On September 29, 2025, the European Commission found itself in the hot seat after reports surfaced of another shooting attack on an NGO migrant rescue boat, allegedly carried out by the EU-trained Libyan Coast Guard. When pressed for details, a commission spokesperson could only reiterate the importance of “respect for international law and international maritime law,” according to EUobserver. The spokesperson stopped short of confirming the incident, leaving many to wonder about the EU’s actual influence over the forces it has funded and trained in Libya.
This latest episode is just the tip of the iceberg in a saga that has come to define Europe’s struggle with irregular migration across the Mediterranean. Migration remains at the top of the political agenda in several European capitals, and it’s a key priority for Yvette Cooper, who took over as the UK’s foreign secretary earlier this month. Cooper’s move from the Home Office to the Foreign Office means she brings with her a domestic mandate to tackle irregular migration, now recast on the international stage. The UK government’s message is blunt: “smashing the gangs,” a phrase that’s become the government’s rallying cry as it introduces counter-terror style powers to identify and disrupt people-smuggling networks.
Few would argue against targeting organized criminal groups that profit from human misery. Yet, as the UK looks to European precedents—especially Italy’s approach—there are lessons and warnings in equal measure. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has suggested that Britain should learn from Italy, which has claimed success in reducing sea crossings. But the Italian model, especially its engagement in Libya, is fraught with complications that go far beyond numbers.
Italy’s deal with Libya dates back to 2017, when the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to combat illegal migration, human trafficking, and smuggling. The agreement included financial and technical support, allowing Italy—and, by extension, the European Union—to train and equip the Libyan Coast Guard and other security forces. The EU Trust Fund for Africa has also funneled resources into these efforts. According to figures cited by Chatham House, the results were initially dramatic: Mediterranean crossings from Libya to Italy plummeted from a peak of 162,895 in 2016 to just 12,977 in 2018.
But the story doesn’t end there. Despite the early success, the numbers have since crept up again. In 2024, there were 42,279 crossings from Libya to Italy, making up a staggering 81 percent of all arrivals in the country. So, while the deals may have curbed migration for a time, they haven’t solved the problem—and the political and human costs are mounting.
One of the most controversial episodes came in January 2025, when Osama Elmasry Njeem, a commander within a Libyan state-affiliated force, was arrested in Italy under a sealed International Criminal Court warrant for alleged crimes against humanity. The case took a bizarre turn when an Italian court released Njeem, citing a procedural error. He was then flown back to Libya on an Italian government plane, a move that sparked a political storm and prompted an investigation into the actions of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, later justified the release by referring to Njeem’s “social dangerousness.”
The diplomatic fallout didn’t stop there. Just six months later, Piantedosi traveled to Libya as part of a delegation that included EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner and Malta’s minister for home affairs. The group’s trip ended in public embarrassment when they were held in the VIP area of Benina airport in Benghazi. According to Chatham House, the incident appeared to be orchestrated by Khalifa Haftar, whose armed faction controls eastern Libya. Haftar reportedly demanded that the delegation meet with ministers from the eastern-based government—an entity the EU does not recognize. When the delegation refused, Haftar canceled the meeting and sent the officials packing.
These incidents highlight a sobering reality: Europe’s leverage over its Libyan counterparts is not what it once was. Italy, which once confidently transported a Libyan armed group commander out of the country, now finds its own ministers left stranded on the tarmac. The balance of power has shifted, and not in Europe’s favor.
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Libya has grown even more complex. Since March 2025, there has been a significant surge in irregular migration from eastern Libya, which is under Haftar’s control. The United Nations Panel of Experts and multiple investigative reports have singled out Haftar’s forces for their involvement in smuggling activities. In effect, the very actors Europe has tried to partner with—or at least contain—are now implicated in perpetuating the crisis.
The human toll is impossible to ignore. Just last week, a video released by the NGO Sea Rescue appeared to show soldiers throwing refugees into the open sea. The soldiers were reportedly wearing the uniforms of the 111th Brigade, which is under the control of the deputy defense minister of Libya’s Tripoli-based, EU-recognized government. As Chatham House notes, while these groups could be described as gangs, there has been little serious effort to “smash” them. Instead, European attempts to stem migration at the source have, in some cases, helped entrench the very forces that undermine peace and stability in Libya.
It’s a bitter irony—European strategies designed to curb migration have at times empowered the same state-affiliated groups that frustrate diplomatic progress and, in some cases, are complicit in human rights abuses. The European Commission, for its part, continues to emphasize the importance of international law, but its ability to enforce those principles appears increasingly limited. “Everyone must respect international law and international maritime law,” a commission spokesperson insisted on September 29, 2025, according to EUobserver. Yet, with each new incident, that call sounds more like a plea than a policy.
For the UK, which is now looking to continental models as it crafts its own migration policy, these developments serve as both a warning and a challenge. The slogan “smashing the gangs” may sound tough, but the reality on the ground is far messier. Organized criminal groups are not the only problem—state-affiliated forces, shifting alliances, and fragile diplomatic relationships all play a role in shaping the migration crisis.
As European governments grapple with the consequences of their partnerships in Libya and beyond, the stakes remain high for migrants, policymakers, and citizens alike. The numbers may fluctuate, but the complexity—and the urgency—of the Mediterranean migration crisis shows no sign of abating. For now, all eyes are on Brussels, Rome, London, and Tripoli, as the search for solutions continues in the shadow of controversy and tragedy.
