On October 7, 2025, Nepal’s Election Commission (EC) officially unveiled the timeline for the country’s next House of Representatives (HoR) election, setting the vote for March 5, 2026. This announcement comes on the heels of one of the most turbulent periods in recent Nepali history—a youth-led uprising that upended the nation’s political landscape and left deep scars on its society and institutions.
The Gen Z movement, which erupted on September 8 and 9, 2025, was a whirlwind of protest against corruption, mismanagement, and controversial social media regulations. According to 360info™, the 48-hour upheaval resulted in 75 deaths and more than 2,000 injuries, plunging the country into a state of collective grief and uncertainty. The economic toll was staggering: the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry estimated that private property losses from arson and looting reached $571 million. The private sector, which accounts for 81 percent of Nepal’s economy and 86 percent of its jobs, was hit especially hard. Public property losses—including damage to the Office of the Prime Minister at Singh Durbar, the historic parliament building, the Supreme Court, and the President’s office at Rashtrapati Bhawan—remain unquantified, with the government yet to disclose the full extent of the destruction.
The aftermath of the protests saw the dissolution of the HoR and the swift formation of an interim government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki on September 12, 2025. As reported by The Rising Nepal, Karki’s administration, after expanding the cabinet twice to eight ministers, was tasked with a singular mandate: to conduct free, fair, and credible elections within six months. "The necessary procedures for holding the election will be carried out on time as per the newly approved schedule," EC spokesperson Narayan Prasad Bhattarai assured in a statement.
The EC’s roadmap is comprehensive. Political parties wishing to contest the elections must register with the Commission between November 17 and 26, 2025. Only those completing registration within this window will be eligible to participate. For the first-past-the-post system, election officers’ offices will be set up on January 16, 2026. Campaigning will be permitted from February 15 to March 2, after which a silent period will be enforced to ensure fairness. Voting itself is scheduled from 7:00 am to 5:00 pm on March 5, 2026, with immediate counting of ballots from both the first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems.
For the proportional representation system, election officers’ offices open on December 1, 2025, and parties must submit their closed lists on January 2 and 3, 2026. The EC has emphasized the need for cooperation with political parties and stakeholders, promising regular consultations throughout the process. The Commission also reminded parties that registration by November 16 is a legal requirement for participation in the March polls.
But the shadow of the Gen Z uprising looms large over these preparations. The violent protests left not only physical destruction but also a legacy of insecurity and distrust. According to 360info™, 486 police units were attacked and 1,247 arms looted. The Department of Prison Management revealed that 15,000 prisoners escaped from 28 prisons during the chaos; only half have returned, and some were apprehended as far away as New Delhi, India. Local communities have pitched in to restore some police posts, but the police face an uphill battle to regain public trust, given their inability to prevent widespread theft and looting.
Security coordination—or the lack thereof—was a glaring issue. Nepal’s three formal security wings (the police, the Nepal Armed Force, and the Nepal Army) struggled to act in concert. The police were proactive during the protests, but the Armed Force and Army were slow to respond, further eroding public confidence. The interim government now faces the dual challenge of restoring security and building trust across society.
To address the human rights violations and property losses, the government established a three-member commission led by former Justice Gauri Bahadur Karki. This commission is tasked with investigating abuses and documenting losses within three months. However, a statement from the home minister that the government "will not entertain any complaints of arson or theft, as the commission has already begun its work" has sparked controversy, as it sidelines the regular criminal justice process. Nepal’s history is littered with commissions—such as those after Jana Andolan-I and II—whose recommendations were never implemented, perpetuating a culture of impunity.
Meanwhile, voter enrollment has been opened for 90 days, a move designed to ensure that the youth who powered the Gen Z movement can participate in the upcoming election. Prime Minister Karki has held consultations with the EC, and political parties have been urged by the president to take part in the process. Yet, the parties themselves are under intense public and internal pressure to reform. There are widespread calls for leadership changes in the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and the CPN Maoist Center, as well as demands for a stronger democratic culture and greater inclusion of younger leaders.
The youth, however, remain divided on their political future. Some advocate for reforms within existing parties to tackle corruption and mismanagement, while others demand constitutional amendments, including the direct election of the prime minister. No formal agreement has been reached between youth groups and the government. A new youth coalition has emerged to negotiate with stakeholders, but the movement remains fragmented, with various groups organizing on platforms like Discord. Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah, who called for calm during the protests, has since maintained a conspicuous silence. In contrast, Dharan Sub-Metropolitan Mayor Harka Sampang has taken a more active role, applying to register a new party—the Shram Sanskriti Party—with Harka Bahadur Rai as coordinator. Shah, for his part, has yet to announce any new political formation.
The government’s response to the crisis has not been without controversy. Travel restrictions were imposed on five individuals, including former Prime Minister K. P. Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak—a move that provoked objections from the CPN-UML and raised fears of politically motivated investigations. If such actions are seen as targeting specific parties, the risk of further polarization and instability grows.
Through all this, Nepal’s interim government must navigate a precarious path. It must win the confidence of youth, political parties, and civil society, while restoring security and upholding the rule of law. As the country edges toward the March 2026 elections, the stakes could hardly be higher. The Gen Z uprising has fundamentally altered the political terrain, and all eyes are now on whether this new generation—and the leaders who emerge from its ranks—can steer Nepal toward a more inclusive and accountable future.
