In the aftermath of Iraq’s November 2025 parliamentary elections, the country stands at a political crossroads, marked by shifting alliances, minority maneuvering, and a new era of bargaining rather than dominance. The final results, released by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), have redrawn the parliamentary map and upended the familiar rhythms of government formation, setting the stage for a complex and potentially fraught negotiation process.
According to Shafaq News, the IHEC confirmed that Shiite parties now hold 187 seats, Sunnis have climbed to 77, and Kurds secured 56 out of the 329 total seats in parliament. This new arithmetic has stripped the Shiite blocs of the dominance they once enjoyed, forcing them to seek consensus with Sunni and Kurdish groups for the selection of the president, parliament speaker, and prime minister. Legal expert Salem Hawas described the new balance as a “game-changer,” noting that Sunnis and Kurds together now wield a “guarantee and veto” over all three presidencies and even over the Coordination Framework (CF), the largest Shiite bloc.
“Shiite blocs can no longer act alone and must now seek consensus with other components,” Hawas told Shafaq News, underscoring the need to navigate Sunni, Kurdish, and Shiite demands simultaneously at every step. Political scientist Haitham al-Heeti echoed this sentiment, explaining, “The election results do not grant any side a sweeping mandate.” He warned that the next government would require broad bargaining, as “al-Sudani will need to align with many smaller groups with differing agendas.”
The presidency, traditionally held by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), is far from a mere symbol in Kurdish politics. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) continues to challenge this claim, keeping the rivalry alive. Within the Kurdistan Region itself, the KDP controls the region’s presidency and the prime minister’s office, while the PUK holds the Iraqi presidency and the deputy premiership in the region. The fight over Baghdad’s presidency is thus not only a national contest but also a negotiation shaped by Kurdish internal politics. According to Shafaq News, the presidency requires two-thirds of parliament in the first round, a threshold nearly impossible to reach without multi-component consensus. If no candidate achieves this, the process moves to a second round, where competition intensifies and repeated failed sessions could force Kurdish parties to compromise or risk losing the post to a consensus candidate backed by non-Kurdish blocs.
The speakership, which traditionally belongs to the Sunni component, has become the center of an increasingly tense contest. Sunni blocs have attempted to consolidate their weight by forming the National Political Council (NPC), an umbrella meant to unify major Sunni players. Yet, as Shafaq News points out, the appearance of unity has not erased long-standing rivalries. The Taqaddum Party, led by former Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi, emerged as the largest Sunni bloc with 27 deputies and is pushing aggressively to reclaim the speakership. However, not all Sunni blocs support this, and the Al-Azm Party, with 15 seats, remains a major obstacle. The speakership requires an absolute majority of 165 votes, and in a fragmented assembly, failing to secure this could delay the first parliamentary session or force last-minute compromises.
Meanwhile, the most consequential battle is unfolding within the Shiite arena, where the Coordination Framework (CF) holds 187 seats but is internally divided. The bloc is split between supporters of a second term for caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and those pushing for the return of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, who enjoys strong backing from Iran. Al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition holds 46 seats, Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition has 29, and other Shiite factions hold smaller numbers. According to Shafaq News, none of these forces can push a candidate through without negotiating with the others, and the deadlock inside the CF has turned the process into the most critical obstacle in forming the next government.
Overlaying this internal struggle is the broader geopolitical competition between the United States and Iran, both of whom have strong interests in who becomes Iraq’s next prime minister. If Sunnis or Kurds reject the CF’s nominee, they can delay the parliamentary session, preventing a vote of confidence and depriving the PM-designate of legitimacy. This dynamic opens the door for negotiations over key ministries, budget guarantees, federal–regional arrangements, and security portfolios.
The specter of past paralysis looms large. In 2022, prolonged deadlock led to the formation of the State Administration Coalition (SAC), a grand bargain in which all components agreed on Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as prime minister and divided ministerial portfolios among themselves. Analysts interviewed by Shafaq News see a similar scenario as a possible outcome if the current impasse persists.
The fragmentation of power is also evident in the minority representation. On November 24, 2025, newly elected lawmaker Kaldo Oghanna announced plans with two other Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian candidates to form a single parliamentary bloc, a move that could reshape the Christian minority’s presence in Baghdad’s political landscape. As reported by Rudaw, the three candidates—Oghanna, Sami Oshana, and Imad Youkhanna—ran as independents and collectively received around 60,000 votes, with strong support from sympathizers and civil servants linked to the KDP. This development has fueled speculation that the new bloc may lean toward Kurdish political priorities or challenge dominant Shia factions.
The Christian quota has five seats in parliament; the other two were won by Ivan Faiq Jabro and Aswan Kaldani, both affiliated with the Babylon Movement, a group criticized for its closeness to Shia power centers and led by US-sanctioned Rayan al-Kildani. The Babylon Movement’s dominance in previous years has waned, with al-Kildani’s militia, Brigade 50 of the Popular Mobilization Forces, weakened after losing the 13th Regiment in October 2025.
Oghanna, speaking to Rudaw, insisted, “Our goal is coordinated work for our people.” The bloc intends to seek the ministerial portfolio traditionally allocated to the Christian quota, aiming for a service ministry that can deliver tangible benefits across federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Yet, as the Beth Nahrain Patriotic Union (HBA) argued in a sharply worded statement, the minority quota system remains vulnerable to outside manipulation. The HBA accused major blocs of “injecting votes” from non-Christian voters, calling the practice sabotage of authentic community representation and a violation of democratic principles. The party called for reform, proposing that only a special registry of Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian voters should be allowed to vote for the Christian quota seats.
Despite these challenges, the formation of a unified Christian bloc carries the potential to revive long-dormant national goals, including the creation of a Nineveh Plains Governorate with the right to develop into an autonomous region. The 2017 Brussels Conference position paper, cited by several Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian parties, outlines a vision for self-administration, self-defense, and reconstruction in the Nineveh Plains—a vision that remains unfulfilled but could gain new momentum in the current parliament.
Amid this landscape of intersecting demands and shifting alliances, Iraq’s political future hangs in the balance. Every bloc—Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish—holds enough seats to block decisions but not enough to impose its own. As parties negotiate outward and inward, the process of forming a government has become a test of endurance, compromise, and, perhaps above all, imagination.
The coming weeks will reveal whether Iraq’s leaders can navigate this maze of interests and forge a government that reflects the country’s diversity and aspirations—or whether the nation will once again find itself mired in the paralysis of political deadlock.
