On October 17, 2025, the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam ignited a firestorm across the country’s financial and real estate sectors by announcing the transfer of Novaland Group’s investigation files to the Ministry of Public Security. The move, prompted by a comprehensive inspection into the issuance and use of corporate bonds between 2015 and 2023, has exposed a tangled web of financial transactions, raising urgent questions about transparency and legal compliance in one of Vietnam’s largest property conglomerates.
According to CafeF and VnExpress, the Inspectorate’s findings point to a series of complex violations involving Novaland Investment Real Estate Group JSC and a network of affiliated and related companies. At the heart of the controversy is the misuse of approximately 7,000 billion VND—money raised through bonds that, instead of being put toward legitimate business development, appears to have been circulated through a network of shell transactions and ultimately funneled back to the company’s own coffers.
The Inspectorate’s report, made public on October 17, details how Novaland, alongside subsidiaries like Unity, Aqua, and Lucky House, orchestrated a series of capital contribution transactions that, in reality, lacked substance. In one particularly telling example, Ms. Võ Thị Kim Khoa received funds from Nova Housing Business JSC to contribute capital to Hoang Kim Century Real Estate Company. Yet, as the Inspectorate discovered, “the contributed capital portion was found to be non-existent in reality as most of it was transferred away on the same day.”
It didn’t end there. Novaland subsequently used 1,500 billion VND raised from bond sales to buy back this so-called “phantom” capital contribution. The money did not remain idle—it was routed through a labyrinth of intermediary companies before, almost magically, finding its way back to Nova Housing Business JSC. This pattern, the Inspectorate concluded, was not a one-off but rather a systematic approach repeated across several entities.
For instance, Aqua City Co., Ltd. used 4,600 billion VND in bonds to purchase capital contributions in Phuc Hoa and Green Land companies, with the original funds again sourced from Nova Housing Business JSC and transferred away immediately after. Unity Real Estate Co., Ltd. (584 billion VND) and Lucky House Investment Service JSC (400 billion VND) engaged in similar maneuvers. Altogether, about 7,084 billion VND from these various companies was cycled back to Nova Housing Business JSC—an astonishing sum that underscores the scale of the alleged scheme.
But the Inspectorate’s scrutiny did not stop at these internal transactions. The investigation also shed light on the use of bond funds for real estate projects that had not yet met legal requirements for sale or business partnership. Take, for example, GreenWich company, which issued 2,000 billion VND in bonds to invest in the Cu Lao Phuoc Hung urban area project in Dong Nai. After receiving the funds, the company’s partner transferred money to multiple other parties, with the Inspectorate noting “signs of misuse.” By June 2023, GreenWich had defaulted on more than 1,812 billion VND in principal and interest.
BNP Global’s case is equally troubling. The company issued 2,100 billion VND in bonds for the Mui Yen project in Binh Thuan, even though the project had not received construction permits. Of this, 1,000 billion VND was seized by SCB Bank after being funneled through intermediaries. As of the latest reports, BNP Global still owes more than 1,216 billion VND in overdue debt—deemed “irrecoverable” by authorities.
Other companies, like Residence (3,000 billion VND) and Gia Duc Real Estate Co., Ltd. (1,300 billion VND), issued bonds to secure villa purchases at the Nova World Phan Thiet project, despite the project being ineligible for sale under Vietnamese law at the time. The Inspectorate’s broader review found that, among 67 organizations inspected, 827 bond codes worth over 462,824 billion VND had been issued between 2015 and 2023. Alarmingly, 58.4% of these bonds were unsecured.
As the investigation unfolded, the Inspectorate transferred two cases of bond issuance violations at Novaland and three of its subsidiaries, along with four related companies, to the Ministry of Public Security for further examination. Four Novaland-related companies alone were reported to owe 4,555 billion VND in bond money, with overdue principal and interest payments threatening the financial interests of bondholders.
In response to the mounting scrutiny, Novaland issued an official statement acknowledging the outstanding bond debt as of June 30, 2023, stood at 34,878 billion VND. The company emphasized its ongoing efforts to restructure and repay debt, stating, “As of September 30, 2025, Novaland had repaid 15,319 billion VND (nearly 44% of the total debt), reducing the outstanding balance to 19,559 billion VND.”
Regarding the controversial “non-substantial” capital contribution transactions, Novaland denied any connection to the prior dealings of the sellers, asserting that “at the time of the transaction, the seller was the legal owner and had committed to the legal status of the capital contribution.” As for shortcomings in information disclosure, Novaland attributed these to “objective, force majeure events such as the Covid-19 pandemic,” claiming to have swiftly remedied any lapses thereafter.
Novaland also stressed that it had “managed capital responsibly and used funds for the approved purposes.” The company said it had proactively submitted explanatory documents to the Government Inspectorate and pledged to “cooperate transparently with authorities to clarify issues and quickly remedy shortcomings to protect bondholders’ rights.”
Despite these assurances, the Inspectorate’s findings have cast a long shadow over Novaland and the wider Vietnamese bond market. The report highlighted that 18 Novaland-affiliated companies had issued 131 bond codes worth 67,100 billion VND, primarily for capital increases, project transfers, and debt restructuring. By mid-2023, 59 codes valued at 34,835 billion VND remained outstanding, with more than 5,500 billion VND overdue in principal and interest.
The Inspectorate’s conclusions also pointed fingers at the banking sector. Four out of five banks reviewed were found to have failed to comply with regulations, either by misusing funds, issuing bonds for unauthorized purposes, or neglecting proper documentation protocols.
As the Ministry of Public Security now takes up the task of investigation, all eyes are on Novaland and its leadership. The company’s next moves—whether in further debt repayment, legal defense, or corporate reform—will be closely watched by investors, regulators, and the Vietnamese public alike. For now, the case stands as a stark reminder of the risks lurking in high-growth markets, where the race for capital can sometimes outpace the rule of law.
Vietnam’s real estate and financial sectors, shaken by the revelations, are bracing for the fallout. The unfolding investigation may well set new precedents for corporate governance and accountability in the country’s booming bond market.
