Since the November 2024 ceasefire, Lebanon has found itself at a historic crossroads, wrestling with mounting internal and external pressure to disarm Hezbollah—a force that has long shaped the country’s political, military, and social landscape. What’s at stake isn’t just the future of a single organization, but the very balance of power in Lebanon and, arguably, the wider region. The drama unfolding in Beirut and beyond is as much about geopolitics as it is about the livelihoods and fears of millions of Lebanese.
Hezbollah, once hailed by its supporters as the vanguard of Lebanese resistance, is now mired in crisis. According to Israel Hayom, the group is facing a perfect storm: military strikes from Israel, intensified U.S. sanctions, and a Lebanese government that, for the first time in decades, has openly demanded its disarmament. In August 2025, Lebanon’s government made the historic decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s military wing. Yet, as quickly as the ink dried on that declaration, Hezbollah publicly rejected it, and implementation now appears unlikely. The stakes are high—Lebanon is desperately seeking to free itself from Iranian domination and meet U.S. conditions for urgently needed economic aid, but the path forward is anything but clear.
Lebanon’s Prime Minister has dismissed Hezbollah’s long-standing formula of “the army, the people, the resistance,” attempting to tie disarmament to an Israeli withdrawal from five outposts still held in Lebanese territory. The Trump administration, however, has refused to play along, pushing instead for immediate disarmament—a move that has only deepened the standoff. Meanwhile, Israel has seized on Hezbollah’s current weakness, highlighted by the group’s conspicuous absence from Operation Rising Lion, a campaign in which Iran suffered a major setback.
The challenges for Hezbollah don’t end there. The assassination of its senior leadership, including the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, has strained its historically close ties with Tehran. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy leader, has been appointed as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon and has received symbolic gestures of support from Iran. Yet, as Israel Hayom notes, the personal dimension of the relationship has been disrupted, leaving Hezbollah in a prolonged period of recovery.
In a recent online address to a religious conference in Qom, Qassem tried to project confidence, describing Hezbollah as “a direct continuation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s ideology” and praising its ongoing fight against Israel. But actions speak louder than words: according to Israeli sources, Hezbollah has largely refrained from retaliating for Israeli strikes that have killed more than 130 of its operatives and destroyed key infrastructure. The Israel Defense Forces continue to maintain control over five strategic positions along the border, underscoring the group’s current limitations.
Despite these setbacks, Hezbollah’s support among Lebanon’s Shiite community remains robust. A 2024 poll cited by Israel Hayom found that 85% of Lebanese Shiites express strong trust in Hezbollah, a figure consistent with previous surveys. In the May 2025 municipal elections, Hezbollah strengthened its grip on Shiite-majority areas through political alliances, especially with the Amal movement. This loyalty is rooted in both ideology and economic dependence: with few alternatives and continued Iranian funding, most Shiites see little choice but to remain loyal. Shiites make up about 40% of Lebanon’s population, compared to Sunnis at around 30% and Christians at 25%.
Yet, as Tehran Times reports, the campaign to disarm Hezbollah is not just a local affair. In 2025, internal and international pressures for the group’s disarmament have reached new heights, with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun officially voicing the demand. While the plan is promoted as a way to strengthen state sovereignty and centralize national security, critics see a deeper strategy at play: weakening the so-called axis of resistance and paving the way for expanded Western and Israeli intervention.
Lebanon’s vulnerability is clear. The country has been battered by Israeli aggression, the assassination of Hezbollah commanders (including Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah), the destruction of infrastructure, and widespread devastation. Foreign interventions, a paralyzing financial crisis, and fragile state institutions have left Lebanon dangerously exposed. Accepting a “vague and dangerous plan” for Hezbollah’s disarmament, some warn, could lead to the country’s total collapse. Historical precedents from Iraq and Libya loom large—when those nations disbanded powerful militias and security forces, the result was chaos, the rise of extremist groups, and the practical disintegration of the state.
Hezbollah’s deterrent role since its 2006 victory in the 33-day war against Israel is central to its narrative. As Tehran Times observes, the group’s ability to halt the Israeli military and impose a new balance of power transformed it from a militia into a critical actor in Lebanon’s national security. For many, disarming Hezbollah now would eliminate Lebanon’s only robust deterrent against Israeli aggression—a move that, in their eyes, would leave the nation defenseless.
The disarmament debate is further complicated by Lebanon’s unique sectarian power-sharing system, its financial reliance on the West, and its fragile institutions. The U.S.-led negotiation model, according to Tehran Times, includes preconditions: a halt to Israeli attacks, Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s surrender of arms. But history suggests that negotiations under duress rarely lead to fair compromise. The pressures from Washington, Tel Aviv, and Persian Gulf Arab allies are seen by some as part of a broader political goal—to dominate Lebanon, eliminate resistance, and open the door to dependency and fragmentation.
One of the thorniest issues is the Lebanese army’s capacity to replace Hezbollah. The army faces limited resources and financial dependency, and nearly half of its forces are Shiite, many of whom sympathize with Hezbollah. Any serious attempt at disarmament could fracture the army itself, transforming it into an insecure and ineffective political force. Notably, Hezbollah has expressed willingness for dialogue since 2005 and has even considered integrating into the army, but it has never agreed to surrender its weapons.
Back in Lebanon, the massacre in Syria’s Sweida province has only reinforced Hezbollah’s determination to remain armed, fueled by fears of revenge from Sunnis and Christians. The group remains loyal to Iran and signals readiness to renew armed conflict with Israel, serving the interests of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which relies on Hezbollah as a key regional force. Yet, according to Israel Hayom, Iran appears to be avoiding public involvement in the dispute, wary that open support could further damage Hezbollah’s standing. This was evident in April 2024, when Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry issued a rare reprimand to Iran’s ambassador in Beirut for speaking out against Hezbollah’s disarmament.
What, then, is the way forward? Many analysts argue that only sustained U.S. economic and political investment, alongside continued Israeli efforts to block Hezbollah’s recovery, can weaken the group’s support among Shiites and diminish its military and political power. Some propose a long-term strategy to challenge Hezbollah’s extensive network of schools, welfare programs, religious institutions, and financial services by creating a rival infrastructure, backed by billions in American investment. The hope is that, over time, Shiite loyalty to Hezbollah can be eroded, bringing this crucial segment of the population under the Lebanese state’s authority.
For now, Lebanon’s future hangs in the balance. The country’s leaders and people must navigate a treacherous path between foreign pressure, internal division, and the specter of renewed conflict. The disarmament of Hezbollah is more than a policy debate—it’s a high-stakes gamble with the fate of a nation.
