On Tuesday, November 18, 2025, Britain’s domestic intelligence service MI5 issued a stark warning to the country’s lawmakers and government officials: Chinese spies are actively targeting the UK through professional networking platforms, most notably LinkedIn. The espionage alert, circulated by House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle, named two specific profiles—Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen—who, according to MI5, were fronts for China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) conducting covert recruitment operations.
Security Minister Dan Jarvis did not mince words when addressing Parliament. He described the operation as a “covert and calculated attempt by China to interfere with our sovereign affairs,” emphasizing that the government would not tolerate such brazen efforts. Jarvis added that the scope of the Chinese operation was broad, targeting not only MPs and their staff but also economists, think tank consultants, and government officials with access to sensitive information.
According to The Times and BBC, the modus operandi was both simple and insidious. Chinese intelligence officers, masquerading as headhunters, used LinkedIn to approach potential targets under the guise of offering lucrative freelance work—authoring geopolitical consultancy reports, for instance. MI5 assessed that these fake headhunter profiles were not just seeking one-off information but were laying the groundwork for long-term relationships that could be exploited for intelligence collection over time. “Officers use false personas on websites such as LinkedIn, which they use to spot and approach targets,” MI5 noted. “From the start, officers are particularly interested in ‘non-public’ and ‘insider’ insights as well as in understanding networks, to identify potential sources of information.”
One such approach involved Amanda Qiu, who claimed to represent BR-YR Executive Search. She reached out to James Price, a former Tory special adviser, offering a part-time consultancy role for a Chinese battery company, Power Glory Battery Tech (Shenzhen) Co, Ltd. In her message, Qiu wrote, “Hi James, Glad to friend you. It would be a pleasure to introduce an opportunities for academic/business collaboration. Currently we are searching for Think Tank Expert for PBG. It is a part-time job which won’t take much of your time. If you are interested we are happy to communicate in more details.” When Price inquired further, Qiu provided additional details about the company and its operations. Reflecting on the incident, Price told The Times, “It’s very worrying that the Chinese Communist Party have the resources and intent to try to engage even former special advisers, let alone MPs and senior civil servants. I hope the government is wise to the extreme threat the CCP represents and responds robustly.”
Another example involved Shirly Shen, who was linked to Internship Union in Hangzhou, China. Shen described herself as “a positive Asia girl” who would “welcome friends all over world join us to get a magic Chinese experience.” MI5 reported that Shen reached out to Labour MP Josh Simons, among others, offering opportunities that seemed benign but were, in fact, part of a larger intelligence-gathering operation.
MI5’s alert is not the first warning about Chinese espionage activities in the UK. Security Minister Jarvis cited a pattern of hostile activity, referencing Beijing-linked actors targeting parliamentary emails in 2021 and the case of Christine Lee in 2022, a London-based lawyer accused by MI5 of facilitating covert donations to British parties and legislators on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department.
The latest warning comes on the heels of a collapsed espionage case against two British men, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who were accused of spying for Beijing. Prosecutors abandoned the case, saying the government’s evidence lacked a “critical element”—specifically, the refusal to label China as an “enemy” or “national security threat,” which was necessary for prosecution under the Official Secrets Act 1911. This legal technicality has drawn criticism from across the political spectrum, with some accusing Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government of prioritizing diplomatic ties over national security.
In response to the growing threat, the UK government has announced a comprehensive Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan. This includes new powers for security officials, security briefings for political parties, and updated guidance for election candidates on how to recognize and report suspicious activity. The government is also working with professional networking sites to make it harder for foreign spies to operate, and new provisions in the Elections Bill will tighten rules on political donations.
Significant financial commitments have been made as well. The government has pledged £170 million to renew sovereign and encrypted technology used by civil servants, aiming to safeguard sensitive work from foreign intrusion. An additional £130 million will be directed toward projects that strengthen counter-terrorism policing and enhance the National Cyber Security Centre’s efforts to protect critical businesses and intellectual property.
Security Minister Jarvis also informed Parliament that the government has completed the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law from all sensitive British government sites worldwide. “As a country with a long and proud history of trading around the world, it’s in our interests to continue to seek an economic relationship with China, but this government will always challenge countries whenever they undermine our democratic way of life,” Jarvis declared.
The National Security Act now provides the government with the power to prosecute those engaging in espionage activity, including obtaining protected information, assisting a foreign intelligence service, and obtaining material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. The recently introduced Cyber Security and Resilience Bill aims to further protect organizations from cyber threats posed by hostile states like China.
Reactions from China have been swift and dismissive. A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in the UK called the MI5 warning “pure fabrication and malicious slander,” urging Britain to “immediately stop this self-staged charade of false accusations and self-aggrandisement, and stop going further down the wrong path of undermining China-UK relations.” The embassy has lodged stern representations with the UK government, maintaining that the allegations are unfounded and politically motivated.
The timing of these revelations is particularly significant, as the UK government faces a decision on whether to approve a new Chinese embassy site in London—a move already mired in controversy due to concerns over security implications. Shadow security minister Alicia Kearns has called for the government to refuse permission for the embassy and to cancel planned official visits to China, stating, “What message does it send when, despite an attack on this House and our Parliament, ministers are happily jetting off to stride down red carpets with the government responsible?”
As the UK grapples with this new front in the ongoing battle over foreign interference, the message from MI5 and Parliament is clear: vigilance is paramount, and the government is determined to confront covert threats head-on—even as diplomatic and economic ties with China remain under the microscope.
