As Iraq stands at the threshold of its parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11, 2025, the country finds itself navigating a labyrinth of regional volatility, internal divisions, and public skepticism. The stakes are high, with the outcome poised to shape Iraq’s political trajectory at what many observers describe as one of the Middle East’s most delicate moments in years, according to Kurdistan24 and the Associated Press.
The regional backdrop is fraught with uncertainty. A recently brokered ceasefire in Gaza has temporarily dampened fears of a broader regional war, yet the specter of renewed conflict between Israel and Iran still looms large. Iraq, which managed to stay largely on the sidelines during the brief but intense Israel-Iran war in June 2025, is now treading carefully, seeking to avoid becoming a battleground for its powerful neighbors’ proxy conflicts. This diplomatic balancing act has become a defining feature of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s tenure.
Al-Sudani, who came to office in 2022 with the backing of pro-Iran factions, is seeking a rare second term. His political survival hinges on his ability to maintain the delicate equilibrium between Tehran and Washington while navigating a domestic landscape marred by violence, corruption, and the enduring influence of armed militias. The November elections will determine whether he can consolidate his position or fall victim to the same political turbulence that has unseated many of his predecessors. Since 2003, only one Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has managed to serve more than one term, as noted by Baghdad University professor Ihsan al-Shammari in comments to the Associated Press.
The election itself is a massive undertaking, with 7,768 candidates—including 2,248 women—vying for 329 seats in the Council of Representatives. The contest features familiar power players from Iraq’s post-2003 political order: Shiite blocs led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and cleric Ammar al-Hakim, rival Sunni factions led by ex-parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi and current speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, and the Kurdish heavyweights—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Yet, perhaps more notable than who is running is who is not. The Sadrist Movement, led by the influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, is boycotting the election. Al-Sadr’s bloc won the most seats in the 2021 elections but withdrew from parliament after failed coalition negotiations, plunging the country into crisis. Banners in Sadr City, a Baghdad stronghold, reflect the mood: "We are all boycotting upon orders from leader al-Sadr. No to America, no to Israel, no to corruption." The Victory Alliance, led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, is also sitting out, citing corruption as the reason.
Meanwhile, reformist and independent groups that emerged from the youth-led anti-government protests of 2019 are participating but remain hampered by internal divisions, scarce resources, and the absence of a unified support structure. Their struggle to break the dominance of Iraq’s established parties underscores the difficulties of translating street activism into electoral success.
Corruption and vote-buying have cast a long shadow over the campaign. Political analyst Bassem al-Qazwini characterized these elections as "the most exploited since 2003 in terms of political money and state resources," according to the Associated Press. A campaign official, speaking anonymously, claimed that "almost all candidates, including major blocs, are distributing money and buying voter cards," with some cards fetching up to 300,000 Iraqi dinars—about $200. The Independent High Electoral Commission has responded by pledging strict monitoring of campaign spending and warning that any candidate found guilty of violations will be "immediately disqualified."
The campaign has also been marred by violence. On October 15, Safaa al-Mashhadani, a Sunni candidate and member of the Baghdad Provincial Council, was assassinated by a car bomb in the al-Tarmiya district. Authorities have since arrested two suspects, with the First Karkh Investigative Court linking the crime to electoral competition. Aisha Ghazal Al-Masari, a parliament member from the Sovereignty Alliance, described the killing as "a cowardly crime reminiscent of the dark days of assassinations" that followed the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
A central and unsettling feature of this election is the overt participation of political parties directly linked to Iran-backed militias. Groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, through its Harakat Huqouq political bloc, and the Sadiqoun Bloc of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, are leveraging their military and financial clout to vie for parliamentary power. Though the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—the umbrella under which these militias operate—were formally placed under Iraqi military control in 2016, many factions continue to act with significant autonomy and align closely with Tehran’s interests.
Prime Minister al-Sudani has defended the right of these groups to participate, stating, "We cannot prevent any group from engaging in politics if they renounce arms. This is a step in the right direction." However, the reality remains that several militia-affiliated parties still possess considerable firepower, a situation that has drawn concern from Washington. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently pressed al-Sudani on "the urgency in disarming Iran-backed militias that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty, threaten the lives and businesses of Americans and Iraqis, and pilfer Iraqi resources for Iran," according to a U.S. State Department statement.
Despite the turbulence, there are glimmers of optimism. Recent polling by Al-Mustakella Research Group, affiliated with Gallup International, shows that for the first time since 2004, more than half of Iraqis believe the country is moving in the right direction. In early 2025, 55% of those surveyed said they had confidence in the central government. Al-Sudani’s pragmatic, service-oriented campaign—emphasizing improvements in public utilities and infrastructure—appears to resonate with some voters tired of ideological battles.
Still, skepticism runs deep. Years of unmet promises on basic services have left many Iraqis cynical about the electoral process. Saif Ali, a Baghdad resident, summed up his frustration: "What happened with regards to electricity from 2003 until now? Nothing. What happened with water? Drought has reached Baghdad. These are the basic services, and they are not available, so what is the point of elections?"
As the November 11 vote approaches, Iraq faces a test of its fragile democracy. The outcome will hinge not just on ballots cast, but on the ability of its leaders to address corruption, curb violence, and navigate the pressures of powerful neighbors and militias. For many, the hope is simply for a government that delivers on its promises—a hope that, after years of disappointment, remains as delicate as the moment itself.
