for creating as many as 37 provinces is being billed as a cure for the country’s chronic political instability and weak governance. According to The Express Tribune (September 4, 2025), advocates of this plan argue that smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people, improving service delivery and narrowing the gap between the state and society. On the surface, the idea is certainly tempting—who wouldn’t want more responsive local government? But is redrawing provincial boundaries really the silver bullet for Pakistan’s governance woes?
The answer, as the Tribune’s analysis points out, may be far more complicated. The real problem, the article contends, isn’t the number of provinces, but rather the persistent refusal to implement the Constitution’s existing provisions for local government. Pakistan’s Constitution, under Article 140-A, already requires each province to establish local governments with “political, administrative and financial responsibility.” The framework for decentralized, responsive governance is right there in black and white. The tragedy is that policymakers have treated these constitutional clauses as optional, not mandatory.
Take Punjab, for example. With over 127 million people, it’s not just Pakistan’s largest province—it’s one of the biggest administrative units in the world. The last local government elections were held in 2015, but even then, budgets were tightly controlled by bureaucrats, leaving mayors with little real power. In 2019, the provincial government dissolved local bodies halfway through their terms. Today, Punjab has no functioning local government at all; bureaucrats answerable to Lahore, not the people, run the show.
Karachi, a megacity of more than 20 million, faces a similar dilemma. Local elections have been repeatedly delayed, and when finally held, results were manipulated to keep the ruling party in power despite a weak urban mandate, according to The Express Tribune. The outcome? Elected representatives are left powerless while provincial and federal authorities bicker over basic services like garbage collection and policing. The city’s broken roads and crumbling infrastructure tell the story of a system where the voices of citizens are routinely ignored.
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan fare no better. In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, local councils were established after elections, but soon starved of resources, rendering them hollow. In Balochistan, local elections are sporadic, and councillors remain powerless in the absence of genuine fiscal devolution. Across Pakistan, the pattern repeats: political parties prefer to govern through bureaucracies rather than share authority with elected local representatives. Local councils are seen as rivals, not partners, and hybrid systems—featuring pliant, unelected leadership—have become the norm.
“No number of new provinces will fix this,” argues the Tribune. “Without fiscal devolution and constitutional respect, smaller provinces would replicate the same failures.” The article points out that Pakistan’s political history is littered with amendments designed to serve rulers rather than citizens. The notorious 8th Amendment under General Zia-ul-Haq, for instance, gave the presidency sweeping powers to dissolve elected assemblies, a clause invoked four times between 1988 and 1996. More recently, the 26th Amendment reshaped judicial tenure in ways widely seen as politically motivated.
To underscore the point, the Tribune draws a comparison with India. In 1992, India passed the 73rd and 74th amendments, constitutionally entrenching local governments in both rural and urban areas. Today, India boasts more than 250,000 gram panchayats and municipalities, with one-third of seats reserved for women. These institutions have become training grounds for future leaders and ensure that government is present in every village and town. During recent floods, India’s empowered local governments mobilized quickly for relief and recovery. In Pakistan, by contrast, the catastrophic 2022 floods—and this year’s as well—exposed the absence of effective local leadership, forcing reliance on international aid.
The ongoing debate over new provinces, then, is less about reform and more about distraction. “We do not need a new map with 37 provinces. We need to honour the map already drawn by our Constitution. That is where resilience begins,” the Tribune concludes. Until political parties are compelled to hold regular local elections, devolve real financial powers, and respect the people’s mandate, governance will remain broken.
Meanwhile, across the border in India, a different but equally consequential debate is unfolding. On September 5, 2025, Hindustan Times reported that a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) led by PP Chaudhary is scrutinizing the 129th Constitution Amendment Bill, which aims to implement the ambitious One Nation, One Election (ONOE) policy. The draft bill proposes a new Article 82A, allowing the Election Commission of India (ECI) to recommend to the President to defer polls in any state if simultaneous elections cannot be conducted.
This proposal has set off alarm bells among lawmakers and jurists alike. Several Members of Parliament and former Chief Justices of India—including UU Lalit, Ranjan Gogoi, DY Chandrachud, and Saniv Khanna—have warned that the draft grants excessive power to the ECI. They argue that any deferral of elections should require approval by both houses of Parliament, referencing the Supreme Court’s Bommai judgement, which established that the dissolution of state assemblies must be approved by Parliament.
Former Chief Justice Chandrachud recommended that the ECI should only be able to delay elections for reasons of national security or public law and order, and even then, only for a fixed period and with parliamentary oversight. “Any decision of ECI must be approved by both Houses of Parliament—a provision that would require further amendments in the Constitution—and it can defer polls only for a fixed period,” Chandrachud told the panel, as reported by Hindustan Times.
Former CJI Khanna was even more blunt, warning that the clause granting the ECI unfettered discretion “may result in indirect President’s rule” and could undermine the federal structure of the Constitution. He pointed out that this clause could be challenged as violating Article 14 and the basic structure doctrine.
The JPC, which has been given an extension until the winter session of 2025 to submit its report, faces the daunting task of balancing the potential benefits of synchronized elections—such as saving thousands of crores of rupees and potentially boosting GDP by 1.6%—against the risks of concentrating too much power in the hands of the Election Commission.
Both Pakistan and India, then, find themselves at critical junctures. In Pakistan, the path to better governance runs through the Constitution’s existing provisions for local government, not through the creation of new provinces. In India, the drive for electoral efficiency must not come at the expense of federal balance and constitutional safeguards. As these debates unfold, one thing is clear: real reform demands more than bold new maps or sweeping amendments. It requires the political will to respect the spirit—and the letter—of the law.
